jor engagement and keeping their pals small, the Finns never allowed the Issians an opportunity to inflict heavy mage on their forces. Finnish patrols d units were kept small. Finnish instaltions and positions were widely dispersed minimize the effects of mortar and tank e from the Russian positions.

Stole Russian Supplies

The Russians, having learned some lesns from earlier operations, organized a stem for supplying food and other essenals by air in order to keep starvation om taking its toll. The Finns lacked ghter aircraft but used ground weapons effectively against the aerial convoys at it became necessary for the Russians conduct their resupply operations at ight. The Russians indicated their posions to the planes by using flares. The inns duplicated these flare signals and Don were obtaining the bulk of their food Tom Russian sources. Food that did reach he Russians was insufficient and they ere forced to eat their draft animals. The Russians made a number of attempts o get through to the 54th Division, but one were successful. On 31 January and February Russian ski patrols, from the orce at Kiekinkoski attempted to estabsh contact with the 54th Division, but ere annihilated by Finnish patrols which tercepted them on the northern and eastrn sides of the division position.

Later the Siberian Ski Brigade, consistng of the 9th, 30th, and 34th Ski Battalns, made a second attempt from the iekinkoski area. This was a force trained nd equipped to fight in forests under winer conditions. It consisted of approxiately 2,000 men, well equipped with utomatic weapons, heavy and light mamineguns, and small-caliber artillery. On 6 February the brigade moved around he south flank of the northern Finnish orces by using one of the Finnish winter pads to reach the frozen Kiekin River nd then followed the river southwest to

ward Kesseli. The Finns discovered the brigade's movement and sent a force of approximately 300 men to intercept it in the vicinity of Kesseli.

By the 17th the Finnish force was deployed in small patrol groups around Lake Kesseli just south of Kesseli. The Siberian Ski Brigade advanced across the open spaces of the lake, but before it could get across or retreat into the forests, the Finnish patrols annihilated it. No further attempts were made to relieve the 54th Division from the vicinity of Kiekinkoski.

The final attempt to reach the surrounded 54th Division was made toward the end of February. A full Russian division with its artillery regiment was moved up along the same road used by the 54th Division for the purpose of reestablishing communications along the road.

The Finns concentrated as many men as they could spare from their strong points around the 54th Division in a blocking position across the road just north of Lake Loyto (Loytojarvi). The position's left flank was anchored on a slight ridge north of the road and extended down the slope across the road to the lake. Except for a very small farm clearing on top of the ridge the position area was wooded. In this position, just slightly over a mile wide with a depth of a quarter of a mile, a force of a few hundred Finns was able to block the further advance of the Russians from 29 February to 13 March. During this period the Russians sought to reduce the Finnish position by aerial bombardment and by concentrating the fires of all their artillery (approximately 40 pieces) on the area. However, this small Finnish force held its position until the war was ended by an armistice on 13 March.

SUMMER OPERATIONS

In June 1944 the Russians again

launched a general offensive on both the north and south sides of Lake Ladoga. The Finnish forces withdrew, fighting a delaying action, against the numerically

sion, on the south, was advancing in a single column along the one poor road leading into Ilomantsi from the east.

Three-Phase Defense

While waiting for the reinforcements scheduled to arrive on 27 July, General Raappana prepared plans to stop and destroy these Russian forces. His plan provided for three phases of operations:

First, an all-out effort to hold the defiles at both ends of Lake Ilaja (Ilajanjarvi) and the employment of an attack group from behind the two lakes to strike the enemy flanks and rear.

Second, to fix the 176th Division by attacking it frontally with the blocking forces opposing each of its columns and, at the same time, severing its line of communications in the vicinity of Longonvara by attacking with two battalions from the north.

Third, to withdraw along the axis of the dirt road being used by the 289th Division to the defile southeast of Lake Sysma (Sysmajarvi) so as to cause this roadbound division to expose its flanks and facilitate attacks on its flanks and rear.

On 25 July the 176th Division was halted by the frequent attacks of Finnish patrols and the strong points established by the Finns in the defiles north and south of Lake Ilaja and a few miles east of Tasavaara.

During the period 25-29 July the Finnish forces conducted extensive reconnaissance of routes to the enemy flanks and rear, continued its patrol activities on the flanks of the Russian columns, continued to withdraw ahead of the 289th Division, and prepared blocking positions on the high ground south of the swamp between Lake Sysma and the small lake to the east.

These positions utilized the open areas of the swamp to achieve excellent fields of fire. The natural obstacle of the swamp was exploited by building dams in the nearby creeks to cause additional flooding.

The Russian attacks on the b tion on 27 and 28 July were the division advance was S flanks of the division were close surveillance by one Finni on the north and a guerrilla the south.

Setting Up Victim During this period (25-29 effort was made to ensure th would be achieved when the m attack was launched. The rein both infantry and artillery, wh on 27 July were kept out of committed in the main attack. the grouping of the Finnish a was completed (see Figure 6).

The attack by the Finns be night of 30-31 July. The main 21st Brigade moved across cou of the 289th Division, to the s Lake Louve and after a day's able to cut this line of comm Simultaneously with this ope battalion of the 21st Brigade c at a point approximately four west. A third cut was made app midway between the first two fantry battalion attacking from from its position west of Lake a result of these attacks the 289 was divided into three groups. operation was going on, two bat bat teams broke through on t between lakes Ilaja and Louve, south to cut the roadway where the Koyto River (Koytojoki). A Finnish operations were conduc country.

North of Lake Ilaja the Finn ern group reached the com routes of the 176th Division and the high ground and trail juncti Longonvara. This, together with by the Finnish forces which blocking the advance of the 17 sion, resulted in a general with this division.