of God is the beginning of wisdom,' is equivalent to this, A just notion and conception of God is the beginning of wisdom.

Having deduced this exposition from the order and nature of things in themselves, let us try the other method, which is more familiar, and see whether we can come to any exposition of these words, which will not lead to the same thing.

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom :' we are to consider what is meant by the fear of the Lord.' The reason of the inquiry is evidently this, that we experience in ourselves different kinds and degrees of fear, which have very different effects and operations: some stupify the senses, and rob us of all wisdom and understanding others render us active and industrious, and give an edge to our invention how to shun and avoid the thing we fear. Of what sort then is the fear of the Lord? Is it an abject slavish fear? No, certainly all expositors agree to warn you against this sense and interpretation of fear. But were you to ask the reason why the fear of God is not a slavish fear, there is only this reason to be given you, because God is no tyrant; and I suppose every man of sense will admit this for a good reason: and what else is this but adjusting the sense of fear from the true notion and conception of God? The properties of religious fear, which are mentioned in Scripture, are various: The fear of the Lord is clean,' says the Psalmist: The fear of the Lord is to hate evil,' says Solomon; and again, It is a fountain of life;' and again, In the fear of the Lord is strong confidence.' Try all these in the same way, and you will find they are deducible only from the notion and conception of God, and are not to be understood without it. The fear of God therefore is not to be expounded from the nature of fear, considered as a distinct passion of the mind; but by considering the natural effect that a just sense and notion of God has on the mind of a rational creature for the fear of God signifies that frame and affection of soul which is the consequence of a just notion and conception of the Deity. It is called the fear of God, because as majesty and power are the principal parts of the idea of God, so fear and reverence are the main ingredients in the affection that arises from it; not but that love and honor and admiration are included in the notion.

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And in this latitude the wise king most certainly understood it, when he said, ' In the fear of the Lord is strong confidence :' for confidence is no effect of fear, properly so called; but it is a natural effect of a just sense of the Almighty's power and goodness.

There is but one thing that occurs to me that seems to look like a difficulty in this way of arguing, which is this: if the fear of God denotes that sense and affection of mind which is the natural effect of a true notion and conception of God, it should seem that none should be void of the fear of God, but those only who want right notions of God; and yet we know there are sinners against knowlege, who discover no fear of God, though they can discourse as rationally as others on his > attributes and perfections. There are two ways by which men may discover that they have a sense of the fear of God: one indeed is by acting agreeably to it but there is another, which is by conscience: self-condemnation, for acting contrary to the fear of God, is an evident token of the sense of that fear. But if there are any instances where neither of these signs are discoverable, there is a farther account to be given; for it is not merely the speculative notions of God which produce this sense, but there must be a persuasion also that there is a real Being to whom these ideas actually belong without this the notion is idle and fruitless: we may raise in our fancies very terrible objects; but they produce little or no effect, as long as we contemplate them as the mere creatures of our imagination. In like manner the notion of a God may cause little change in the fool's heart, which says there is no God. And though I am far from thinking that there are many atheists in the world, yet there is in many a heart a secret lurking infidelity, or rather a want of a due belief and persuasion of the reality of the things invisible; which makes religion appear so cold and formal, so void of life and activity. Where this is the case, there wants a just conception of God; and no wonder there should want also a due sense of the fear of the Lord. But let us proceed to the second thing, which was to show,

That this just conception of God is the right rule to form our judgments by in matters of religion, and the only thing that can secure us from either atheism or superstition.

Hitherto we have considered the true meaning of the fear of God. We are now to consider what is affirmed of it: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom;' taking wisdom here to mean true religion, as it often does in the books of Solomon and in the Psalms of David. When it is said that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,' you are not to understand merely that the notion of God is, in point of time, or order of nature, prior to religion; which, though it be true, yet is it not the whole of what is taught concerning the fear of God. All religion, indeed, has a relation to God; and therefore without the sense and notion of a Deity there can be no religion: but there is religion which is folly and superstition, that better suits with any name than that of wisdom: and therefore, if the fear of God does only in general show us the necessity of religion, and does then leave us to take our chance in the great variety of forms and institutions that are to be found in the world, it may be our hap to learn folly as well as wisdom, on the instigation of this principle. But in truth, the fear of God does not only show us the necessity of religion, but likewise teaches us wherein true religion, which is indeed wisdom, does consist; and enables us to judge of our offering, whether it be fit to be laid before the Almighty.

In natural religion this is evidently the case; because in that state there is no pretence to any other rule that can come in competition with this. It is from the notion of a God that men come to have any sense of religion; and it is by the same principle only that they determine this to be a proper part of religion, that to be otherwise. When we consider God as Lord and Governor of the world, we soon perceive ourselves to be in subjection, and that we stand obliged, both in interest and duty, to pay obedience to the Supreme. But what is this obedience? and in what acts does it consist? For this we must recur to our natural notion of God. If we conceive him to be holy, pure, and just, we must necessarily judge that he will be pleased with no service but what is agreeable to holiness, purity, and justice if we conceive him to be a Being good and merciful, a common Father to mankind, whose love is without partiality, and equal to all his creatures, we must, on this view, conclude that religion binds us not to be hurtful or injurious to any of the

sons of men; because it is a contradiction to think that we are bound to serve and obey God, and yet at liberty to injure and abuse those whom he most affectionately loves. Mutual love and benevolence may be a moral duty, arising from the relation of man to man, on mere principles of reason, exclusive of religion; but it becomes part of our religion from such consideration of God's nature as I have just now mentioned. Take from the notion of God any of the moral perfections that belong to it, and you will find such alteration must influence religion likewise, which will degenerate in the same proportion as the notion of God is corrupted. The superstitious man, viewing God through the false perspectives of fear and suspicion, loses sight of his goodness, and sees only a dreadful spectre made up of anger and revenge; hence religion becomes his torment, and he thinks the worse he uses himself, the more he shall please God; and the best service he can pay, is that which renders him most miserable.

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There are other kinds of superstition, which, though they have less of torment and anguish, have not more of reason or religion such are they which have turned religion into a trade, and found something to offer God in exchange for virtue and holiness. In all these cases the spring is corrupted, the notion of God is lost, or not attended to: what notion has that man of God, who thinks that washing his hands three or four times a day is a part of religion; who imagines that penances and pilgrimages, or any thing else, is equivalent to virtue and holiness? Search your notion of God; consider his holiness and purity, and see what you can find to make you think that beating yourself, or washing yourself, or parting with your money, will please him like virtue and holiness. These must appear to be absurd follies to any man who will attend to this principle. In the heathen world, some happily discovered some glimmerings of the true holiness and perfections of God, and were to maintain virtue on the foot of religion: others perhaps were much better men than their principles of religion led them to be. The natural sense of good and evil, and the relation of man to man, led some generous spirits into the right way. But in this case goodness was not the effect of religion, but of a

rational nature: it was a political or sociable virtue, but not a religious one.

It is plain then, both from reason and fact, that a just conception and sense of God is the beginning of wisdom, the fountain from which true religion flows: by this it is that you may distinguish between true and false religion, since that only is true religion which is agreeable to the nature of God. God

is a spirit,' says our blessed Lord, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.' Here you are referred to the same principle, and by the best authority: you see here our Lord himself inferring the nature of worship from the nature of God.

This may be true, perhaps you will say, on the foot of natural religion, where we have nothing but natural notions to direct us but what is it to us, who have the surer word of prophecy to guide and instruct us? In answer to this I would observe that natural religion is the foundation on which revelation stands; and therefore revelation can never supersede natural religion without destroying itself. The knowlege of God is, in the nature of things, antecedent to revelation; for there can be no reason for attending to the voice of God till we know who God is. The natural notion of God then is the foundation of revelation, as well as of natural religion; and consequently, nothing contrary to this notion can be admitted for revelation, any more than for natural religion.

There is indeed a difference, which ought always to be remembered, and for want of which some have imagined they have discovered great opposition between natural religion and revelation, where in truth there is none. The difference is this: in natural religion nothing can be admitted that may not be proved and deduced from our natural notions; for every thing must be admitted for some reason; and in natural religion no reason can take place, but this agreeableness of the thing to our natural sense but in revelation it is otherwise for revelation introduces a new reason, the will of God, which has, and ought to have, the authority of a law with us. Nor is it plain, from enlarge our duty, or

any natural principle, that God cannot

oblige us to any thing but what nature has already obliged us