favor one infantry division in the position defense along Mill River. Now if I don't permit Aggressor to cross in the east he will be forced to try the west. The terrain favors this anyway. I must base my entire defense plan on forcing him to penetrate in the western sector, controlling this penetration to the extent that he will have to mass, and then destroying his forces in the penetration by atomic fires and my striking force. "I must provide for a strong covering force with atomics to get the maximum delay. I'll consider giving both infantry divisions in the forward defensive area a limited number of atomics to ensure accomplishment of their assigned missions. The bulk of my atomics will be kept in corps reserve. "My ability to control Aggressor, compress him into a suitable target, and then destroy him will result in success for my corps." Based on all available information, the Commanding General, I Corps, now would present his planning guidance which would include his general idea as to the manner in which the operation should be conducted. As a result of his staff's estimates, his own estimate of the situation, and his decision the corps commander then would issue his concept of operations as follows: Concept of the Operation sor to penetrate to Line Red, only if Aggressor masses sufficient strength to do so. The 20th Division as the corps covering force holds Aggressor north of security Line Zilch until 032100 August, achieves maximum delay in order to provide adequate time for the preparation of the Mill River line area; then corps striking force. The 111th Armored Group (—) Upon completion of night withdrawal from present positions, corps conducts a mobile defense in sector permitting Aggressor to penetrate generally to Line Red, at which time the 20th Armored Division (Reinforced), supported by atomic weapons, counterattacks to seal off and destroy Aggressor forces in the penetration. The 10th Infantry Division conducts a position defense of the Mill River line in its sector to prevent crossings and to force the enemy to cross farther upstream. The 5th Infantry Division conducts a mobile defense in sector permitting Aggres sion. Other atomic weapons will be employed under corps control forward of the Mill River in support of the frontline divisions and the corps striking force and behind FEBA in support of corps counterattacks. Surface bursts will not be employed without prior approval of army. Maximum damage to Aggressor personnel and armor is desired without exceeding moderate damage to friendly forces. The purpose of the concept of operations is to amplify the decision to ensure there will be complete understanding of just how the corps commander visualizes the conduct of this operation. Operation Plan Next the operation order would be issued. Part of the operations overlay accompanying this order is shown in Figure 2. The 5th Infantry Division would have the following attachments: a medium tank battalion, an armored cavalry regiment (-), a light howitzer battalion (105-mm self-propelled), and a transportation light truck battalion (-). The 10th Infantry Division would have the following attached: a light howitzer battalion (105-mm SP), a transportation light truck company, and an armored cavalry battalion. While on the covering force mission the 20th Armored Division would have attached a medium tank battalion, the armored cavalry regiment to be attached later to the two infantry divisions, an armored engineer battalion, and a field artillery group consisting of two medium howitzer battalions (155-mm SP), one heavy gun battalion (155-mm SP), three heavy howitzer battalions (8-inch SP), two automatic weapon battalions of antiaircraft artillery, and the two light howitzer battalions (105-mm SP) to be attached to the infantry divisions later. Barriers Planning Barriers of all types would be used in the organization of the defense. The plan ning and execution of the concept of the mobile defense with its wider and deeper sectors clearly indicates the pressing need for barriers in depth as a part of a corps defensive plan. Barriers employed will depend upon the available labor, time, equip ment, and matériel available, and in the mobile defense provides potent assistance to the commander in the execution of his missions. The barrier plan is designed to deny certain areas so that the defender can achieve additional control over the enemy. In other words, it is desired to canalize the Aggressor forces into areas where they can be destroyed by atomic weapons in conjunction with counterattacks. However, barriers must not hinder the movement of the striking force or shifting of strong points. Atomic Employment A five-day allocation period would be used as a control measure to reserve for the corps commander the ability to weight the operations as necessary in implementing his decisions throughout the entire period. Atomic weapons are allocated to the 10th Infantry Division since, in the position defense which it will adopt, the division reserve is comparatively small. The division commander must have immediate control of atomic weapons power to ensure holding his position along the Mill River. Atomic weapons are allocated to the 20th Armored Division for use only while on the covering force mission. Any weapons remaining after the completion of the covering force mission will revert to corps reserve immediately. Forces other than the covering force will be specifically prohibited from using atomic weapons or fires until after the withdrawal of the covering force south of the Mill River line and on corps order. Atomic weapons are allocated initially to the 5th Infantry Division which is in the mobile defense. The concept of the mobile defense visualizes using the bulk of the corps combat power to destroy the enemy at the time and place desired by the corps commander. Friendly forces must force the enemy to form suitable atomic targets and then capitalize on this situation by striking with atomics and exploiting forces. However, the 5th Infantry Division should have atomic weapons for use in local counterattacks and to facilitate generally the accomplishment of its mission. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Maxwell D. Taylor, has said: It may not be too much to say that the purpose of land maneuver tends to become that of finding or forming suitable enemy atomic targets, then of exploiting the effect of atomic fire. The remainder of the available atomic weapons are retained in corps reserve. The essence of the mobile defense is strong counteraction. The corps commander must maintain sufficient atomic means and maneuverability to ensure his retention of this counteraction capability. He must be able to take immediate advantage of any suitable opportunity to destroy the enemy. The foregoing represents the initial allocation of atomic means. Subordinate commanders certainly have the duty and prerogative of requesting atomic weapons and fires they consider necessary during the conduct of the defense. The covering force commander will use his allocated atomic weapons to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission. More specifically, he probably will use these atomic weapons to achieve disengagement of his forces should they become heavily engaged. Atomic firepower properly used by the covering force commander can cause considerable delay, confusion, and damage to Aggressor. The use of atomics should reduce the number of disengagement type maneuver counterattacks required of the covering force. This use of atomics should fending strong defensible terrain may need fewer weapons than a division defending terrain which definitely favors the attacker. In the present case, however, the concept invites a penetration in the sector of the 5th Infantry Division—but only if Aggressor is willing to mass sufficient force to effect a penetration. By his aggressive conduct of the defense the commander hopes to overcome his initial disadvantage in the matter of relative combat strengths. The judicious allocation of atomics can alter the relative strength picture markedly. The defender must have the ability to counter quickly any capability which the enemy may choose to adopt. The allocation of atomic weapons and fires provides the corps commander with a flexible, positive method of counteracting the enemy's adoption of certain of his capabilities. Priority Allocation In the situation depicted the Commanding General, I Corps, recognizes that he has a wide front to cover, relatively few forces, and a comparatively limited number of atomic weapons for a 15-day period. The disposition of forces, counterattack plans, fire and barrier plans, and atomic weapon allocation are interrelated closely and cannot be considered unilaterally. For example, in allocating available atomic weapons, the bulk of the weapons must be retained in corps reserve. Since sufficient means to destroy the enemy must be retained, this use of atomic weapons is the first priority. Additionally, the corps must have adequate time to prepare the defensive sector and still ensure a powerful striking force. Therefore, the second priority is the allocation of atomic weapons to the covering force. Finally, the last priority considered is the allocation of atomic weapons to the divisions in the forward defensive area to support the planned commitment of the corps striking force and to permit the accomplishment of other assigned missions. Certainly the corps commander would be interested vitally in two methods avail able to him to maintain adequate control and initiative in the defense, that is, limited offensive actions and counterattacks Limited Offensive Actions Assume that the covering force has completed its assigned mission successfully and Aggressor has closed with the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at 040300 August. The time is early morning 5 August. During the preceding evening heavy Aggressor vehicular traffic has been reported. However, the organic mechanized divisions of the Aggressor rifle corps opposing I Corps have not moved. Clandestine sources, patrol action, and aerial photos indicate the concentration of an Aggressor rifle division in the vicinity of Beanville (Figure 1). All indications point to an early attack by Aggressor to seize the high ground near Horton. In light of such information, the corps commander must consider various courses of action before making a decision concerning this Aggressor concentration. Possible courses of action dealing with the concentration are: 1. Do nothing. 2. Request additional atomic fires from army to attack this concentration. 3. Use many of the comparatively limited atomics available to I Corps and attack by atomic fires alone. 4. Use a lesser number of the I Corps atomic allocation and exploit these atomic fires by one of the following: a. The entire corps striking force. b. A portion of the corps striking force. c. The striking force of the 5th Infantry Division. d. An armored cavalry sweep. f. Nonatomic fires. 5. Use only nonatomic means (air, artillery, and ground maneuver elements) to attack the concentration. These courses of action should be analyzed in light of the mission, the area of operations, relative combat strengths, and enemy capabilities. Limited objective attacks involving ground maneuver are undertaken only when conditions are highly favorable. This is true even though ground exploitation should follow the use of atomic weapons if feasible. Against numerically superior forces the use of atomic weapons facilitates action previously considered impossible. The following items would be considered carefully by the corps commander before deciding which course of action to adopt: 1. Atomic. a. Are the atomic means presently available to I Corps sufficient to destroy this concentration by atomic fires alone? b. What is the projected allocation of atomics by army to I Corps in the future? c. Will army attack this target with larger atomic weapons under its control? d. How can I Corps best utilize its allocated atomics in view of pending Aggressor attacks? 2. Air. a. Can local control of the air be gained to permit a limited objective attack? b. Is a helicopterborne attack feasible? 3. Time. How long will this attack take if ground maneuver is used? 4. Terrain. a. Does the terrain favor ground maneuver in the area? b. Is the fordable Mill River a formidable enough obstacle to preclude an attack? 5. Enemy Capabilities. a. Will the corps be exposed needlessly to atomic attack? b. Are there Aggressor elements capable of influencing any ground action I Corps may undertake and if so, to what extent? 6. Enemy Dispositions. Do present Aggressor dispositions particularly favor one or more of the courses of action? |