numerically superior force of Federal General Joseph Hooker. Preceded only by a few scouts Jackson personally led his corps over this route and achieved such surprise that the Union Army of the Potomac was routed. He deployed the units and through his sole supervision brought the battle to its climax, which offered to serve the North one of its most decisive defeats in that war.

At this critical time Jackson was wounded by his own troops while on reconnaissance, a particularly unfortunate event because he was the only man in the corps acquainted with the dispositions of all of the units, and he was not able to communicate with anyone.

His intention had been to cut the enemy retreat at Union Ford, yet he could not pass on that intention to any other person. He had designated no second in command and to make matters worse several of his senior officers, and logical successors, were wounded at about the same time. Needless to say the entire effort came to a standstill.

In the resulting chaos General J. E. B. Stuart rose to the occasion and assumed command of the leaderless corps without knowledge of the unit dispositions or a plan to exploit the success. He made a valiant attempt to continue the attack but the initiative was lost by a lack of knowledge of the task as well as the loss of Jackson. The Federals recovered but Jackson did not and the South lost one of its most successful generals whose love for secrecy died with him.

There are any number of case histories which tend to prove that the proper application of the principles of leadership most often is the secret of success while

lack of proper application produces failure in one form or another. While a single leader seldom is able to achieve complete mastery of the principles in their entirety, almost without exception great leaders consciously or unconsciously practice a majority of the principles.

Principles Are Valid

The principles of leadership are, in some cases, so closely allied in meaning that at times it is hard to distinguish one from another. In violating the principles set the example and ensure that the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished General Custer also appears to have violated the principles keep your men informed, know your men and look out for their welfare, and make sound and timely decisions. Another study of the life of Custer might result in an entirely different set of violations, foremost of which might be know yourself and seek self-improvement.

While Stonewall Jackson was steadfast in the application of most of the principles of leadership it was his violation of the principle ensure that the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished that cost the South heavily at the Battle of Seven Days and later at Chancellorsville. Both times victory was within the grasp of General Lee and each time the loss of complete victory could be traced to Jackson who, like Custer, failed to keep your men informed.

Thus it is that one man was a great leader in almost every aspect of that art, yet the downfall he suffered because he could not or would not trust his subordinates was just as costly as that suffered by a man who violated almost every one of the sound principles of leadership.

THE

HE word KATUSA is almost forgotten. About the most it produces today is a faint glimmer of recollection. Yet it wasn't long ago that KATUSA seemed like the answer to many soldiers' prayers. For a while it promised to solve what was probably the most pressing problem in Korea at the time-combat manpower. How the unusual, perhaps unique program worked is in itself interesting; why it failed is significant; together, these items add up to a lesson.

In studying the KATUSA lesson it must be emphasized that we are examining a specific, separate program and the draftees it produced-not the trained Republic of Korea (ROK) soldier or the ROK Army in general.

Many Obvious Advantages KATUSA came into being not long after the start of the Korean conflict. The army of the Republic of Korea had been hit hard and faced a staggering task of reorganization while still under attack. The American units committed on the Korean peninsula had been maintained at low peacetime strengths and they suffered extremely large numbers of casualties in the early engagements. Some infantry companies quickly were reduced in size to 50 men; a company of 75 soldiers was not uncommon. Out of this situation emerged the KATUSA idea-augmenting US combat units by integrating Republic of Korea soldiers into American ranks.

Korean Army Troops, US Army.

The idea had many advantages. Since American replacements were not immediately available, Korean troops rapidly would build up the committed US units to near-authorized strengths. They would give American units troops familiar with the unusual terrain, climate, and language of that remote part of the world. They would, in a relatively short time, become familiar with and trained in US military methods and techniques. Also, reconstituting depleted American ranks with Koreans would make it possible to absorb into the armed forces for immediate use against the aggressor more Koreans than the Korean Army could handle at the moment.

The details were worked out by representatives of the Eighth US Army in Korea, the US Military Advisory Group to Korea, and the Republic of Korea Army who met in mid-August 1950 and formulated the KATUSA plan. It was no easy task. They had to decide how they might best procure, equip, train, transport, and integrate approximately 40,000 Korean soldiers quickly into the four American divisions then committed in Korea and a fifth still in Japan.

They decided to share the burden. The Republic of Korea would procure the troops by means of its own regular governmental machinery. The ROK Army, with the help of American supervisors, would train the new troops. The US Army would equip and transport them to the units which would integrate them. Pay

ment of troops, disciplinary control, and courts-martial jurdisdiction would remain a responsibility of the ROK Army. Special Korean teams were to be placed on duty with US units to administer KATUSA personnel, and a special section of the ROK Army Adjutant General's Department would handle KATUSA records.

The way it worked was simple. Each KATUSA soldier was processed through a ROK Army reception center where he received a uniform and a carbine or a rifle. (The initial American problem here was obtaining clothing-particularly shoes -in small sizes for Koreans.) Equipped, the KATUSA soldier then went to one of several training centers for 10 days, during which he learned to fire his weapon and was given basic instruction in such subjects as personal hygiene, field sanitation, and military discipline. The centers turned out a total of at least 500 trained Koreans each day for the US divisions. Thus every fourth day each of the four American divisions in Korea received 500 KATUSA troops. Additional troops in training were assembled for shipment to the fifth US division still in Japan. The plan looked so good that the decision was made to augment a sixth US division, also in Japan.

Captain Martin Blumenson is the author of "The Hammelburg Mission," which appeared in the May 1955 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW. During World War II he served in Europe as a combat historian with the Third and Seventh Armies. He was an instructor in history at the US Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, and at Hofstra College, Hempstead, New York. Recalled to active duty in 1950, he went to Korea where he commanded the 3d Historical Detachment. In 1952 he was assigned to the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, where he wrote Breakout and Pursuit, a volume in the United States Army in World War II European subseries. He served as historian of Joint Task Force Seven and participated in Operation Redwing in 1956. He requested release from active duty last spring and since then has been a civilian historian with the Office, Chief of Military History.

To Bolster Company Units The augmentation of US units was t take place at the infantry company an artillery battery level. Each company and battery was to receive no more than 100 Koreans. How they were to be integrate was left to the discretion of each US di vision commander. Yet he was not to us them as common laborers or cargo car riers. He was to provide them with the same gratuitous issue of quartermaster items that US soldiers received. He was te give them the same medical care in the combat area, but KATUSA soldiers re quiring hospital treatment would be evac uated to ROK Army hospitals.

When KATUSA soldiers first appeared at US units, American officers and men welcomed them with open arms. They were glad to see fresh troops coming in. Unfortunately, initial optimism soon faded. The program did not work out as expected.

The first place where the system broke down was in the procurement of KATUSA troops. Because of the chaos in South Korea during the first few months of the conflict, recruiting was simply a matter of gathering people off the streets. One soldier showed up at his US unit carrying his briefcase containing business papers; he had been on his way to work when recruited. Another KATUSA soldier had been enlisted while he was on his way home from the pharmacy with medicine for his sick wife; he still had the pills in his pocket when he reported for duty.

Not only recruiting but processing the draftees posed difficulties which resulted in deficiencies. Because of a lack of Korean medical facilities, KATUSA soldiers were not immunized against disease. American medical officers, operating with shortages of supplies for Americans, naturally were concerned about the possible introduction of disease and the increased potentiality of epidemic disease.

Lacking classification machinery, the ROK Army had no way of knowing how many potential leaders, if any, were part

of any one increment sent to the training centers. Some groups of men had no individuals capable of being developed into good noncommissioned officers in the time available and under conditions then existing. How important this was soon became obvious from the repeated reiterations of American commanders on the need for Korean leaders.

Training a Major Problem

The training was the second place where the system broke down. Even before the training centers were established, each US division received an initial increment of 250 untrained Koreans. Some units were able to give these KATUSA troops two or three weeks of training; but others were forced to commit them to combat at once. The units able to train their Koreans before combat generally found that they soon were able to give a creditable performance. The units which had no time to train the new men naturally found them unfit"they didn't so much as know how to load a rifle."

It should not have been surprising when the original 250 KATUSA troops received by the 2d Division and committed immediately with a battalion of the 9th Infantry were overrun during the night of 31 August 1950. The division reported "many desertions and stragglers," a report which must be judged against the further admission that "straggling was not confined to the ROK personnel." The second KATUSA increment to the 2d Division500 soldiers who had received 84 hours of training before their arrival-"had excellent morale and have done good work as combat riflemen." "ROK personnel with this division are doing well," came the report. Yet two weeks later the division bleakly stated, without comment, that KATUSA troops had abandoned their positions during an enemy attack.

Experience elsewhere was similar. The 1st Cavalry Division reported the KATUSA's "susceptible to training," yet

observed that when they were in a fire fight they expended ammunition "rapidly with little or no results." It was difficult to get them to move forward to make contact with the enemy. "This situation may improve with time and experience" was a hopeful note; but 10 days later the division reported that KATUSA troops had left their positions on several occasions, thereby "jeopardizing the . . . remaining American troops."

No matter how the US divisions integrated their KATUSA troops into the ranks, the deficiencies of procurement and of training were apparent. The 2d Division, which fed its KATUSA troops into the existing units, estimated KATUSA combat effectiveness after a week or so of experience (in early September) as between 25 and 75 percent that of American troops. The division artillery, which used Koreans as wiremen and interior guards, estimated their effectiveness at 80 percent; the military police company rated them 90 percent effective. Ten days later these estimates declined to an over-all figure of 50 percent, and by mid-October they were down to 10 percent.

Buddy System Helped

The 25th Division not only paired a KATUSA soldier with an American "buddy" in the infantry companies to facilitate the passing on of military knowhow, but also formed several platoons and one entire company of Koreans as an experiment. After about two weeks the division estimated its KATUSA personnel as having a combat effectiveness of 25 percent that of American troops. Ten days later the division found that Koreans in the buddy system were 50 percent effective; those organized into separate platoons and squads under American noncommissioned officers were 35 percent effective. KATUSA troops in various sections of the lettered artillery batteries were 25 percent effective; those with the reconnaissance company 60 percent. By

mid-October, after all the KATUSA troops had been integrated into the existing squads, the division estimated 60 percent effectiveness in the reconnaissance company, an efficiency of 48 percent in one regiment, and between 20 and 35 in the other units.

The 24th Division used its Koreans as riflemen in the infantry squads, as litter bearers in the medical companies, and as security troops for artillery positions. Estimated combat effectiveness as infantrymen increased from 10 percent in early September to 45 percent by the following month; for the other elements an average of 30 percent. The division reported better than average success when each Korean worked with two American buddies.

The 1st Cavalry Division took its KATUSA soldiers into the infantry squads as riflemen, assistant machinegunners, communications linemen, and ammunition bearers; into the artillery gun squads as linemen and security guards for line crews; and into the reconnaissance company as riflemen, scouts, and observers. Combat effectiveness during the month of September was judged as 50 percent.

Two Controlling Factors

The relatively low performance ratings for KATUSA personnel were the result, basically, of two factors. First, they could not have adequate training. They did not know how to use their weapons. They were unschooled in team tactics. They had not been trained in modern field sanitation practices. They had not had enough training in military discipline and sometimes were difficult to control. (Since offenders had to be turned over to the Korean Army, US units could not administer corrective measures rapidly enough for effective remedy.) In short, 10 days of indoctrination in a training center could not produce soldiers no matter how thorough the program.

Second, there was a vast language and cultural separation between Koreans and

Americans. There never were enough English-speaking Koreans or Koreanspeaking US personnel to achieve sound understanding and integration and to permit true coordination and control of all troops in combat. Besides placing an additional burden on all combat leaders, the language barrier made it impossible to train Koreans in the technical aspects of weapons and gunnery.

The cultural difference, although more subtle, was no less a problem. The Korean draftee could not be expected to grasp the American concept of everyday living. Understandably, he was bewildered by a new world not only of attitudes and habits but of strange people and machines. The problem of adjustment for a man suddenly thrown into the complex pattern of living in a highly organized modern army in combat could not be solved in so short a period of time.

There was no time for Americans to develop with Koreans the personal relationships necessary for the proper performance of an infantry squad-that echelon where a man's life depends to a large extent on the action of his companions. Where his life was at stake the trained soldier on the line could not be tolerant of any mistake, failure, or undependability, even though the cause might be inexperience or lack of understanding.

Some Performed Well

As a result of the lack of training, the language barrier, and the difference in cultural background the Koreans were unable to perform skilled technical jobs. They d'd not know or understand supply discipline. Many could not perform well in ndependent positions such as outposts and listening posts and on guard duty, yet they were quite effective with artillery and service units. Artillerymen used them in the higher numbered positions in the gun squads, where commands could be relayed by arm and hand signals, and as security guards. Ordnance units found them to be