THE

LITERARY PANORAMA.

FOR MARCH, 1807.

Thoughts on the Minister's Financial Proposition for pledging the War Taxes for Fourteen Years, in a revolving Series, in order to avoid the further Imposition of Taxes, for the next Three Years founded upon sundry demi-official Papers, printed by Authority, but not published for general Sale: 1. STATEMENTS OF A PLAN OP FINANCE PROPOSED TO PARLIAMENT, IN THE

YEAR, 1807, pp. 22: 2.-TABLES AND

CALCULATIONS RESPECTING THE PLAN
OF FINANCE PROPOSED TO PARLIAMENT

IN 1807. Leaves about sixty.-3. Fi-
NANCE, 1807, One Sheet.

BRITAIN exhibits an uncommon spectacle among the nations of the earth. Most kingdoms have been considered as the property of the King, and, according to his frugality, or expenditure, they have been deemed rich, or poor. But, in this government the nation, as to its finances, is distinct from its sovereign; who, although he appoints the officers of finance, yet is only nominally interested in the amount of the revenue, the rise and fall of the public securities, the produce of the imposts, or the ways and means of providing for the expenses of the community. The crown receives a fixed appointment, and whether the taxes are more or less efficient, this appointment feels neither increase nor diminution. The monarchies of antiquity, therefore, offer no comparison from which any deduction affecting this kingdom can be drawn. The Emperors of Rome might squander the revenues of the state, on their unlawful pleasures, while their creditors were suffering for want of payment: they were despots; and, but too often their creditors felt their despotism.

Of the trading states of antiquity we know but little; and of the principal of VOL. I. Lit. Pan. March 1807.]

| them, Carthage, what we do know is most assuredly transmitted to us greatly perverted by rivalship and jealousy. If the Carthaginian historians had happily survived the destruction of their city, we might have derived assistance from the conduct of that people under those financial difficulties which wars never fail to produce, after a certain continuance. But Carthage fails of complete resemblance to Britain, inasmuch as it was not a state of extensive landed territory: it became rich by commerce: by receiving commodities at one time and place, and delivering them at another time and place, with a certain increase of price attached to them. The dominion of this city produced little for staple manufacture; little which industry had improved; and though it affected to grasp the dominion of the sea, yet its sailors were hardly to be called Cartha ginians, and its soldiers were auxiliaries or hirelings, not natives fighting for their country. We are not able, then, to characterise the patriotism of the nations. of antiquity: nor to ascertain either the plans of their rulers, or the privations to which individuals willingly submitted, to relieve the state from its embarrassments.

That a few military heroes devoted themselves in the course of their profession, though striking as examples, yet does not enable us to determine the general patriotism of the population: neither are we certain, that these ardent minds themselves, could have supported the prolonged inconveniencies which year after year, it has fallen to the lot of modern states to experience, and of the community of this

nation to endure.

We may, therefore, without assuming too much, consider our own times as equal to others, in spite of that degeneracy which some feel so much delight in attributing to them; and our population as not less patriotic, in th true sense of the word patriotism, thay 2 P

their cessation, but, by providing a small overplus above the taxes absolutely necessary to pay the interest of the incumbrance, and applying this overplus to the redemption of a portion of the principal. This operation was silent, but efficient; it gave no alarm; no man was obliged to part with his property; he might continue to hold his stock, if he pleased; but, if he would not sell, his neighbour would; and it mattered not to the public from whom the stock was redeemed. The effect of one per cent. acting at compound interest, was adequate to the redemption of the whole hundred pounds in somewhat more than forty years.

This was the first efficient effort toward the redemption of the national debt: not that the attempt had not been devised, and that something of an undertaking intending the same thing had not been instituted; but this, very unwisely, in a financial point of view, had been interrupted by Sir Robert Walpole; and whatever good it was capable of producing, had vanished, in consequence of the desecration the fund had suffered from the violent hands of the minister, and by perversion from its purpose.

The way was thus opened, by Mr. Pitt, to the solution of the problem,-if one per cent. will redeem its capital in about forty five years, in how many years will five per cent. redeem its capital? As this is a mere operation of figures, there needs no great intricacy of calculation to inform us, that this may be accomplished in about fourteen years. Supposing then, our expenses to continue at their present rate for fourteen years, to what fund shall we look for 1. their security, and 2. their redemption? These two ideas must never be lost sight of: 1. what fund shall we pledge for the payment of five per cent. interest on the money borrowed? 2. Will the same fund, or any other, afford another five per cent, in order to redeem the capital itself in fourteen years?

Both these accommodations the minister found in the system of war taxes; instituted by his predecessor, and making considerable advances yearly toward that immense sum which they now produce. Whether Mr. Pitt had this result in view from the very first, is more than we can say; but there is nothing impossible in the supposition, that he who had con、ceived the idea of paying off the capital in

| forty years, had calculated the same scheme at thirty years, and at twenty; why not then at fourteen, since five per cent. the proportion required, is the legal interest of money in this country, and, consequently, presents itself to the mind with somewhat of a prominent aspect.

The proposition, as our readers will perceive, combines the two ideas hinted at above, 1. that of paying legal interest, five per cent. for money borrowed: 2. that of forming a purchasing fund of five per cent. acting with compound interest, for the redemption of the capital. The minister, therefore, takes ten per cent. proportioned to the capital borrowed, and this effects his purpose. By what degrees, or on what calculation this purpose is effected, the reader will find in the tables annexed to this discussion.

But there are two considerations arising from this measure, which are submitted to the reflection of those whom they concern. The first is, that the war taxes were imposed under the pledge of Parliamentary faith, that they should last no longer than the war: the second is, whether the imposts which furnish these taxes are laid upon articles that ought to be burthened in this non-terminating manner.

If the proposition were absolute, to collect these taxes with inflexible rigour, during the specific period of fourteen years, this might be taken as a departure from parliamentary faith: but we conceive that the minister's proposal includes the alternative; and is conditional, if the war shall so long last. Such, at least, is the inference we draw from language like the following, which is transcribed from the Statement mentioned in the title to this article. The same sentiment may be seen in the paper annexed.

This part of the calculations is framed on the supposition of the continuance of the war for the whole fourteen years. If peace should be sooner re-established, other arrangements may easily be made, by which the portions of war taxes so pledged may be released at earlier periods; and the part not pledged will of course immediately be liberated on the return of peace.

If then the war should termingle in two years, the minister would be bound to substitute other taxes, such as would best suit a state of peace, for those imposed to support the war: and that this would be in his power, as to every desirable purpose

consequently does not enhance the price of the goods?

The Tonnage duties laid on vessels car

cessary to be invested in the purchase and outfitting of ships: they render this commodity dearer: will it be wise to continue that impost which raises the price of mercantile speculations in vessels, when we have no doubt on our minds, that our present enemy, and then our invidious friend, will strain every nerve to establish a navy, and will patronize with all his power a carrying trade in his own vessels for that purpose?

to effect in a single Budget, no one acquainted with the resources of this kingdom can doubt. In short, if the war continues, these war taxes are pledged to sup-rying coastwise, augment the capital neport the war; and the circunstance of their being pledged is of little importance to those who pay them. If the war terminates, the security given on these taxes will be withdrawn, and transferred elsewhere. In other words, the security on which the mortgage was established will be exchanged, till the mortgage itself be paid off. It does not appear, then, that this exchange amounts to a breach of Parliamentary faith: but, we confess, that the statement of the principle on which the transaction is conducted, ought to be made with the utmost candour, openness, and clearness; and in terms so explicit, as to incur no charge, or even hazard, of ambiguity. For, though we have said that taxes of a hundred years standing have acquired the power of habit, and are of little moment in the second century of their existence, yet taxes recently imposed, and for a specific purpose, and professedly of limited duration, that duration contracted by the hopes of every well wisher to his country, and to humanity, differ widely from the former. They have not had sufficient time to press into numbness the limb which supports them. They create pain; and the sooner pain can be removed from the body politic, as well as from the body natural, the better for the patient, and the more honourable to the operator.

This will become evident beyond denial, if we enquire on what articles these taxes have been laid, and whether they be chosen for are such as should these taxes, supposing them prolonged; such as can support them, without in volving extremely important interests of the community.

The Convoy duty is a price paid by merchant ships for protection by ships of war: will it be wise to demand this price when the necessity for protection by ships of war has ceased?

The Exportation duties are in effect charged on the consumer, in foreign parts, of those articles to which they are attached: will it be wise to continue these when the consumer may have a choice of markets, and purchase other goods that will answer his purpose as well, from quarters where this duty is not paid, and

The Property Tax with all its vexations, suspicions, inquisitions, appeals, hearings, re-hearings, and attendances, with its temptations to evasions, and shuffles, and a most ungodly envying of those neighhours who have luckily eluded examination-will it be wise to continue this tax after the immediate occasion of its imposition has subsided; after peace has dismissed national animosity against the enemy, and soothed to tranquillity the mind which had thought only of resistance to the implacable foe?

These questions are important, and their importance would be extreme if peace did not, almost by necessity of its character as peace, introduce other and more pleasing expectations. It is said, that,

By the present plan the whole of the war taxes will in no case continue pledged beyond the war. With the aid of the excesses of the present sinking fund, peace, at whatever period it may take place, must produce some immediate and considerable reduction of those taxes.

But the release of the war taxes will be much more rapid, if instead of applying invariably the whole of the sinking fund created for the war debt, to the redemption of that debt in peace as in war, the arrangement which has been explained in a former part of this paper be adopted on the return of peace. According to that arrangement the sinking fund of the war debt will then be consolidated with the sinking fund of the present debt, and the excess of those combined funds above the interest of their combined debts, will be placed at the disposal of Parliament. And in this manner it will be seen, that on a peace, even after fourteen years of war, above eleven

millions of the war taxes may be immediately taken off, and that the public may thus at once be relieved from nearly the whole of the property tax, while the remainder will, in a very short time after, be liberated by the ap