command. As a consequence the Germans were dependent upon the Italians for logistical support in the field. Base service, depot supply, and higher echelon maintenance were all Italian, with a sprinkling of German technicians.

Rommel reported time and again that this arrangement was unsatisfactory, and he attributed his defeat largely to the unsatisfactory supply situation.

In principle the supply of forces in the Axis was a national responsibility, similar to the policies of the Allies. In part, the North African theater was a departure from this principle. In this case a major force of one country became dependent for logistical support upon another, and weaker, nation.

Needless to say, German-Italian war planning had not taken logistics into account. Apparently there was very little coordination between the two countries in the field of industrial mobilization and general logistical planning. No attempt was made to standardize arms or equipment, nor coordinate the production of items which could be standardized. Some effort was made in the later stages of the war to send German technicians to Italy to assist in producing certain types of war material with which the Italians were unfamiliar; but even this was on an ineffectual scale. When it became urgent that the Germans give the Italians some logistical help, the solution generally was to produce the item in Germany and send it to the Italians. Specialists and techniians frequently accompanied the item to assist in the installation and training of he users.

After the loss of the North African Campaign, the Italians became more and nore dependent upon Germany for logisical support, even in Italy.

Korea

The logistic support policy for the varous national elements of the United Naions Command, including the South Ko

reans, was that each nation assume responsibility for the logistic support of its own forces. Support in kind obviously was infeasible for many of the contingents; in these cases the United States furnished the supplies and equipment on a reimbursable basis. In other instances, US equipment was issued as an expedient and the bookkeeping was done later.

Many special problems new to Americans arose in the supply of forces from many lands in the course of operations in Korea.

The Abyssinian force was equipped with every make rifle they could obtain. It soon became necessary to issue US arms in order to maintain ammunition supply. The problem then really became acute when it was learned that the Ethiopian custom required that a warrior return home with the same weapon with which he departed, else it was an indication of personal defeat!

Rations for the Moslems created a problem when the Turks arrived in Korea. Their religion prohibited the eating of pork, a common ingredient of the "C" ration. This problem eventually was solved through the cooperation of the Moslem religious leaders who granted a dispensation to the Turks fighting in Korea.

The customary practice of ration issue in the Korean Army varied from US practice and led to some confusion in the beginning of the campaign. The Korean ration is divided into a staple portion which is issued, and a fresh portion for which a monetary allowance is given to the commander for local purchase. Obviously, this could not go on during combat. Yet the only ration available was the United States "C" ration which soon proved too large in both quantity and type. Furthermore, this ration cost $2.00 at the time, compared with the few cents which the Korean ration cost. This problem was solved by procuring in Japan an oriental type of "C" ration catered especially for the Korean appetite.

A further problem arose with the Koreans in regard to combat boots. The tariff sizes issued by the US Quartermaster are based upon the average sizes of American feet and clearly were too generous for the Koreans. This problem was solved by instituting a "boot cutdown" project in Japan for the Koreans.

At considerable effort and expense the US Quartermaster provided live lambs to the Greek contingent for a religious rite, only to find that the lambs were not entirely suitable, as they should all have been female lambs.

ΝΑΤΟ

From the outset logistics have been an important consideration of the supreme commander of NATO forces.

In his first and last report as supreme commander of NATO forces, General Eisenhower called attention to the fact that the United States had provided most of the resources for NATO up to the spring of 1952, the date of the report. However, he continued, the American taxpayer should not be expected to continue carrying the load indefinitely unless other nations showed cooperation and enterprise in improving their own defenses.

In a subsequent report of the supreme commander, attention was called to the fact that improvement had been substantial, but there still remained considerable room for improvement. This was apparent from a remark to the effect that the principle of national responsibility for logistical support resulted in a lack of flexibility within his command and that he had made proposals for overcoming this rigidity. Presumably some of the allies had not adequately supplied their part of support for their forces. Under these circumstances the supreme commander apparently felt that in the absence of any other recourse he was compelled to seek authority to supply the delinquents out of resources on hand in other national forces. This is certainly treading on tricky ground.

If the foregoing presumption is correc it is difficult to see how the cross transfe of supplies could work out satisfactoril in practice. To focus on a specific cas among the forces of SHAPE, US force probably are the most adequately supplied Adjacent to the American forces are th French who are practically at home, whil the Americans are at the end of a 4,000 mile pipeline. The French can afford t have less stockage than US forces. If th resources are then pooled, US forces wil be placed in a very tenuous position.

It is understandable that the suprem commander, or any other commander fo that matter, must realize that the com mand as a whole is only so strong as the weakest link. If he can strengthen tha link, he must surely do so.

A better solution than cross-servicing would seem to be the provision of logis tical support through channels other than the battlefield distribution system such as lend-lease and the Mutual Defense As sistance Program. In effect, this was the procedure followed in Korea.

The military burden for each country in NATO was determined by a team under the International Secretary, Lord Ismay and agreed to by member nations. There should, therefore, be no real necessity for cross-servicing or pooling if each nation does its bit.

The financial responsibility for largescale undertakings which comprise the infrastructure is prorated among the various member nations through agreements at ministerial level. The United States has underwritten a large part of the total cost to date.

A rather novel feature in the buildup of NATO forces has been the effort placed upon developing a European Arms Production Base to support the logistical requirement. The most recent addition, of course, is the phenomenal German industrial machine. Originally, the rearmed German forces were to receive their base logistical support and heavy war equip

ment from allied sources. This now is changed, and one can expect that a strong arms production base will develop in Germany.

Under the NATO Defense Production Board a survey of defense production capabilities was made for the purpose of coordinating war production. Mr. Herrod, the distinguished Englishman who headed the board, made two observations regarding the use of European factories for war production at that time (1951). First, price fixing was essential to ensure coordinated procurement, and second, many of the factories would require "financial stimulus" to get them into arms production. The necessary stimulation has come about through the United States Offshore Procurement Program. With that start, production appears to be well in hand.

Summary

Logistical coordination between allies obviously is influenced by the way in which the various members of the alliance operate. General Morgan in his book, Overture to Overlord, concluded that United States and British procedures for administration were so irreconcilably opposite that he charged his administration section with keeping the two systems "as severely apart as possible." However, his administrative section, staffed with both British and American officers, did coordinate all administrative (in British parlance the term includes logistics) planning for Overlord in the early stages.

The US press had coined descriptive terms to differentiate between nations which are considered rich or poor, the "have's" and the "have not's." Without question, this is a basic factor. It follows then that one's allies will require logistical help according to whether they are "have's" or "have not's." During World War II the Free French Forces lost their homeland, and with it the capability for supporting their forces from French resources. As a result they were almost

completely dependent upon the Americans and British for logistical support. This was the reverse of the situation in World War I when the United States forces were almost equally dependent upon the European Allies.

In World War I the Russians made the mistake of bringing Romania into the war without first finding out that the Romanian Army would be almost a complete logistical liability to the Russians. Romania had no war reserves and no means for producing them. Consequently, she looked to Russia for even the initial issue of arms to her reservists. Sorely lacking in equipment, Russia now found herself bound to share with her new ally. In the end, Russia sent troops to operate under the Romanian High Command, rather than equipment she could secure only by withdrawing from her own soldiers. Even the most casual coordination of logistical matters between the two countries would have disclosed that the Romanians would have been more valuable, indeed more willing, as neutrals than the logistical burden they turned out to be.

Our public officials seem to have left little doubt that requirements of the allies which cannot be met from abroad will of necessity become demands upon the United States during war. Since so many of the allies require assistance from the United States during peacetime, so much more so will they be dependent if war should break out. For the foreseeable future no major power could become involved in all-out war with the Soviet bloc without major logistical support from the United States.

Thus the "have" nations of any coalition will be called on for logistical help by the "have not" nations. Many of the misunderstandings between the allies stem from this basic factor, and the fact that so many nations are in the "have not" category.

The program through which our allies are receiving logistical help today was

established by the Mutual Defense Assistance Pacts.

In effect, the MDAP's continue the principle of US military aid to allies just about where lend-lease left off at the end of World War II. It also is a companion to Marshall plan type aid, in an economic sense. The underwriting of military equipment and offshore procurement of military supplies are the means by which the United States is aiding the allies in the general field of logistics. The over-all plan in Europe is coordinated by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who also is the NATO Supreme Commander, through the various Military Assistance Advisory Groups. This dual relationship of SACEUR ensures a certain amount of coordination and gives some assurance that the aid is related to the over-all objectives of the United States.

Some of the allies do not have the industrial base for the production of their arms and equipment. Offshore procurement is intended to build up a production base in Europe so that the NATO countries will be able to produce their own

arms.

This has brought about a requirement for the standardization of equipment which, in turn, requires standardization of terms.

Clearly, standardization of equipment must precede any large-scale standardization of organization, tactics, or logistical procedures. It also must precede any effective pooling of supplies. In some cases it may not be desirable to standardize. For example, cases have been cited where pooling of rations was not feasible because of the difference in standards.

During World War I the French and Americans successfully pooled ammunition. On the other hand, attempts at pooling between the French and British were not so successful, largely because the equipment was not standardized.

Much has been accomplished recently in the field of standardization, but it is doubt

ful if much more can be achieved profit ably for the time being. One sure way to standardize equipment is to make gratui tous issues to one's allies.

Overemphasis on standardization ca nullify the strength of customs and tradi tions. There are times when these matters are more militarily valuable than stand ardization. It is necessary to guard against the zealot who sometimes appears to push standardization for standardization's sake rather than the achievement of military effectiveness.

A coalition engenders a certain amount of distrust among the members. Napoleon is alleged to have said that he could defeat any coalition because of the indecision and diverse interests of the allies. He was right except for a couple of times. Nevertheless, there is great merit in Napoleon's thesis.

An example from World War I illustrates the lack of confidence between Allies: The Germans made great gains in the spring offensive of 1916, and it seemed probable that the Allied positions would be penetrated. At one and the same time, the French secretly were planning a withdrawal toward Paris which would have uncovered the British right flank; and the British were considering a withdrawal which would cover their evacuation ports on the channel, thus leaving the French left flank uncovered. Fortunately, neither plan had to be put into effect.

The problems inherent in the coordination of logistics among allies of different language are so patent as to not require emphasis. Even though highly skilled interpreters and liaison personnel are employed, as with the French in World War I, it is quite difficult to find common grounds for a thorough understanding. All agreements involving logistics also involve money in the final analysis and must be recorded in precise language to avoid as many misunderstandings as possible.

If the ally is impecunious and mutual agreements are not precise, it can be ex

pected that he will take advantage of every opportunity to escape commitments; this may not necessarily appear dishonest to him.

The command structure of a coalition affects logistical coordination in an allied force.

The supreme commander of an allied force normally exercises only operational control of the forces in his command. Nevetheless, he must concern himself with the state of logistical support for these forces to ensure that they can fulfill the missions assigned.

Whether we like it or not, each nation has certain national characteristics which distinguish it from other nations. These characteristics play, at times, a decisive part in military operations within a coalition.

In this regard it is worth noting the comment of a well-informed German general of World War II regarding the characteristics of various nationalities when working together as allies. His views were that the British are trained to operate in a coalition. These matters are studied in their service schools and from long tradition they are psychologically and emotionally adapted to the problems which arise. He felt the Germans were too impatient and the French too arbitrary. The Americans he felt were a mixture of the French and German attitudes. He also noted that the British were very tolerant of their allies, a characteristic not enjoyed by the others.

Like national characteristics, each nation has standards and customs of its own.

Conclusions

From this study of coalition logistics, certain conclusions emerge which should form the guidelines for logistical coordi

nation between allied forces in future wars, both hot and cold. Most of these conclusions stem from human motives and reactions; therefore, they should be as valid for nuclear warfare as for conventional.

1. The principal obstacles to the coordination of logistics among allies have their roots in finances. Generally speaking, the more impecunious the ally, the more difficult the solution to the problem, unless resort is made to grants.

2. The problems are not by any means confined to relationships between the United States and her allies. In two wars the Germans have faced similar problems.

3. The British handling of the problem has won the respect of friend and foe alike. One would conclude that their methods warrant study.

4. Some over-all authority, other than a committee, is essential for the coordination of logistics in a coalition. Because of the financial implications, it certainly will be difficult to secure the necessary delegation of authority.

5. Lack of proper coordination can spell disaster, as Rommel found out in the North African Campaign.