weighed and solved. The second reason is not quite as obvious. It is probable that the initial phase of total war will be followed by a much weakened effort by one side to deliver the final blow to the other. This leads to the assumption that the second phase will be fought by limited forces whose original stocks of large atomic weapons have been expended or destroyed.

The remaining atomic weapons will be those of smaller yield which best lend themselves to use in the tactical role. Hence it appears that destiny may lead armies along diverse but converging routes to the point where the general atomic war and the limited war become, for all tactical purposes, identical. If this is proved true, the contention that there is no future for the amphibious operation in total war might be challenged. However, this requires recognition of the fact that the two phases of such a general atomic war would be so distinctly different that they should be considered separately.

The third reason for emphasizing the consideration of atomic warfare is the fact that the nature of such a war can change easily and rapidly. A single decision-one act of desperation-and the entire character may change. No commander can afford to forget this. If decision is in the hands of rational, reasonable men, moral restraint may make the use of atomic weapons a remote possibility. But cornered and defeated men may lose their moral scruples and start searching for anything which could rescue them from a perilous position.

Recognition of this unknown human quantity leads to the inescapable conclusion that formations employed in the past will not be satisfactory under any condi

tions of future war. To pass from one form of war to another is as simple as pulling a lanyard or flipping a toggle switch. For this reason, new concepts and equipment are necessary no matter what the type of war. They offer an opportunity to convert an unacceptable risk into an acceptable one; to accomplish the amphibious assault in a more decisive manner in less time.

One outstanding merit of the amphibious capability not previously mentioned is the strategic mobility it provides. If the threat is posed, the enemy must look over his shoulder constantly toward his flanks and rear-to dispose military forces to counter all possible threats or, as an alternative, risk surprise and defeat. To have such a skill in hand and then abandon it does not seem wise. But to pose a realistic threat, the capability must be a true one-not one that is only a figment of the imagination. True capabilities arise only out of tested and established concepts, techniques, material, and trained troops in being. Without these vital elements, amphibious capabilities which lead to a strategic mobility are not true capabilities and the enemy logically can disregard them as idle threats. It follows, therefore, that this method of moving to and establishing contact by ship over water-cannot be relegated to the past. The requirement to maintain this added degree of strategic mobility decrees otherwise. Instead, it is the task of military men to modify and rejuvenate this skill to a point where it poses a serious threat to the enemy-one he dare not overlook or minimize in all his planning.

On balance, it is concluded that there still is a place in the scheme of war for the amphibious operation, the potence of the atomic weapon notwithstanding.

REAPPRAISA

EAPPRAISALS of the military situation in the light of nuclear weapons have emphasized the need for increased battlefield mobility. As one means of obtaining such mobility a reexamination of that once popular piece of equipment, the armored car, is suggested.

Armored cars first gained prominence in World War I. Their performance was such, in fact, that they became an important part of the postwar armies. The British Army, for example, formed as many as 12 independent armored car companies, representing one-half of the total strength of the Royal Tank Corps. Other armies adopted armored cars-although their employment was patterned largely on the French concept of using them as part of the cavalry-to furnish mobile fire support for the mounted units and for long-distance reconnaissance.

The armored car maintained its position in these roles throughout the first postwar decade. By the late twenties and early thirties, however, with the appearance of greatly improved tracked vehicles of the Carden-Loyd and Christie type it began to lose ground. For example, the armored car companies of the Royal Tank Corps were converted to light tanks and similar changes took place in other armies. The over-all effect was such that during the second decade, preceding World War II, the armored car was relegated to an unimportant position; where it was still used it was confined to the reconnaissance field.

The value of the armored car was rediscovered during the first British-Italian campaign in Libya in 1940-41. The Ger

mans already had demonstrated this value to some extent during the 1940 French Campaign and the African campaigns of the following two years brought the armored car back into full prominence. Its development and that of other wheeled armored vehicles was undertaken on some scale, not only for reconnaissance and scouting roles but also as combat vehicles with armor and armament comparable to that of contemporary tanks, as self-propelled gun carriages, carriers, and command vehicles.

In the second part of World War II the armored car once again suffered an eclipse. The terrain and the slower tempo of operations in Italy, on the Eastern Front, and in Normandy combined with other factors to push it well into the background. It reemerged in the closing stages of the war but only for a short time, insufficient to reestablish its position even in the reconnaissance field.

Interest Revived

In fact, after World War II, in 1947, the United States Army abandoned the development of armored cars altogether and other armies, at best, showed limited interest in them. In the last few years, however, interest in armored cars and wheeled armored vehicles in general has revived. This has been accompanied by the appearance of several new vehicles such as the British six-wheel Saracen personnel carrier and Saladin armored car, and the Ferret scout car, the French eight-wheel E.B.R., and the Soviet armored personnel carrier.

The reasons for these fluctuations in the

fortunes of the armored car and the recent revival of interest in it deserve careful consideration.

There were two main reasons for the repeated setbacks suffered by the armored car. One was the general restriction to roads; the other the difficulty of mounting sufficiently powerful armament.

The former was understandable enough as far as the early armored cars were concerned, for they were little more than converted cars or trucks. Even during the 1940-42 revival period the majority of armored cars still was based on commercial vehicle chassis designed for highway operation. It is not surprising, therefore, that their off-the-road performance was poor and their employment restricted to favorable conditions, which could not be relied upon to any extent outside the African theater of operations.

Only a few armored cars, such as the German eight-wheelers and the British Daimlers, could be regarded as having been designed properly for military use. These were far less dependent on favorable conditions but, unfortunately, their performance was overshadowed by the indifferent showing of the commercial vehicle chassis models.

The other and more fundamental reason for the failure of the armored cars in the latter part of World War II was the question of armament. This was not a serious problem before, although there was some unnecessary delay in fitting armored cars with adequate armament similar to that

Mr. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, a British author, was graduated in mechanical engineering from the Imperial College of Science, London University, in 1946, and subsequently was engaged there on research and lecturing. He has held a number of assignments with the Ford Motor Company in England. He has made a special study of armored vehicle development and has had numerous articles published in military journals on the subject. Mr. Ogorkiewicz now is with the Rootes Group of London where he is engaged on long-term automotive design projects.

of contemporary tanks. But when tank armament began to move up to high-velocity 75-mm guns and beyond the armored cars could no longer keep pace.

The size and weight of vehicles demanded by the powerful high-velocity guns which came into service during the latter part of World War II were well beyond the possibilities of armored car design. Specifically, to obtain competitive off-the-road performance in this class would have required wheels of prohibitive size. Without these guns, however, armored cars could not face hostile tanks. Thus, because they could not be combined effectively with sufficiently powerful armament, armored cars seemed doomed to insignificance.

Lightweight Weapons

Now, however, this limitation no longer applies in view of the appearance of powerful lightweight weapons-such as recoilless guns and short-range surface-tosurface guided missiles-which do not impose a heavy load on the vehicles from which they are fired. Because of this reduction in weight of armament armored cars once more can be provided with an effective antitank capability and need no longer be confined to a limited reconnaissance function.

Unfortunately, Germany, as one of the leading countries in the development of recoilless guns, was unable to use them effectively before her military work came to a halt in 1945. The United States, on the other hand, has shown no interest in armored cars during the last 10 years. Consequently, the application of recoilless guns to armored cars has been delayed longer than it might and should have been.

Some of the possibilities of recoilless gun armored cars are shown by the jeepmounted 105- and 106-mm guns which are among the principal antitank weapons of today. However, these installations leave the gunners exposed to stray bullets or shell splinters and leave a good deal to be desired as gun platforms. There is no