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All these things

in its own Exercife, and endeavours to augment its Happiness by the pursuit of fuch things as are repugnant to them. The more Difficulties and Abfurdities it encounters, the more it applauds itself in a consciousness of its own Abilities; which feems to be the very thing that we call Vanity and Pride. Hereupon it compels the Senfes, Reason, and natural Appetites, to be fubfervient to its Elections: nor can he be call'd a Madman who acts against Reason, thro' the force of a fuperior Faculty, any more than he that falls from a Precipice by the violence of a greater impulfe. For it is not every one who acts against reason, that muft immediately be looked upon as Mad, but only he that acts abfurdly from fome injury done to the understanding Faculty itself, or an Impediment to the Use of Reafon: he that could have followed the dictate of Reason and yet knowingly violated it, must not be reckoned mad, but wicked, unless we will impofe upon ourselves by changing the customary Names of things.

XXI. If it be granted that we have this fuperior cannot be Faculty, 'tis plain enough that all these things may explained come to pafs. For he that is endowed with it, will otherwise be able to please himself in the Profecution of his than by Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and admitting Mind; to the prejudice of Senfes, Appetites and aPrinciple Reason; which we often fee done to our Amazement; but unless we have this Faculty imparted to us, it does not feem poffible for us to create Good to ourselves by Election, and to prefer what is thus created to every natural Good.

of this

kind.

As much good arifes

from this Principle,

XXII. These things, I confefs, ought not to be done; but if nothing could be done which ought not, there would be no fuch thing as a Fault. As therefore much Good arifes from this Principle, fo tended there is this Evil also, that by it Crimes and Follies with this are committed: And it has this Inconvenience, that Evil, viz. it can do what it ought not.

fo it is at

a Power

of finning.

XXIII.

the Will

the

Under

that it is

out con

XXIII. From these and other Arguments which This mifmight be brought, I think it is evident that God has take, that given us a Principle of this kind, and that our Will follows is only determined by itself. They are mistaken the Judgtherefore who affirm that either the Appetites, Paffi- ment of ons, or Understanding, determine Elections. What probably gave occafion to the Miftake was, that other standing, things please or displease us, befide what we choose, arose from viz. fuch as are agreeable to the Appetites or Senfes. hence, Now it being obferved that we have regard to thefe viz in Elections, and do not choose any thing repugnant imprudent to them, but upon neceffity, and that all Men are of in us to Opinion, that the Judgment of the Understanding act withought to be made ufe of in choofing, and being ac- fulting the customed to this kind of Choice, we become at laft Underperfuaded that it is abfolutely neceffary, and that our ftanding. Wills are always determined by fome Judgment of the Understanding: at least, that it is a Condition. requifite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing chofen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the contrary to all this is generally true, viz. that the Mind judges things to be good because we have willed them, because we have formed an Appetite in ourselves by some antecedent Election, and those things which we embrace by this factitious Appetite, as we may call it, give us equal Pleasure with that which we defire by the Neceffity of Nature.

fhew our

XXIV. Nay, we choose Objects which are con- We can trary to all the Appetites, contrary to Reason, and act in ordeftitute of all Appearance of Good, perhaps for this der to only Reason, that we may affert our Liberty of Elec- Liberty, tion. 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and which is he that does it, proves by an Experiment that he is proved to free, and has a Power of pleafing himself in Election. be the Nor can he be faid to be determined by the Judg- acting ment of the Understanding; for this reafon is made without by the Mind itself, and may ferve equally for every any reason Election, fince it is drawn from the Indifference of at all.

the

fame as

the Will itself: and he who does any thing upon a reafon which is made by himself, and is indifferent to either Side, must be esteemed to act in the fame manner as if he had done it without any reafon at all. 'Tis evident therefore that we have this Power, and make use of the Appetites and Senfes only as Spies and Informers; of Reason as a Counsellor; but that the Will is Master of itself, and creates pleafure for itself in Objects by Election. (58.)

NOTES.

SECT.

(58.) Upon the whole it appears that the true defcription of Free-will muft include thus much. A Power of choofing or not choofing, or of choofing either Side in any given Cafe; naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external or internal force, compulfion, influence or neceffity; phyfically determined by either bodily Senfations, Appetites, &c. or mental Perceptions, Reafon, Judgment. 'Tis an Ability of determining either among equal and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the purfuit of fome before others that are entirely different from or contrary to them; or lailly, of preferring the very confideration of fome unknown Objects to all the rest'; of deliberating upon, or attending to fome particular Ideas, and refolving to overlook others, though equally prefented to the Mind, and fuppofed to be of equal Importance.

All this is contained in the very Notion of a Self-moving Power; (though none perhaps have given fo full and diftinct an Explication of it as our Author) for that which in ftrictness moves itself, is properly and phyfically independent of, and indifferent to all external Movers, as long as it continues to do fo; what is determined in certain circumftances by or according to particular Senfations, Motives, &c. and cannot poffibly be determined either without or against them, is fo far, and in fuch circumstances, only moved, acted upon, and purely paffive. If then there be any fuch thing, properly speaking, as an active Principle, it must be endowed with fuch an abfolute Indifference as our Author fuppofes: and when we fpeak of the frongest Motives, we don't mean fuch as have the greateft phyfical Influence or Weight in turning the ballance of the Will (fince we fuppofe none of them to have any at all) but only fuch as the Mind most commonly determines itself upon in fact; and to argue from fuch determinations that thefe Motives must have fuch an Influence both abfolutely and comparatively, i. e. whether taken by themselves, or in oppofition to each other, is manifeftly to beg the Question, and fill to fuppofe that it cannot move or direct itself, notwithstanding our moft evident perception and experience of the contrary. And that

SECT. II.

Where it is fheon that Happiness confifts in

I. FROM

Elections.

ROM what has been faid above, it appears The more that a Being endowed with a Power of free any Being is, choosing is more excellent and perfect than one the lefs he that is without it; For that which neither acts is expofed

66

- NOTES.

non to Motions

without, and meets

nience.

we have fuch experience, a little reflection on ourselves will from convince us. "I think (fays Mr. Colliber,) I may appeal "to any confidering Man, whether he be not in all ordinary with lefs "Cafes fenfible of an ability of darting his thoughts upon any inconveparticular Object, even antecedently to any deliberation, " and then, whether after deliberation about particular Objects " he cannot resume his deliberation, and fometimes vary his "Judgment; and whether, after the cleareft Judgment, and "most deliberate Choice of particular things or actions, he be "not ftill conscious of a power of fufpending his practice, of refuming the confideration of the Objects whenever he plea❝fes, or of immediately choofing or practifing the contrary, "without being determined by impreffions from without, or "impediments from within. But we have no clearer proof " of our own Existence than Confciousness and I conceive we "need not expect greater Evidence of any thing than we have “ of our Existence.”*

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If then our Mind has fuch a power of selecting fome particular Ideas out of many perceived by the Understanding, and attending to them alone without any previous apprehension of their nature and tendency, without any special Reason, Motive or Inducement whatsoever to fuch particular Choice; if the Mind, I fay, does in fome Cafes exert fuch a power as this, then it is in these Cases abfolutely free. It cannot here be directed by the Judgment, fince it is fuppofed to act independently of it: nay it may be properly faid fometimes to influence and direct, or rather to obstruct and fubvert the Judgment itfelf, for as much as it confines that to fome particular Objects only, and of consequence renders it partial, and precipitates it in the Choice of these and withdraws others from it, which

were

*Impartial Enquiry, & P. 42,43. See also an Essay on Conf ciousness, p. 205, &c.

nor is acted upon, is the farthest from Perfection, fince it is of no more use in Nature than if it were

NOTES.

nothing

were abfolutely neceffary to a compleat View of the Subject, and an exact determination about it. Hence the fpring of all Errors, at leaft all criminal ones, hence vitious, abfurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe. From the fame Power alfo duly apply'd proceeds the happy consciousness of Defert, and in it is entirely founded all the Reason of Reward. It's usefulnefs then, and neceffity, appear both for the establishment of Morality, the ground of all rational Happiness; and also, that we might always have wherein to please ourselves, which (as) our Author has fhewn in the latter end of Subfect. 4.) otherwife we very often could not. Hence it appears I think fufficiently, that this Power is one of our greatest Perfections, tho' (like all other Perfections that come fhort of Infinity) it be liable to the greatest abuse, and so capable of being turned into the worst of Imperfections.

It remains to be enquired with our Author, whether all the Happiness arifing from it counterballances the Mifery, and confequently, whether we and all other rational Creatures might not have been as well or better without it. But for this fee § 2. and 5.

We shall here only add a Word or two in vindication of this Principle against the three principal Oppofers of Liberty abovementioned. In the first place then, we don't affert that by this Power the Mind can choose Evil as Evil, or refufe Good as Good, i. e. that the former, as fuch, is or can be a Motive for Choice, or the latter for refusal : But we say that it can choose the one and refuse the other without any particular Motive at all; (i. e. any drawn from the particular nature of the Object chofen,) nay, in oppofition to the strongest Motive (viz. that Motive which prefents the greateft Happinefs, and which it ufually does, and always ought to follow) purely by the force of its free, active or felf moving Power.

You'll fay it does this to prove it's own Power, and the pleasure attending fuch proof is the ftrongest Motive in these Cafes. I anfwer, that granting this to be fo (which yet is not very probable, as appears from what was obferved from the Effay on Confcioufness in Note 45.) yet this, as our Author obferves, must be a Motive of its own creating, which, with refpect to Volition, is the fame as none at all. Nay this is the very thing we are endeavouring to prove, viz. that the Soul has a Power of determining to think or act, and of pleasing itfelf in fuch determination, without any other Motive or Reafon

See Jackson's Vindication of human Liberty, p. 49, &c. or. the beginning of E. Strutt's Defence of Dr. Clarke's Notion, &c.

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