pact of other principal infantry weapons. Artillery inns adapted f either tractor-drawn or horse-drawn. t, training, new tanks were included in their organmeet the clinton. Although this was due principally found in this economic reasons, the extensive use of rganized and was not considered feasible except degree of support of operations along the roads. Finnish tactics permitted them to retain

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ONGONVARA

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Why Did Finns Succeed?

The principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war. Their proper application is essential to the exercise of command and to successful conduct of military operations. The degree of application of any specific principle will vary with the situation and the application thereto of sound judgment and tactical sense.*

The success of the Finns in the two operations discussed here was due primarily to their proper application of the principles of war.

In both operations which have been discussed, the principle of the offensive was applied by the Finnish commanders. The taiga terrain offers excellent means for conducting local defense operations by small units, but the presence of numerous obstacles and dense forest precludes coordinated defensive operations by large units. This same terrain offers excellent opportunities for offensive operations by small units provided these forces are organized and equipped to achieve a high degree of cross-country mobility.

In both operations the Finns resorted to defensive operations primarily to gain time to facilitate offensive operations which were conducted generally against the flanks and rear of the Russian forces. Had the Finnish commanders relied solely on defensive operation, it would have been only a matter of time before the superior Russian forces would penetrate or pass around the defensive positions. However, by attacking the flanks and rear of the Russian columns and by maintaining an offensive patrol system, the Russians were

Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations,

forced to assume the defensive on unfavorable terrain and required to fight in all directions.

The Finnish forces possessed great cross-country mobility which enabled them to apply the principle of maneuver. By a combination of defense and maneuver the Finnish forces were able to fix the Russians in place. By maneuver of highly mobile forces the Finns enveloped the enemy forces and by striking at weak points in their defenses they were able to accomplish their destruction without, themselves, becoming involved in a major action with the concentrated Russian forces.

Careful Coordination

The principle of unity of command was applied by the Finns in both operations. All of the Finnish forces in the area of operations were placed under one commander who was able to coordinate and control the numerous separate operations conducted by small units and direct their efforts toward a common objective, the destruction of the enemy forces. The Russian forces, on the other hand, were operating relatively independent of each other. They were under direct control of an army headquarters which was considerably removed from the area of operations. This command organization did not provide for rapid reaction to unexpected changes or developments.

The principles of mass and economy of force were applied by the Finns. By the employment of lightly held blocking positions and highly mobile striking forces they defeated vastly superior enemy forces

by concentrating rapidly to att emy's flanks, rear, and weak p his lines of communications. The principle of security was fectively by the Finns who ut range reconnaissance patrols t Russian forces under close s As a result the Finns were abl the Russians where they were nerable. The Russians failed adequate security for their rear. Their security elements, the highly trained Siberian S remained too close to the mai troops to provide adequate v their force or to deny informa Finns.

In both operations the princi plicity was applied by the Fi mander. The plans were based exposed flanks and cutting lin munication by the proper ma Finnish forces.

The application of the remai ciples of war was demonstrate operations. However, their exerted less influence on the the battle than those just disc Finns, in both operations, a principle of the objective by di their efforts toward the destruc Russian forces. Surprise was a exploiting the cover and conce fered by the dense woods and th bility. Skillful use of camou assisted in its achievement. A the sudden changes in weather ficability of terrain were ex strike where least expected.

A CROSS

CROSS the country a continuous manhunt is in progress.

Eager agents of booming business, industrial, scientific, and governmental organizations are ever on the search for potential leaders. Not last in the pack are representatives of the armed services. In this era of ever-mounting demands for technological, scientific, and educational backgrounds ranging from international politics to nuclear physics, the trail to prospective leadership points with clearer intensity toward the college campus.

On the campus gather recruiters from all business and professional fields, competing with each other for the interested attention of college students. It is time to realize that the degree of success with which the Army competes for leaders on the college campuses of the Nation today may mark the measure of its effectiveness as a combat organization tomorrow.

To those who entered the services some years ago, when the Active Army was a Regular Army, as well as to those who entered during or since World War II, it may be difficult to realize some of the present conditions of leadership hunting. In an Active Army of over one million men, the graduating cadets of West Point do not go far in filling annual officer needs. Important as they are in forming a disciplined and highly motivated nucleus, they alone account for barely half of the annual Regular officer intake. Nor do officer candidate schools produce the heavy volume of sec

ond lieutenants that once filled the vacancies in expanding divisions. The largest part of the yearly requisition for officers is filled by young men from institutions of higher learning trained in the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). Included in this college trained product are some 50 percent of the newly commissioned Regular Army lieutenants.

How does one fit young men for a career of service and leadership? How can one determine those potential character traits and aptitudes which will lead to an effective officer career? What kind of instruction will best fit a junior officer for an immediate role in a company and still provide the background for continued professional advancement in a highly technical era? Above all, how can we motivate our youth to serve their country by leading men?

None of these questions are new and it is doubtful if we will ever find final answers for them. At a time when the majority of today's platoon leaders and a considerable portion of tomorrow's generals come from the college campus it would pay well to give careful consideration to the collegiate approach to these problems and the future implications of continued officer training in the university.

Complex Problem Now

The creation of the Reserve Corps by the National Defense Act of 1916, experience with the Student Army Training Corps on college campuses during 1917-18, and the

lessons learned from the officers' training camps of World War I laid the basic foundations for the philosophy and program enunciated by the National Defense Act of 1920 which created the ROTC in its modern form. The value of this institution was proved many times over when some 100,000 ROTC-trained officers came to the assistance of harassed Regulars and National Guardsmen during the expansion for World War II.

What began originally as a relatively simple training proposition, manageable by any civilian educational institution, has become through the years, a task of considerable complexity for well-qualified professionals. Fifty years ago a fairly respectable course in military science could consist of mounted or dismounted drill, the basic principles of tactics, a study of three or four weapons, and instruction in administration from Army Regulations, then encompassed in one rather thin volume.

Just to telescope the bare rudiments of modern military art into the available time allowed in an already crowded academic curriculum is a feat of no mean proportions. It is not enough that a potential officer have a firm grasp of the fundamentals of his trade. In an atomic age he must be prepared to cope with warfare involving nuclear physics, electronics, international

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel H. Hays graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1942 and from the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1943. He was assigned to the 94th Infantry Division in Europe during World War II, was on occupation duty in Germany with the 39th Infantry, and was Headquarters Commandant, European Theater Intelligence School, at Oberammergau. He was on the faculty at USMA during 1947-50 and received his Master's degree in Political Science in 1950 from Columbia University. He was PMST for three years at Montana State University where he taught General Military Science subjects. He is now Assistant Plans officer on the staff of the Commander, Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.

political strategy, and nationa policy-areas well beyond the d his predecessors of only a few Yet with all the increased deman nical and administrative instru education given fledgling offi equip them above all with those techniques which will enable the age and lead men in battle.

ROTC Junior Division Probably the first requiremen ership is the desire to be a lead there are relatively few means the youth of high school age to tary leadership. The single agen area is the Junior Division of t It dispenses military training to 60,000 students in some 37 mil paratory schools and 262 hig Designed to develop a foundati telligent and patriotic citizensh impressionable teen-age student provide such military instruction ons, drill, and tactics as might individual if called upon to serv points the way toward leadership tary service.

This Junior ROTC has been viewed by many economy minde charged with budget and program Criticism stems from the fact touches only a minority of the schools, has been financed prima Army funds, and does not directl commissioned leaders. On the ot when one considers the very limi being made among the youth of group compared with the extensi ing required of youth in the Sovi the entire problem of leadership at the secondary school level meri consideration. Lacking some form versal military training, there w pear to be a continued need 1 method of presenting the teen-ag ster with the ideals of military se leadership before he is seized by 1