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Washington at this time, and telling him where he ought to go. But there was no telegraph beyond Cairo, and it was a long way for letters to be sent from Cairo to the interior of Mississippi ; and he would act so rapidly, that, when they arrived, they would be found to relate to past events. It is well to contemplate him here.

Gen. Badeau says,

6 So Grant was alone. His most trusted associates besought him to change his plans; while his superiors were astounded by his temerity, and strove to interfere. Soldiers of reputation, and civilians in high place, condemned in advance a campaign that seemed to them as hopeless as it was unprecedented. If he failed, the country would concur with the government and the generals. Grant knew all this, and appreciated his danger, but was as invulnerable to the apprehensions of ambition as to the entreaties of friendship, or the anxieties even of patriotism. That quiet confidence which never forsook him, and which amounted, indeed, almost to a feeling of fate, was uninterrupted. Having once determined in a matter that required irreversible decision, he never rever

versed, nor even misgave, but was steadily loyal to himself and his plans. This absolute and implicit faith was, however, as far as possible from conceit or enthusiasm. It was simply a consciousness, or conviction rather, which brought the very strength it believed in; which was itself strength; and which inspired others with a trust in him, because he was able thus to trust himself.”

At midnight of the 3d he had taken farewell of Grand Gulf in his own mind, and was on his way to Hankinson’s Ferry, on the Big Black River. But his orders show his state of mind. Sherman's corps was hurried across the river. Supplies were wagoned sixty miles from Milliken's Bend, ferried over the river, and carted eighteen miles farther.

To Sherman he wrote, “ Order forward immediately your remaining division, leaving only two regiments (to guard Richmond), as required in previous orders. Have all the men leave the west bank of the river with three days' rations in haversacks, and make all possible despatch to Grand Gulf.”

To Hurlbut he orders, “ Four regiments to Milliken's Bend with the utmost despatch.” 6. Take them from the troops most convenient to transportation.”

To the commissary at Grand Gulf, “You will load all teams presenting themselves for rations with promptness and despatch, regardless of requisitions or provisionreturns. There must be no delay on account of either lack of energy or formality."

To one of his staff superintending affairs at Grand Gulf he says, “See that the commissary at Grand Gulf loads all the wagons presenting themselves for stores with great promptness. Issue any order in my name that

may be necessary to secure the greatest promptness in this respect. ... Every day's delay is worth two thousand men to the enemy.”

To the same officer, two or three days after, “Send me a report of about the number of rations on hand, and send forward to Grand Gulf. Send also to McFeely and Bingham, and remind them of the importance of rushing forward rations with all despatch. How many

teams have been loaded with rations and sent forward? I want to know, as near as possible, how we stand, in every particular, for supplies. How many wagons have you ferried over the river? How many are still to bring over? What teams have gone back for rations?"

To Hurlbut, who was to remain at Memphis, he

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the war.

wrote, “ You will have a large force of cavalry: use it as much as possible in attracting attention from this direction. Impress upon the cavalry the necessity of keeping out of people's houses, or of taking what is of no use to them in a military point of view. ... They must live as far as possible off the country through which they pass, and destroy corn, wheat-crops, and every thing that can be made use of by the enemy in prolonging

Mules and horses are to be taken to supply all our own wants; and, when it does not cause too much delay, agricultural implements may be destroyed : in other words, cripple in every way, without insulting women and children, or taking their clothes, jewelry, &c.

These, and many other despatches that could be quoted, show, better than could any comments, the varied and multitudinous cares which pressed upon the mind of Gen. Grant at this time. They show, that, while major-general, he could be quartermaster, commissary, ordnance-officer, and even ferryman. Nothing essential to the one grand object, succe88, was too great or too small for him to grasp with all his energy. He pressed his orders with all the more force and exactness because he knew that the campaign was in defiance of rules: it was his own.

Near the battle-field of Leuthen, the traveller is still shown the tree under which Frederick the Great assembled his generals, and said, “ The moment for courage has come.

I am resolved, against all rules of the art of war, to attack the army of Charles of Lorraine wherever I may find it. There is no question of the number of the enemy or the strength of his position.

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We must beat them, or find our graves before their batteries."

It was not until his arrival at Hankinson's Ferry that the personal baggage and horses of Gen. Grant and staff arrived. Previous to this he had slept in the porch of the nearest house, and eaten at the table of the officer near whom he happened to be. He ordered reconnoissances to be made by the cavalry on the roads leading up to Vicksburg, to keep alive in the enemy the belief that he intended to march in that direction.

On the 8th, Grant had his headquarters at Rocky Springs. Sherman, who was still solicitous about the result of the campaign, did not see the possibility of the army abandoning its base; and wrote from Hankinson's in regard to the crowd of men, wagons, and trains, urging him to “stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life, if

you attempt to supply fifty thousand men by one single road.”

To this Grant replied, “I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard-bread, coffee, and salt, we can, and make the country furnish the balance. . You are in a country where the troops have already lived off the people for some days, and may find provisions more scarce; but, as we get upon new soil, they are more abundant, particularly in corn and cattle."

Grant was here acting on the policy which he deter

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mined to be the only one practicable to end the Rebellion; and that was, to make the Rebellion furnish the supplies for the Union army. He had never, in the earliest days of the war, sent back a trembling fugitive with his compliments to his master. He had never detailed soldiers along the line of his march to guard the flowers and fruit of rebel officers. The rebels themselves had taught him that the Government must bring the war home to the slaveholders of the South, and compel them to feel the consequences of their acts in consuming power. It was his belief, that, the quicker this was done, the quicker the war would end.

On the 11th of May, Grant sent word to Halleck, “My forces will be this evening as far advanced towards' Jackson as Fourteen-mile Creek. As I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more, except it becomes necessary to send a train with heavy escort, you may not hear from me again for several days.

The same day, and almost the same hour, Halleck, from his desk at Washington, was ordering Grant on a far different expedition, as follows. He said,

He said, “If possible, the forces of yourself and Banks should be united between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, so as to attack these places separately with the combined forces.” Singular position in which a commanding general finds it necessary to use strategy both with the enemy and his superior at Washington !

At this time, the Hon. J. J. Pettus, Governor of Mississippi, determined to test the effects of a proclamation addressed to the whole State, in retarding the advance of the Union armies. The principal portions are as follow:

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