Smithfield, per stone of 8lb. to sink the offal. Beef. Mutton. Veal. Pork. Lamb. Nov. 21 5s. Od. 5s. 2d. 5s. 6d. 6s. Od. Os. Od 6 6 0 0 0 Dec. 6 11770 5 4 6 Newgate and Leadenhall, by the carcase. Nov. 21 4 0 4 4 5 0 6 0 0 0 28 21736 73 54 0 Hay. 28 4 14 6 2 18 6 4 12 0 280 8 o'clock Morning. 11 o'clock Hygrom. Kent £50 to £6 2 Kent £4 14 to £5 12 22 60 6 0 PRICE OF LEATHER.* 857 49 55 55 3343 37 29,02 37 46 55 57 53 Butts, 50 to 56lb. each Dressing Hides 26 54 50 47 24d. 27 46 48 46 - Crop Hides for cutting Flat Ordinary 181 ༠- -28 46 57 51 59 Calf Skins, 30 to 40lb. per dozen, per lb. 40 [at night Fair &stormy Fair Newcastle. Nov. 24 41s. od. to 43s. od. 42s. Od. to 50s. 6d. Poole, Exeter, Dartm. Plym. Falm. ...14 gs. ..6 g gs. ret. 3 Poole & Dartmouth-Exeter & Plymouth ...4 gs. 20s. Boston, New-York, and Philadelphia .. 3 gs. Mediterranean Portugal Bay of Honduras to Charles-Town, England or Ireland Jamaica to Lond. Brist. Dubl. Į .25 gs. .15 gs. ret. 5 10 gs. 25 gs. 20 gs. ret. 5 Windward and Leeward Islands. London, Bristol, Dublin, and 18 gs. ret. 6 Islands to New-York or Philadelphia, 12 gs. Africa to Windward and Leeward } 15 gs. or America.... East-Indies to London .15 gs. 8 gs. ret. 4 10 gs. ret. 5 Baltic to Liverp. Cork, and Dublin, 8 gs. ret.2 Riga and Prussian Ports to London ~...6 g、 CURRENT PRICES OF MERCHANDIZE, 19th DECEMBER, 1806. Omnium. Irish Daily Prices of STOCKS. 21st NOVEMBER to 19th DECEMBER, 1806. welt. The Siege of Beauvais marked A. D. 1471, Panorama, p. 622, is, by Henault chere read Censurate here. Line 5 from the bottom, for du elegant wilt read die elegant Errata.-Page 576, line 19, for Blätten read Blätter; line 22, for Censurae and Mezeray, placed in 1472. 88 14 581 7 574 || 57 19 15 31186661 19 16 0 88 THE LITERARY PANORAMA. FOR FEBRUARY, 1807. THE HE subject next in order among those not published, on which we might have submitted our thoughts to the public, is of too delicate a nature to be divulged, as it refers less to the defence of the kingdom in times past, which therefore may be spoken of without hazard, than to time present, when every honest subject will consider caution, and sometimes silence, as an important part of his duty to his country. What other articles of a similar description we have been favoured with, cannot well be comprised in the remaining numbers of this volume; they will therefore appear in the succeeding volume; and we propose, at this time, to avail ourselves of what intelligence has been officially communicated in the Papers relative to the Negociation with France, presented, by His Majesty's Command, to both Houses of Parliament, 22d December, 1806. These papers have been already reviewed, as to their main subject, by two Most Honourable corps of Reviewers; which have reported their opinion concerning them. Undoubtedly, we have not the smallest intention of impugning the decision of those eminent critics, who, we learn, expressed their approbation" without a division;" but, as we have often seen circumstances that escaped the first reporters on works of importance, become interesting under the consideration of others, we are tempted to hazard a few thoughts on the contents of this publication. We believe that our remarks have not been anticipated by any of the literati who had taken their seats in those critical assemblies to which we refer, It appears by these documents, that the negociation commenced about March, 1806. That, it was, at first, understood, VOL. I. [Lit. Pan. Feb. 1807.] that each party should keep the countries, then in its actual possession, unless exchanges should induce either to accept others in cempensation, whether for a part, or for the whole of them. M. Talleyrand states expressly, April 1, that, the Emperor of France covets nothing England possesses. This may be admit ted, as to Buonaparté himself; but, if we reflect on the possessions of England at that moment, we shall discover obstacles which we wonder Buonaparté should be so blind as to have overlooked, though but for a time. The ancient and established possessions of England could not, on the slightest pretence, be called to recollection on this occasion; they could, on no account, be separated from the parent state but, the recent acquisitions of Britain could hardly be forgotten by a well-informed statesman. These were, the Cape of Good Hope, taken from the Dutch; Sicily, held on behalf of the King of Naples; and lastly Buenos Ayres, very lately taken from Spain. Buonaparté having placed one of his brothers as King over the Dutch, and another brother as King of Naples, discovered, or more probably was informed by them, during the negociation, that their respective kingdoms were not worth holding, under these privations. The reasons of this, worth our inquiry. may be Holland is a country of dense population, but of small extent; and part of its surface produces little that can serve as food for man. Unable to support its inhabitants, it draws supplies from abroad; and receives corn for its sustenance from foreigners. For this accommodation Holland must pay and having enjoyed a flourishing commerce, it was able to pay, with great ease, for whatever foreigners could furnish. But if once the source of its ability to pay Le interrupted or exhausted, by what means should it acquire 2 H that wealth which might enable it to remuncrate foreigners for their commodities? and that this source of its ability was, and still is, in the power of Britain, may easily be demonstrated. Foreign colonies belonging to Holland, were- -some in the West Indies, the Cape,Ceylon, the Spice Islands, Batavia, &c. Those in the West-Indies had been taken, and occupied by the British, some years ago; when a British capital of nearly, or quite, £20,000,000 had been employed in improving them. This naturally led to British connections: and the interest of this capital was a debt due to Britain; to be paid before any profits could be thought on. Add to this, the customary expenses attending all governments, and some peculiar to the most considerable of these settlements, such as, the necessity of maintaining a force capable of overawing the run away negroes established in the woods, and we shall perceive that the wealth derived from the West-Indies by Holland could be but very moderate. The commerce of the Cape of Good Hope never was worth mentioning, in a national point of view. The importance of the Cape consists in its situation, as being a kind of half-way house, where vessels bound to India, (Batavia, &c.) find succour and refreshment. The directors of the British East-India Company gave it up, without reluctance, at the peace of Amiens; because, their ships were under no necessity of calling there, being prepared adequately to the voyage, and visiting other ports on their passage: but the Dutch ships must make the Cape, as they sail slower than the English, and are more liable to disorders among their crews, from which alone the land can relieve them. Moreover, whoever possesses the Cape, and stations a cruising fleet there, commands the high naval road to the east, and interrupts all commerce but what he protects. If then, the commerce of Holland with her eastern possessions was interrupted, or the accommodation of those who engaged in it was abridged, Batavia, with its dependencies, was proportionately diminished in value. And this was to them a serious evil; because, Batavia as a seat of commerce is not what it was: 1. The expenses of government are more, while the commerce of the place is less: 2. The port, which was its glory, is filling up. The spice islands, too, have lost much of their importance; because, 1. They have suffered by the inroads of the English: 2. The spices themselves have been transplanted to other countries, so that these productions are no longer exclusively found in the Dutch islands. Ceylon, which furnishes cinnamon, &c. is British property. We may, therefore, safely infer, that the east was not likely to pour an abun dance of riches into the lap of Holland, while England detained her present pos sions. We refer to Panorama, p. 681, in proof that the European establishment of Holland has suffered in its very vitals: 1. As its carrying trade is diminished : 2. As its independence, and consequently its political dignity, is now out of the ques tion: 3. As the recovery of its mercantile connections to a political extent is ex tremely problematical. To these considerations may be added others, arising from the actual state not so much of the inhabitants as of the country: and these we shall now submit to the reader. Dec. 5, 1806, the following observa. tions were addressed from the Dutch King to the Dutch States: their authority, therefore, is indisputable. "We cannot conceal that, independently of the enor mous imposts which render the situation of our subjects so afflicting, the suppres sion of all the neutral flags, and parti cularly the general blockade, have annihilitated the last resources of commerce. As to the finances,-we are justly astonished at the prodigality of expenses, and the want of economy.-We attribute this to party-spirit. Holland has been every year in danger of losing its existence, political and natural." We shall not here repeat what we have said concerning the general languor of commerce in Holland: commerce will long continue in transitu there: but not, comparatively, in a flourishing state. The danger of Holland's losing its natural existence has been noticed, and commented on by several; but none has yet explained the full import of the phrase. To us, it appears to refer to two distinct objects: the first is the conservation of the dykes, the artificial defences of this country from the Ocean; these require, annually, great reparations, and of course great sums of money. These sums have |