each side has gained a better appreciation of the other's problems, and both are well aware that appropriations are not unlimited.

Joint Command Suggested

Actually, the gap between the existing positions has narrowed considerably and is far from unbridgeable. What is needed now is a fresh push to get off dead center -and it appears to the writer that one way to do this might be to establish a Joint Mobile Command, charged with the preparation of plans for the exploitation of strategic mobility as a deterrent to Soviet peripheral enterprises. One of the first missions of such a command should be to set up and carry out a series of Joint Mobile Exercises, involving, perhaps, the overseas movement of no more than one of the new "Pentomic" infantry battle groups at first. Such exercises should be related successively to the movement of troops to each of the principal areas of our possible strategic interest-for example, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia. The cooperation or active participation of allied and friendly governments should be sought. Thus the exercises would serve not only to indicate the nature of the problems to be encountered and the measures required to remedy defects, but also would be demonstrations of our mobile capability visible to everyone concerned. Moreover, interservice participation in this new command would establish an atmosphere in which the approach to the solution of existing difficulties might be made easier: an accomplishment which would, naturally, require the most painstaking care in the selection of the first commander and of the principal members of his staff.

It goes without saying that the plans and exercises of this command should cover the entire area of strategic mobility

in peripheral and local emergencies, and of the tactical means associated with the commitment of forces to combat under favorable conditions. The experience of the Navy and especially the Marine Corps in amphibious operations, of the Army and Air Force in airborne operations, and the local knowledge of allied forces should be drawn together and woven into a fabric of global mobility appropriate to today's requirements-both of deterrence and of the defeat of Communist initiatives if carried into the realm of action.

The Need Is Increasing

We also should keep in mind that political changes may well bring about changes in military thought which will help us adapt our military programs to the needs of the times. As the prospect of "big war" recedes, at least for the time being, under the inexorable pressure of the nuclear deterrent, the need for the peripheral deterrent increases and surely will be further demonstrated by the enemy. The creation of a Joint Mobile Command and the prompt activation, under its direction, of exercises demonstrating the strategic mobility of our ground forces should be in itself a useful hint to the Kremlin as well as a reassurance to our friends that they will not be left alone to face a future hour of peril.

The deterrent power of our nuclear armaments is credited by Sir Winston Churchill with having preserved Europe from Soviet attack in the years immediately following World War II. Today, Eu rope breathes more easily, but around the vast Communist perimeter live many free peoples who take small comfort from the nuclear umbrella. The threats they fear are of a different character: these threats can best be discounted by "the peculiar deterrent effect of troops upon the sea" and upon airborne wings.

This is the second in a series of articles expanding various aspects of "USA Command and General Staff College Keeps Pace With the Future," written by Major General Lionel C. McGarr, USA, Commandant of the College, and published in the April 1957 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.Editor.

NO OTHER army

in the world is as fortunate as the US Army in the potential of its Reserve components. The vitality and variety of viewpoint, the versatility of skills, the adaptability to changing conditions, and the broad cross section of American "know-how" potentially available in our Army Reserve and National Guard are indispensible assets in the atomic age. More than two-thirds of the Reserve forces of this Nation are Army forces. But the Army is vitally interested in quality even more than quantity, when it measures its reserve strength against the challenge of deterring aggression and of keeping instantly ready to defeat aggression if it

occurs.

The key to quality in the Army's Reserve components is in the peacetime training and education of their potential leaders -the corps of Reserve and National Guard

officers. In case of future war this officer corps, as in past wars, will supplement the small nucleus of the Regular officer corps. Together, these two categories will furnish most of the commanders and general staff officers at division, corps, and army level, and at comparable administrative and logistical support levels.

Keep Reserves Abreast

There exists a normal procedure to bring selected officers of the Active Army to Fort Leavenworth in peacetime to attend resident Command and General Staff courses. However, relatively few of our patriotic National Guard and Reserve officers can spare the necessary time from their very busy civilian occupations to attend such resident courses. To fill the urgent need of the latter at their home stations, the nonresident programs of the College provide other roads to a Leavenworth education. In this era of rapid change, the nonresident programs also fill a pressing requirement for officers of the Active Army. They afford an excellent opportunity for such officers including USA CGSC alumni-to prepare themselves for a tour at Leavenworth or in the latter case to keep themselves abreast of new organizations, techniques, and doctrine.

In its continuing effort to keep pace with the future, the U. S. Army Command and

General Staff College has given emphasis to its "off-campus" curricula. The steady flow of new weapons, ever-improving doctrine, and streamlined organizations designed to meet the radically different conditions of the atomic battlefield are producing major changes in nonresident as well as in resident instruction. In modernizing its curriculum to emphasize employment of new weapons and new organizations, the College firmly believes that "what is good for the resident student is good for the nonresident student." More than 11,000 nonresident officers (mostly from Reserve components) look to the College for command and general staff (CGS) instruction.

It is not expected that a future war will permit a lengthy training period for the bulk of our fighting divisions, nor will it provide time to mass-produce the many thousands of USA CGSC graduates immediately required. To assist in meeting such an emergency, the responsibilities of the College for nonresident instruction are to:

1. Prepare and administer extension (correspondence) courses.

2. Prepare and distribute instructional material suitable for training of the general staffs of National Guard Divisions, Reserve Divisions, and Reserve Logistical Commands.

3. Prepare and distribute programs of instruction, instructional material, and to provide academic guidance to US Army Reserve (USAR) schools for use in their five-year CGS course.

Colonel Edward C. Dunn was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1936. He was a member of the 10th General Staff Class of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1942 and a graduate of the Regular Course in 1951. During World War II he served in Europe with the 4th Cavalry Group (VII Corps, First Army). In July 1955 he was assigned to the faculty of the USA CGSC, where he is Director of the Department of Nonresident Instruction.

Supporting Organization

The College has centralized the responsibility for these activities into a single Department of Nonresident Instruction, organized as shown in Figure 1.

To focus attention on this vital area of College responsibility, the Commandant, in 1956, gave the nonresident department director a second hat and elevated him to Assistant to the Assistant Commandant for Nonresident Instruction. The latter position makes him the principal advisor to the Assistant Commandant on Reserve components affairs and assures continuing top-level attention to the problems of offcampus education.

The internal composition of the nonresident department makes it appear somewhat like a "miniature version" of the resident faculty. All arms and services and experts in every important field are represented.

The majority of the officers assigned to the Department of Nonresident Instruction are employed in writing extension subcourses, since this is the department's most time-consuming task. Extension course writing is essentially a conversion of subjective material to objective techniques. The foremost goal of the subcourse author is to make the student think and thereby improve his decision-making ability. Considerable writing skill as well as a broad professional background is required to convert a resident unit of instruction into an effective self-teaching vehicle. The framing of sound, valid objective tactical and logistical exercises is an art. The use of objective type questions in lesson exercises and examinations, however, does permit a relatively small number of personnel to grade the thousands of answer sheets received from students.

Resident Faculty Helps

All nonresident instructional material is based upon material prepared by the other academic departments for use in resident instruction. Thus almost every member of the College faculty contributes to the ac