Command and General Staff Colleg Maj Gen Lionel C. McGa Brig Gen F. R. Ziera Col W. W. Culp, Arm Col A. S. Buynoski, A Col J. F. Franklin, Jr. Arm Lt Col C. V. McLaughlin, h EDITOR IN CHIEF LT COL RODGER R. BANKSON, INF MANAGING EDITOR LT COL GEORGE B. MACAULAY, ARTY SPECIAL SECTIONS EDITOR LT COL ROBERT M. WALKER, ARTY SPANISH-AMERICAN EDITION Editor MAJ GILBERTO GONZÁLEZ-JULIÁ, INF Assistant Editors MAJ TOMÁS H. GUFFAIN, INF CAPT ORLANDO ORTIZ MORENO, INF BRAZILIAN EDITION Editor LT COL SEBASTIÃO FERREIRA CHAVES, ARTY Assistant Editor MAJ WALDIR DA COSTA GODOLPHIM, ARTY The MILITARY REVIEW disseminates modern military thought and current Army doctrine concerning command and staff procedures of the division and higher echelons and provides a forum for articles which stimulate military thinking. Authors, civilian and military alike, are encouraged to submit articles which will assist in the fulfillment of this mission. POLICY. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in the original articles in this magazine are those of the individual authors and not necessarily precisely those of the Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. Production Officer Editor. The printing of this publication has been approved by MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by J. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav enworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Entered as second-class matter August 31, 1934, at the Post Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: $3.50 US currency) a year in the United States, United States military post offices, and those countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal Union (including Spain): $4.50 a year in all other countries. George Fielding Eliot GLOBAL mobility is the greatest stra tegic advantage possessed by the United States. It is the gift of geography-the insular, two-ocean position occupied by the continent of North America, and the landlocked position of the Soviet Empire. Like all advantages of position, however, it must be understood and implemented to be useful. We cannot maintain true strategic mobility as long as our thinking tends to be immobile. Unhappily, our popular thinking on this military question currently is confused by the notion that limited and peripheral operations involve a danger that they may spread into general nuclear war. This is mere rationalization, quite unsupported by experience. Great international wars do not grow out of chance outbreaks of local hostilities. They are the result of the deliberate decisions of governments. The record of the past two centuries offers no exception to this rule. All the major wars of that period came about because one or more great powers decided to resort to arms to achieve a chosen objective, whether of conquest or security. In no case has a small war "spread" until it became a big one. The decision to go to war has often been based on a conviction of military superiority and hence anticipation of a quick and comparatively cheap victory. Local conditions, or incidents, have not been the causes of any great wars, although they have been seized upon occasionally as convenient excuses by governments already determined upon hostilities. Capitalize on Mobility The conditions of the present time give no room for conviction that a resort to nuclear war could serve any national objective save that of mutual annihilation -which scarcely can be called an objective in any rational view-and certainly rule out all anticipation of swift and inexpensive victory. Indeed, the major nuclear armaments of the United States and Great Britain are avowedly directed to the prevention of such a war by the exercise of an imperatively deterrent influence on the minds of the Soviet leaders, and there are indications that all-out nuclear conflict has small attraction for the Kremlin. The means of deterring the Soviet Government from pursuing its ends by piecemeal methods have not been so clearly established. Indeed, in this area our policy in practice evolved into a series of defensive actions to meet hostile initiatives as these developed. This is not deterrence at all, but mere containment. Surely a far more promising policy could be produced, based on the worldwide mobility of the United States and her allies. This mobility is derived from: 1. Command of the sea and of the airspace above the sea. 2. Outlying bases and overseas deployment of forces. 3. The support of a widespread system of alliances, including many states possessing effective local forces, the whole being linked together by global sea-air Limited and peripheral wars result from deliberate decisions of governments. They do not “spread" into big wars. The basic military peripheral deterrent is an adequate ground force and its delivery systems rogram. da Emited object, and the French f sating advan ation and supported by policy which requires the United States to have military forces with sufficient strength and mobility to react swiftly to Communist local aggression in order to defeat that aggression and prevent its broadening into general war." (Author's italics.) pability can be applied pport of American and = as a true deterrent to viet aggression and to nitiatives of our own t this would require that supported should corve, flexibility, and imagalities possessed by the Its on which they depend. such policies our Miliat constantly is exposed of the economists that n of strategic mobility nse than that required ce of the nuclear deters expense. ars Stay Limited ; to combat such arguitary leaders--more parpokesmen-have shown ndency to preserve the : big wars grow out of emphasizing this possito justify our requirevith peripheral conflicts. Army's interest in strastified Major General Director of Plans, Of· Chief of Staff for Ope Symington committee, from national security ding Eliot is the author War-Hot or Cold," the December 1956 is'ARY REVIEW. Although ed States, he received ation in Australia. He ustralian Imperial Force s and on the Western From 1922 to 1930 he the US Army serving 1 Intelligence Reserves. ival correspondent with Syndicate, Mr. Eliot is Ramparts We Watch; High Explosives; and JSN. It is this last phrase which confuses the issue, by bringing into the considera tion of limited operations the dread sanc use as a lev The main F on the Rhine Frederick the in an unfavc French were last foothold lief by thei Mauritius. Such enterprises are, tions of nuclear conflict which do not be verbiage, that the long in this context. Not only has this any time since 1945, peteral war to accometh it has entertained The device plans in both Elder (after) Soviet Union does not suggest that the the over-all pur- then directed cautious men of the Kremlin (to whom the very adjective "adventuristic" is aght well be thinking Avoid Nuclear Immobility American military thought in the atomic age has not managed to separate its concept of local and limited conflicts on the perimeter of the Soviet empire-bloc from the concept of all-out nuclear war, or at least of maximum effort and risk in each such conflict by the USSR. The idea that a limited risk of our own might be countered by no more than a limited risk by the enemy, and the companion idea that our mobility gives us a vast advantage in he concept of a more acmaybey in which, on suitmay be based useful initia Mobile Threat a in this concept is the Yet when we examine the post-1945 ple deterren ious power. seven batta. Portsmouth ports and ar Augustus K preparation France. Already c the French British amp coasts and They were wide range nation of th ingenuity c diers. "One that it was » against Ma leisle or the were sure Ostend... it was now report ins: Mauritius, Indian Oce the arriva. pearance o to hoist his outbreak o "Troops w Britanny ar veterrent effect of troops purpose was to deter feverish |