careful welders and good mechanics. Signal units discovered them useful as guards and wiremen. The KATUSA soldiers obviously tried to be of service in a situation as difficult for them as for the US troops they sought to help. But during the initial and early periods of the experiment—the critical time, when combat troops were needed desperately their lack of training often tended to make them as much a burden as a help. Their appearance brought joy to US soldiers in depleted units, but the mere presence of more men in uniform was not enough. Two months after the start of the program, after about 15,000 Koreans had reached US units, the KATUSA experiment was curtailed. In the latter part of October 1950, Eighth US Army headquarters permitted the American divisions to return to the Korean Army those KATUSA soldiers not yet up to standard. The divisions immediately reduced their KATUSA strengths by several thousand; 6.000 Koreans were brought back from Japan. These troops, who had practical training while with American units, formed the cadres of new Korean Army units. Soon afterward, as American replacement troops became available in increasing numbers, the divisions were allowed to reduce their KATUSA soldiers from the original basis of 100 per company to 25. No additional KATUSA assignments were made to US combat troops, but service units and rear area installations, where KATUSA soldiers performed well, continued to receive limited numbers of them until April 1951. Those who remained with the US combat elements for several months eventually were sufficiently trained by combat to be an asset to their organizations. They proved invaluable in handling refugees, in securing information from civilians, and in establishing identities of orientals during night operations. If a natural selec tivity toward the survival of the fittest prevailed, those KATUSA troops still with US units in 1951 were competent, seasoned soldiers. Unfortunately, when a Korean was evacuated from his US unit for medical or other reasons, he was lost to the command, for he returned to duty through Korean Army replacement channels to a Korean unit. The fact that US troops clamored for a change in this arrangement proved that a good soldier always is appreciated by other soldiers. Experience Made Soldiers A year after the program began only a few KATUSA soldiers were left. In the words of a division commander, these troops by then were highly trained, welldisciplined, and skilled combat soldiers serving for the most part with infantry companies. They are of the utmost value as fighting soldiers, interpreters, and in contacts with Korean civilians. By then, the original impetus for the program was long since gone. The need had been met by different means. Although the KATUSA program did provide essential assistance to depleted US forces, as an emergency measure to provide combat effective soldiers immediately it failed. The rapidity of the integration program, the lack of training and the consequent absence of military skills among the KATUSA members, and the profound language and cultural differences made the KATUSA solution fall short of the immediate goal. But this was due to no inherent Korean deficiency. No nationality group so different from Americans could have performed with greater effectiveness. Only after several months of association did better understanding, partial grasp by each group of the other's language and customs, and military training bring about real integration. Those KATUSA soldiers who survived and who demonstrated an ability to adapt to a new situation and absorb a rigorous training on the battlefield made the transi tion. Unfortunately, they were only a handful when compared with the number fed into the program. Lesson for the Future In this age of speed when armed conflict may develop literally overnight, when the weapons of war can produce chaos in a matter of seconds, and when trained foot soldiers on the ground well may be the only agency capable of restoring some semblance of order, there is a lesson in the KATUSA experience. The lesson points to the need for a continued Military Assistance Advisory Group program throughout the free world, a MAAG program of military cooperation devoted to preparing combat troops for instant readiness to meet the challenge of emergency. Implicit in the MAAG effort should be the intent to create a body of linguists among our own troops and among our allies for the administrative echelons as well as for the combat level-troops not only linguistically effective but also combat ready. If, as seems likely, war in the future will open with a violent and devastating shock, the capacity to regain combat effectiveness at once may well determine the outcome of the conflict. Trained troops provide the best guarantee of an outcome favorable to the free world. TO OUR READERS The United States Army Command and General Staff College has several important missions-of major importance is the preparation and presentation of high-level instruction to mature and experienced officers in resident and nonresident courses each year. In order to place our doctrine and tactical concepts ahead of the technological and organizational changes taking place in our Army today we found it necessary to accomplish a complete rewrite of all instructional material to be used in the academic year of 1958. The printing of this new material as compared with previous years has imposed a critical load upon the facilities of the Army Field Printing Plant at Leavenworth, which supports the MILITARY REVIEW in addition to the instructional requirements of the United States Army Command and General Staff College. Your copy of the MILITARY REVIEW has been delayed slightly each month this spring and summer. We solicit your understanding of the important reasons necessitating this delay and we will return to schedule at the earliest opportunity. Editor. Must It Change? Lieutenant Colonel Keith M. Schmedemann, Infantry We must get rid of the logistical tail. Large supply complexes are a thing of the past. The system must be responsive to the needs of the command. We must have flexibility and mobility. T HESE HESE and similar statements are frequently heard arguments and criticisms for bringing our administrative support system and organization into line with new atomic warfare concepts. No forwardthinking individual would question WHY we must view critically our practices in the past for providing support for combat forces; but HOW is this reorientation to be accomplished? Does the advent of atomic weapons make obsolete existing concepts and doctrine for administrative support? Methods of World War II and Korea would generate highly lucrative targets on the atomic battlefield. And to add to the problem, technological advances have increased the complexities of modern warfare equipment, making it more difficult to have the right item at the right place at the right time. The concepts and doctrine for the employment of tactical units have not been scrapped, but they constantly are undergoing critical analysis with resulting changes leading to improvements. The administrative support func tion is difficult to analyze on paper, on maneuvers, or in simulated field exercises, so there is a need to be realistic in viewing the system. Past experience in combat must not be disregarded entirely. Even the atomic battlefield will require supplies and services for the forces engaged. It is time to place in proper perspective the organization, methods, and principles for providing administrative support for combat forces under conditions of atomic warfare. Aggressor will not be concerned with our organizational charts. He will not care if the support organization has technical service directors or purely functional subdivisions. Operational control versus command channels will mean little to him. However, he will be searching for targets -installations and units which will make it possible for him to inflict the greatest damage, per weapon expended, to our capability of supporting and maintaining combat effectiveness. These targets may be supply or transportation facilities, but command and control means also have increased in significance as potential atomic targets. One Mission-or Two? Is there a need for separating the administrative support mission and functions from the tactical mission and functions? Does the advent of atomic weapons make existing concepts and doctrine for administrative support obsolete? No, not if intelligence and vision are applied now to solving problems posed for these weapons In a military organization there are two basic tasks: one is fighting and the other is providing administrative support. Present doctrine provides for control of these two functions in a theater of operations by assigning to a communications zone or comparable commander the responsibilities for administrative support so the major tactical commanders may be able to devote their attentions to the tactical employment of their units. The magnitude of the tasks in large-scale operations requires division of the missions. The type of activities involved makes it feasible to separate the two. However, this separation is not a complete cleavage. In the "rear" the emphasis is on administrative support, but attention is oriented on combat operations in proximity to the enemy. Additionally, there is considerable "gray" area, and the functions of combat and combat support will become more closely related on the atomic battlefield as time and space factors are reduced. The present mission of the communications zone is to provide administrative support-except personnel replacement-for all Army units located in the theater, and such administrative support of Navy, Air Force, allied, and other forces as may be directed. The communications zone commander exercises territorial control within the communications zone. Lieutenant Colonel Keith M. Schmedemann is a graduate of Kansas State College, and in 1950 received his Master of Arts degree from the American University, Washington, D. C. His service during World War II was with the 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division. Postwar duties have included Headquarters, V Corps; Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Department of the Army General Staff. He was battalion commander and regimental executive officer, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, during the Korean conflict. He completed the Advanced Course of The Infantry School, and upon his graduation from the 1954-55 Regular Course of the USA CGSC was assigned to the faculty where he now is with the Department of Larger Units and Administrative Support. The future mission of the administrative support commander in an atomic theater will be similar to that stated above. However, several aspects will gain added importance. The lines of communications and the support areas must be defended. Damage control and rear area defense will be major problems, particularly if operations are in areas with unfriendly civilian populations, and if the installations are within the range of the enemy's tactical delivery means for atomic weapons. The adminis tration of the civilian population and the provision of minimum essential care for, civilians will have a serious effect upon the accomplishment of the military mission. The administrative support commander may be required to reorient the political control of the countries involved. And it can be assumed that future warfare will find US forces fighting under the United Nations flag with such attendant problems as handling supplies documented in foreign languages, procuring and distributing different types of rations, and maintaining equipment of types different from US manufacture or US equipment given allies under military aid programs (the latter category may include equipment since replaced in the US Armed Forces). Many of the future aspects of the administrative support mission are pure conjecture. Therefore, it is logical to restrict considerations here to the more tangible aspects of the mission-supporting the forces. Must Calculate Risks Combat operations always have involved a risk. In the future the risk will extend from the frontline foxhole to the limits of the enemy's means to deliver his destructive power. The risk will be the greatest wherever our vulnerability is the greatest. But it must be a calculated risk. The support commander must know at all times his vulnerability to mass destruction weapons. He must know at all times the relative vulnerability of each 1 class of supply, of items (if they are critical), of units, and of other means at his disposal to perform his mission. He must visualize that an entire installation can be lost in a single mass destruction attack. The success of the support commander on the atomic battlefield will depend upon his ability to calculate his risks, to reduce his risks to acceptable proportions, and to continue his administrative support mission after an attack. Reorganization No Panacea A logical approach toward sound appraisal of administrative support capability is to analyze the organization. Current doctrine emphasizes flexibility of organization. The organization is as flexible and adaptable as the imagination and foresight of the commanders and staffs assigned thereto. The combat zone and the support or communications zone are divided under current doctrine (for valid reasons already discussed). However, there is no reason why the communications zone must be adjacent to the combat zone. The support organization may be separated by a water barrier or may be within the area of the combat zone, as in the case of an independent and air-supported operation. Current doctrine on territorial organization of the communications zone provides for employment of an intermediate section only if required. On the atomic battlefield it may be advantageous to employ more headquarters to facilitate decentralization of control, provide for alternate commands, and afford closer supervision. A headquarters is not expensive in manpower if it contributes to the over-all effectiveness of the organization and if it exped tes the performance of the support mission. It may be expedient to employ an intermediate section or similar headquarters to control some of the theater of operations functions not directly concerned with the support of military forces. Although the concepts and principles of organization are sound, reorganization of an existing organization may be required if it is not adaptable under atomic conditions. There must be no resistance to reorganization whenever the conditions for rendering the support are changed. Because the atomic war of the future will be fought under a greatly accelerated timetable, there is a need for development of type administrative support forces for each type of support operation in which this country may become engaged. The predictable types of organizations needed are those which could provide support in a general war on a large land mass, in a peripheral war, and in conjunction with atomic striking forces to afford them an independent operating capability. And, of course, it will be necessary to provide some organization capable of achieving a smooth transition of supply and other support from the Zone of Interior to the combat forces in the field. A new or changed organizational concept is not the panacea for administrative support on the atomic battlefield. However, there are many opportunities and requirements for improvement and if improvements in current support means and methods are not developed our installations and units providing administrative support may provide Aggressor with his most lucrative targets on the atomic battlefield. Areas for Improvement Why should Aggressor place several atomic weapons on the battalions or combat groups of an infantry division advancing to an unfordable river, if three well-placed weapons might destroy the river-crossing equipment for an entire corps? Why expend several atomic weapons on an armored division, which is a mobile and easily dispersed target, if a series of guerrilla raids and small-yield weapons can destroy the petroleum, oil, |