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(said Charles II, wie ie vu i prz

never choose that of a lawyer: for I can s a bad cause, nor oppose a good se' dan nau would never sufer any ff is peading is le JLL lished; because be was coostUP

occasion he had malttalled the ting a other time the opposite.

A lawyer does not pretend, and a 13 undete

view to his own private interest, irrespective of the welfare of others; for this would open the way for evils of every kind. It would serve as a pretence for habitual lying, insincerity, hypocrisy, and treachery; and thus men would possess no confidence in one another. Julius Scaliger had such an aversion to a practised liar, that he would hold no conversation or dealing with him. The ancient Romans were exceedingly upright and sincere. When the treacherous physician of Pyrrhus offered to poison his master, they sent back the traitor to his sovereign that he might be punished. The ancient Florentines never made war by stealth; but they always issued a month's notice, that the enemy might have time for preparation. They never attacked their foes in the dark, nor sheltered themselves in secret places. How different was the conduct of the Arii (a nation on the borders of Poland), whom the Emperor Probus met with in one of his expeditions to the north!-they always attacked their enemies by night, and by stealth; and, in order to deceive them the more, they painted themselves and their armour black.

In contests among nations (as I have already intimated) deception is allowable; but it is not so in treaties. A nation that would violate its word would tarnish its honour. It is just the same in confidential contracts among men. An upright person will be depended on, and respected; while a deceiver will be despised. The former will act honourably without trammels; the latter must be bound by oaths and witnesses. Lord

Burghley used to say, that he placed more confidence in the word of an honest man, than in another man's bond.

The habit of joking with falsehoods ought not to be indulged; otherwise deception in fun may become lying in earnest. It evinces a sterile mind, and a great deficiency of ingenuity, when a person cannot be amusing, or cannot endeavour to be so, without relating glaring lies. As a direct and malicious untruth is odious, so even the appearance of one produces an unpleasant sensation; and this is one reason why falsehood should seldom be employed for amusement.

The habit of deceiving by conduct and pretensions is hypocrisy. This is one of the foulest vices; for it is an insult to God, and an injury to man. Every thing fair, in such a case, is pretended; but every thing foul is practised. Smooth language is used; but the person who depends on it is wofully disappointed. This is a disposition most appropriate for fiends. Milton says of Belial,

"He seem'd

For dignity composed, and high exploit;
But all was false and hollow."

Hypocrisy may exist, either in appearing better or worse than the reality. The former is more prevalent. The latter exists among mean gropers for a compliment — who pretend a trifling defect, that they may obtain a little flattery. It exists sometimes among fanatics; who think that the lower

the higher they shall rise in the favour of Heaven. Now, if they expect to make an exchange, there is no great merit in it. But it is a question, whether the Almighty would have endowed mankind with certain qualities, if he had intended that they should remain unconscious of them? A man must not think more highly of himself than he ought to think; but where is he commanded to think more lowly of himself than the truth? If we compare ourselves with the Almighty, we are less than the dust in the balance; but if we compare ourselves with men, we may modestly place ourselves in our proper sphere, and maintain it without offence.

Indeed we may, on some occasions, assume an exterior which is better than the reality, without consigning ourselves to the class of hypocrites. A person may be gloomy; but in society he may cause the clouds of sorrow to pass away, or apparently so. If he be soured and angry, he may veil his feelings with a smiling countenance, when he enters the presence of those who were not the occasion of the offence. When a man is introduced to the company of patrons and superiors, he may stimulate himself to more than usual mental exertion; he may endeavour to make his language sparkle as it flows, and his ideas, as so many gems, to shine brilliantly. And thus a person in the society of one who is beloved may endeavour to appear attractive. Every thing that gives a highly coloured representation, whether it be intended or not, is deceptive. The lover seldom shows an unamiable disposition when he wishes to win the

heart of the fair one; for a good temper is as pleasing in man as a bright heaven to the admirer of nature. A disposition that is naturally good is more agreeable, and more to be depended on, than an ill temper under the control of the judgment: and yet the latter is more worthy, and more indicative of a high degree of moral feeling. If the heart be right, the conduct will generally be consistent; and, consequently, the former demands our principal attention. It was said of Aristides that he endeavoured to be virtuous, rather than to appear so. And Socrates, having a high opinion of the duties of man towards his fellow-man, in his external conduct, maintained that the readiest way to obtain excellence was to endeavour to get what we would wish others to think we possessed.

Sometimes falsehood arises from great loquacity. "He that talketh (to excess) what he knoweth," observes Lord Bacon, "will also talk what he knoweth not." On some occasions it arises from interest. The lawyer, for instance, is obliged to make the worse appear the better reason. He endeavours, frequently, "to darken counsel by words without knowledge."-"Among all the professions, (said Charles II., when he was a prince,) I could never choose that of a lawyer; for I cannot defend a bad cause, nor oppose a good one." Marc Antony would never suffer any of his pleadings to be published; because he was conscious that on one occasion he had maintained one thing, and at another time the opposite.

A lawyer does not pretend, and it is not under