ER since wars have been waged, anders at all echelons have attempted ize natural terrain features to their dvantage. The attacker sought terwhich would facilitate movement and him to maneuver and close with efender. He usually avoided natural tificial obstacles such as forests, ps, rivers, and fortifications in his to maneuver the defender out of on. The defender, on the other hand, d natural lines of resistance and obs as much as possible to hamper the

er.

long as armies were relatively small, s usually much more expedient for my to pass around a defended fear obstacle to reach its objective than it through the obstacle. The growth nies to forces numbering millions of as all but eliminated the simple ext of sweeping around an obstacle on round. Maneuver to avoid obstacles 1 often restricted, simply because of of room on the battlefield. As a nsation, however, recent wars have that modern armies are capable of g over any terrain and can overalmost any type of natural obstacle ; the course of combat operations. ether future wars are nuclear or clear; big or little; or are fought in jungle, mountain, plain, or urban here will be a requirement for ground , properly trained and equipped, to

seize specific ground objectives to en the accomplishment of the ultimate jective. Although the choice of wher conduct military operations lies init with the attacker, the manner in w the defender utilizes the terrain for fensive purposes exerts a considerable fluence.

A study of past wars and operat can contribute materially to the fu employment of ground forces. In this of worldwide unrest and related der ment of United States military force seems prudent to study past ground erations in areas of possible future ployment in order to benefit from e rience in these areas. To this end following brief account of operations in forests of northern Europe is present

THE TAIGA

The land surface of the earth can divided into six principal patterns ba on climate and the similarity of landsc These patterns are: desert, jungle, for plain (steppe), mountain, and fr areas. Each of these patterns exert t own particular influence on military erations.

Northern forests, the type in which Finnish-Russian wars were fought, tend across the northern latitudes of rope, Asia, and North America. Th forests are often called "taiga" by Russians. They extend south from

Europe erally fat, with differen

present 50 percent in some

and marshes are the most variable terrain features in the taiga areas because they dry with great rapidity and become impassable very rapidly after precipitation or during the thaw-out period.

Invariably, the inhabited areas of the taiga will be found in comparatively high and well-drained locations. Cities, towns, and villages are scarce and because they usually are located along possible routes of movement they are important as communication centers. Some areas of strategic value do exist in these regions, such as the Moscow-Leningrad-Gorki triangle of Russia and certain areas of Alaska and Canada essential to defense.

Movement in the taiga is severely restricted. Roads generally are few and normally are constructed of dirt, gravel, and (occasionally) cobblestone. During the periods of the spring thaw (breakup time), the summer rains, and the early freezeup the roads become almost unusable. In the winter the roadbeds are firm, but snow and ice may limit their use. However, the climatic conditions (extreme cold) facilitate the rapid extension of the road network over the snow and frozen waterways by experienced personnel. During the summer period the lakes and streams are used to augment other means of transportation. Railroads are the principal means of transportation for large-scale movement, but they are few in number and often poorly constructed.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. V. Pearson received his commission in 1941 from Cornell University, and was assigned as Assistant PMST at Cornell until 1944. His service also includes duty with the 895th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 16th Armored Division; 11th Medium Port, Military Government, Korea, 1946-48; instructor, Kentucky National Guard, 194951; and as executive officer and battalion commander, 981st Field Artillery Battalion, 40th Infantry Division, Korea, 195253. Following his graduation from the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1954 he was assigned to the faculty of the College.

protect the flanks of the long (approximately 15 miles) column of tanks, armored cars, trucks, and field kitchens (both motorized and horse-drawn).

The Finnish plan of operation primarily was based on the high cross-country mobility of their troops. The over-all plan provided for establishing strong points in the defile between Lake Rastin (Rastinjarvi) and Lake Lapin (Lapinjarvi) to halt the enemy forces and then to immobilize and contain them by cutting their lines of communication. The actual destruction of the force was to be accomplished by the severe cold and starvation.

Used Terrain and Climate

In the execution of their plan the Finns established strong points and patrols at intervals around the Russian force to prevent any movement into or out of the area and to sever contact between it and its base of operation. They also used the terrain and climate in other ways to facilitate their operations:

First, they took advantage of the excellent fields of vision afforded by the frozen lakes to protect their patrol positions from attack. To improve the fields of vision and fire, the trees in the defile between the frozen lakes were cut down to form a continuous open area which the Russians would have to cross to continue their ad

vance.

Second, they utilized winter ice roads to increase their mobility. These roads were constructed rapidly by cutting down the necessary trees, flooding the area with water from nearby lakes, and then allowing time for it to freeze.

Third, they took maximum advantage of the cover and concealment offered by both the forests and the snow to screen their movement and operations. In the open areas a series of snow fences were constructed to cause the snow to drift and conceal the movement of small patrols deployed around the Russian force.

Fourth, barbed wire was stretched be

tween the stumps about a fo ground and covered by snow very effective obstacle.

Upon reaching the Finnish str and finding the Kuhmo road bl 54th Division attempted to b strong points by changing its di advance to the southwest along to Nurmes. This attempt was cause the Finns had disposed t ions just west of Lake Latva (L in anticipation of such an effor themselves unable to break th either road, the main body of th occupied defensive positions in along the road approximately long and a half mile wide. The of the division contracted itself smaller groups along the road the main body.

Russians Quickly Isolate By 29 January the Finnish f completely isolated each of the fo of the 54th Division. By aggressi ling, the Finns cut all communic tween the groups and then clo complete the encirclement of ea The Russians were cut off comple their base and were unable to through the forest in any directio of Finnish strong points and pat ity. Attempts to send out patrols of the groups resulted in their c annihilation. The Finns thus the first phase of their plan.

Now the second phase began. January until 13 March the Russ tions remained unchanged. The Fi attacked the encircled groups While waiting for hunger and cause submission of the isolate the Finns conducted small-scale o to harass them. Small detachment nish artillery were moved at w the winter ice roads and used t the encircled groups. These hara erations succeeded in further spli main body into three groups. By