the trap on the Roman rear before the weakened center was broken. Annihilation resulted.

Mobility Is Relative

Of course it can be argued that this was not true mobility, that it was a superior scheme of maneuver. Be that as it may, the fact remains that at Cannae the Carthaginians outmaneuvered the Romans and by so doing a numerically very inferior force annihilated the superior Roman legions. The important point is that mobility is relative. It is not necessarily marked by great speed of movement as demonstrated by the Mongols' use of mobility; rather, it is marked by the ability to bring superior force to bear at the decisive place and time.

Throughout the pages of military history are many examples of the decisive use of mobility to overcome enemy forces. Von Schlieffen points out that Frederick the Great repeatedly capitalized on a mobility differential over his enemies to attack and defeat numerically superior forces. Almost habitually Frederick relied upon outmaneuvering the enemy, turning his flanks or flank, and striking deep in the rear. His basic concept appears to be the use of the envelopment, single or double, to annihilate superior forces-much as Hannibal destroyed the Roman army. Frederick's repeated success against numerically superior forces must be attributed to his effective use of mobility since he had no apparent advantage in firepower. Again, this mobility was not achieved by any new equipment or superior gadgetry. Lieutenant Colonel Theodore A. Dodge, US Army, Retired, in his study on Napoleon has this to say:

In the 18th century, European armies did not maneuver much, but the battalions drilled by the old Dessauer (Frederick the Great) were able to do so to a much greater extent than any others Prussian Army could ploy and deploy with considerable rapidity and was wont to

the

take the offensive, and owing to the im. mobility of other armies, it could execute flank marches in the presence of the en emy which might not otherwise have suc ceeded.

Thus the superior mobility enjoyed by the armies of Frederick the Great resulted from his capitalizing on the foot mobility of better trained, better drilled, and bet ter disciplined soldiers.

Prussia's Battle Groups

Frederick's use of mobility introduces some additional considerations of interest to the modern student. Even when opposed by superior forces he did not hesitate to divide his own army into relatively small, independent battle groups. These groups, generally operating beyond mutual support distance, used their mobility to maneuver around the enemy flanks and rear in order to position themselves so they could strike at the decisive point. The maneuver of these widely separated forces was coordinated carefully so that all forces acted concentrically against a common objective. Further, it should be noted that Frederick the Great's schemes of maneuver appeared to concentrate on the annihilation of enemy forces rather than upon the seizure of terrain as such. While he used terrain to the best advantage, his efforts almost invariably were focused on the total destruction of the enemy army by the convergence of mobile battle groups to strike the opposing force entrapped by their maneuvers.

Maneuver regulations of the French Revolutionary armies prescribed the use of the Prussian type linear formation; however, it soon became apparent that the raw levies of citizen-soldiers making up the Revolutionary armies of France were inadequately trained and drilled to be able to handle these rather inflexible formations in battle. The Revolutionary armies gradually evolved more suitable formations for their citizen-soldiers. In general, they adopted the American con

cept of a line of skirmishers to precede their main battle formations. These main formations were made up of a line of deep columns.

Napoleon capitalized on these new concepts and maximized the flexibility and maneuverability permitted by these formations. Like Frederick the Great, Napoleon recognized the tremendous advantages to be gained by capitalizing on the mobility of the foot soldier. His campaign in September and October 1805, terminating in the surrender of Mack's Austrian forces (Baron Karl Mack von Leiberich) at the city of Ulm on 19 October, provides an excellent example of his masterly use of mobility to gain decisive results with minimum fighting. In a little over a month he marched his armies from the English Channel, across the Rhine, into the Danube Valley; surrounded the Austrian forces under Mack, separating them from their Russian allies who were advancing more slowly from the east; and forced Mack's capitulation, without engaging in any really major battles. This again is an example of the effectiveness to be gained by the vigorous exploitation of a superiority in mobility; and again it was a case of achieving this enhanced mobility by capitalizing on improved organization and superior training and conditioning to exploit a mobility potential that was equally available to both forces.

What Are the Lessons?

Are there any lessons to be learned which can be applied to the atomic battlefield? Do these experiences of Genghis Khan, Hannibal, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon provide any lessons which can be applied to the atomic battlefield?

The decisive effect of the proper use of mobility obviously has significant value. However, more to our point, the manner and the means by which these commanders achieved their superiority in mobility is of more interest. Do these methods offer

anything of value to us in preparing for atomic war? It appears that one method by which Genghis Khan achieved tremendous superiority in mobility was by his virtual independence of a logistical tail. Because on the atomic battlefield we cannot hope to live off the country as did the Mongol hordes, there is little doubt that we must concentrate on reducing the immobility imposed by dependence upon an inflexible, unwieldy line of communications. Of equal or greater significance was Genghis Khan's use of a more flexible organization and the advantage given him by superior training in the mobility available to him. In short, superior organization combined with superior training, gave his force greater mobility than that of the opposing armies.

What can we learn from Hannibal's tactics at Cannae? As pointed out previously, it was not so much a matter of Hannibal's forces enjoying superior mobility over the enemy as it was Hannibal's use of the enemy's mobility to his own advantage-call it the judo approach. Hannibal drew the enemy forces into a compressed pocket where they became massed to the point of ineffectiveness and he was able to destroy them. Confronted by an enemy who may possess a mobility advantage, could not a similar mousetrap tactic be adopted? Cannot the enemy be induced to affect a penetration and in the process thereof become compressed into a relatively restricted area which then could be used as an atomic killing-ground by our own forces? It is emphasized that it will be of the utmost importance to hold the shoulders of this penetration so troops will be in position to exploit the effects of defensive atomic fires by attacking and annihilating the enemy forces thus trapped.

Concentrate on Enemy

In a concept of operations on the atomic battlefield of the future, visualizing the use of widely separated, highly mobile,

independent battle groups, it might well be that like Frederick the Great we should orient the application of combat power on the total destruction of enemy troops, rather than on the seizure of critical terrain as such. Further, we should recognize that the maneuver of these independent battle groups should be so planned as to effect a convergence of force on a common objective, such as an enemy troop concentration, at the decisive time in such a way as to lead to the total destruction of that force. It may be that the mobility of our battle groups will be no greater than that of the opposing forces, but success will result from exploiting that mobility better.

To emphasize the lesson, both Frederick and Napoleon took a capability available to their opponents-the mobility of the foot soldier-and by superior drill, conditioning, and training gave their armies a mobility differential over their opponents. Even in this day of guided missiles and atomic power, so long as battle involves conflict between opposing forces on the ground, the mobility of the well-trained and disciplined foot soldier may provide the mobility differential that determines the ultimate victor.

Mental Mobility Pays Off

Finally, it is worthwhile to emphasize what is perhaps the most important lesson: Genghis Khan, Hannibal, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon each achieved superior mobility, or superior use of mobility, over his opponents by the application of means and capabilities enjoyed in common with those enemies. That is to say, none of them developed improved means of transportation, but all of them capitalized on the capabilities they had, exploiting their mobility in a decisive

fashion by concentrating their mass at the critical point and at the decisive time. In general, they achieved their success by exploiting the superior mobility they acquired through improved organization, better training, and better discipline. In large part, the mobility differential those great leaders used to such advantage was mental more than physical.

In summary, the following points appear to stand out:

1. Mobility, when vigorously exploited to permit decisive maneuver, has long been a major factor in the successful conduct of battle. As Lieutenant General C. D. Eddleman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, stated in a report quoted by the February 1957 issue of the Army Information Digest: "It is this mobility differential over the enemy, coupled with the ability to mass firepower, that can ensure victory in battle."

2. Repeatedly in the past a mobility differential has been achieved, not by means of new equipment, but rather by superior use of capabilities common to both sides but overlooked or neglected by

one.

3. Areas which in the past, when properly exploited, have resulted in an advantageous mobility differential have been organization, training, and discipline.

4. We must recognize the fact that the scientist can give us at best a temporary advantage in the field of mobility over our enemy. However, the commander who makes the most of what he has, who develops a disciplined unit conditioned to withstand long periods of exertion, and who best trains his units to capitalize on their inherent mobility will have the means for achieving victory on either the atomic battlefield or the nonatomic battlefield.

MUCH

UCH has been written and said about the contributions of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) and justly so. The officers assigned to this advisory group are dedicated to the advancement and improvement of the ROK Army, and have been most successful. Their military abilities are respected, and their counsel is sought on decisions, large and small.

But little has been written or said about the other face of the coin-the contribution KMAG and the ROK Army make toward the training and career advancement of the United States officer assigned as a KMAG advisor. Too much acceptance has been given to the attitude that the KMAG tour is a 16-month "Undesirable Tour of Duty" which a certain unlucky percentage of our officers must undergo. The adverse publicity given to duty in Korea during the conflict and the natural desire of officers to serve with United States units has placed KMAG duty low on the assignment preference lists of most US commissioned personnel.

Recent graduates and former instruccors of US military colleges are quick to detect and point out the educational advantages available to the officer who serves with KMAG.

The graduate of the U. S. Army Comnand and General Staff College is impressed with the fact that he not only can out the "goose eggs" on his map, but accually can go to that spot on the ground and see the disposition of the troops, And, what is even better, he finds at the troop unit a

commander who is an ardent student of US field manuals and who is seeking advice as to how he can improve his troop dispositions, his plans, and the operations of his unit.

The graduate of a US service school usually will find many of his classmates in the officer corps of the Republic of Korea Army units he visits. He will find them alert, forward looking, and capable. They are quick to show him how US doctrine and principles are being applied in small-unit training and tactics, and are most receptive to constructive criticism and advice. Here, the advisor has a wonderful opportunity to broaden his experience and to observe in practice the lessons he has learned in his prior schooling. He can assist in the development of effective training techniques and sound operational plans, and can observe the application of tactical doctrine at levels of his own choosing.

The United States advisor who is interested in operational or logistical planning has at his fingertips operational plans (and supporting logistical plans) from a level comparable to army group down to and including the battalion. What is even more advantageous, he can travel to observation posts, command posts, fortifications, and logistical installations and actually observe the ground and see the steps being taken to implement these plans. Further, by light aircraft he can observe the area from coast to coast, thus making the plans much more realistic.

The student of logistics has unlimited