visionally under the command of their two field grade officers. Each company consisted of three officers and 78 enlisted men. No table of organization was provided for the company. There were eight such infantry regiments, designated the 1st through the 8th, and one rifle regiment.

The artillery was composed of one regiment of light artillery and eight battalions of foot artillery. The staff of the light artillery regiment was almost identical with the infantry regimental staff. The strength of a company, of which there were 10 in the regiment, was three officers and 78 enlisted men. Each company was able to service six smoothbore, muzzle-loading cannon.

The foot artillery battalions were responsible for servicing the guns of fixed installations. Four such battalions were assigned to each division, and they were designated as the 1st through the 4th within that division. A lieutenant colonel or a major commanded each battalion, assisted by an Adjutant and a Quartermaster. Each battalion contained four companies of five officers and 118 enlisted men. Companies of each division were lettered from A to Q (excluding J) regardless of their battalion assignment.

Assigned to the Corps of Engineers were 22 officers and 113 enlisted men, excluding the Topographical Engineers and the complement of the USMA. The Chief Engineer was authorized the grade of colonel. In addition to commanding the engineer troops he supervised the Topographical Engineers and the Military Academy. The former bureau was made up of six topographical engineers and four assistants, and was charged with conducting surveys and preparing maps. At the time the Military Academy was authorized 10 instructors and 250 cadets. The administration of the academy was assigned to an officer of the Corps of Engineers, Major Sylvanus Thayer. The Ordnance Department was commanded by a

The Medical Department was without a professional commander until April 1818, when Congress authorized the appointment of a Surgeon General and an Assistant Surgeon General. An Apothecary General and two assistants, responsible for medical supplies, had already been provided. By this same act of April 1818 an additional 20 surgeons and surgeon's mates were authorized for each division. The allocation of medical officers to regimental staffs is shown in Figure 2.

After Calhoun's staff reorganization in 1818 the division staffs were composed of a major general commanding, an Adjutant General, an Inspector General, three Commissaries of Issue, five Topographical Engineers, an Assistant Apothecary, a Judge Advocate, a Chaplain, and two aides-de-camp. Assigned to the Division of the North in 1817 were the 2d, 3d, 5th, and 6th Regiments of Infantry, the Regiment of Light Artillery, four battalions of foot artillery, four companies of the rifle regiment, and the Corps of Engineers, which was garrisoned at West Point. In General Jackson's Division of the South were the 1st, 4th, 7th, and 8th Regiments of Infantry, four companies of foot artillery and the headquarters and remaining six companies of the rifle regiment.

Contrasted with the authorized strength

of 12,388 officers and enlisted men are the actual reported strengths listed above.

1821 to 1825

The reorganization of 1821 eliminated the rifle regiment and one infantry regiment. The infantry regimental staff was reduced to four officers and four enlisted men. The 10 line companies were each authorized three officers and 49 enlisted men.

The Artillery and Ordnance Departments were drastically reorganized. Although the Chief of Ordnance was retained on the WDGS, his department was merged with the artillery. One supernumerary captain was to be detailed for ordnance duty with each artillery regiment, and a total of 56 enlisted men were given an ordnance assignment.

Four artillery regiments, each to consist of one light and eight foot artillery companies were provided. The staff was essentially the same as that of the infantry regiments. Both light and foot companies were to consist of six officers and 55 enlisted men.

The officers of the Corps of Engineers were retained, but no enlisted men were provided. The Medical Department was reduced to a Surgeon General, eight Surgeons, and 45 Assistant Surgeons.

The Divisions of the North and South were abolished and replaced by Departments of the East and West. Two briga

dier generals were provided to command the departments. Their staffs, aside fron specially detailed officers, were to consis only of an aide-de-camp who doubled a their Adjutant.

Summary

The period during which John C. Cal houn was Secretary of War (1817-25) ha been discussed mainly from an organiza tional standpoint. The foresight and soun military thinking of Calhoun can be see easily by a consideration of his policie and proposals during his tenure of office On the other hand, the unsatisfactory re sults of congressional attempts to cut th military budget without regard for th protests of the civilian Secretary of Wa also are apparent.

Because of congressional and public dis trust of a strong military, the Unite States went through its first century with a poorly organized War Department Gen eral Staff. The defects of our staff systen are evident in every war fought by th United States in the 19th century. Ye here, before the Nation was 50 years old was a Secretary of War whose concept were akin to those eventually adopted by the Congress in 1903. It is regrettable tha he is remembered by most of his country men for his championship of the souther cause of States rights, and that his excel lent service as Secretary of War is largel forgotten.

General Maxwell D. Taylor

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds which has not been thought out and calculated.

-Napoleon

TO FOLLOW Napoleon's guidance, one

our principal tasks today is speculation the future of the art of war. The narw concepts of war as struggle between med and uniformed bodies of men have one with the wind." Economic, political, sychological, and unconventional warfare e accepted in today's cold war jargon. hese facets that are considered in shapg our national strategy are well known all our policymakers and planners; the urpose of this article, however, is to show at more emphasis needs to be placed on a realization that philosophical viewints now also have a terrific indirect Fect upon the development of national rategy. Although these viewpoints are ot always evaluated in the evolution of ar strategy, there should be a conscious ad serious consideration of them in any timate of the situation at the national or international) level.

The views of men are combined to form e opinions of groups; those of groups are nalgamated to form a community phisophy. Consideration of community phi

losophies produces a national philosophyand we have one.

While it is true that our philosophy is not as pronounced in point and propaganda as that of the Communist, we are now aware that there are conflicts in hissuch as the denunciation of Stalin and the immediate reversal. However, in actuality, little real Communist philosophy appears in print. Karl Marx was their philosopher; but most of the works we read and hear about are those of Lenin, Stalin, et al, which are not really any more philosophical than Mein Kampf. These latter works are doctrinal, not philosophical. There is a difference; for, pragmatically considered, we can see that the ends of Communist philosophy, as announced by Marx, and the implementation by Stalin and his successors, are grossly different.

Decision Making

Philosophy affects our lives at every level. Our senior statesmen are confronted with the ethics of decision making which is, or should be, based on our national philosophy. Our schoolchildren are subjected to philosophy from their first day in the classroom. Where the statesman may recognize the source of his decision of "greatest good for the greatest number of Americans" as the philosophy of utilitarianism, the father who says "no" to

his teenage daughter to avoid setting a poor precedent may not realize that he appreciates Immanuel Kant's principle of the categorical imperative. Yet each decision was based upon philosophical viewpoints. These viewpoints are found in every aspect of our daily lives and affect the mental attitudes of our leaders, directly or indirectly, in making the decisions that promulgate our national strategy.

Not only are there philosophies in existence that affect our policy arts type professions such as government, business, the military, and teaching, but some philosophies have tremendous effect on what can be termed the national character. To read the national character then, we must isolate the various philosophies that influenced its development. "As a man thinketh, so is he" can be expanded easily to "as a people thinketh, so are they," for philosophy molds thought patterns of nations as well as of individuals.

To state categorically that "all Americans are pragmatists" or "all Russians are Communists" would be a gross oversimplification of the term "national philosophy." As Napoleon said, "From the sublime to the ridiculous is often just one step." But we can isolate the philosophical viewpoints that mold the character of a nation and we can study these to get an insight into an enemy's manner of thinking. This can be done in its simplest form

Colonel George B. Pickett, Jr., was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1941; the Armored Force School, 1942; the General Staff Course of the U. S. Army Command and. General Staff College, 1943; and the Armed Forces Staff College, 1956. He served in Europe with the 11th Armored Division during World War II. Other assignments include duty as Chief of the Armor Section, IX Corps, Korea; Senior Advisor, Japanese Military Academy; and Headquarters Fourth Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. A frequent contributor to the MILITARY REVIEW, he is now an instructor, Research and Development Division, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.

as illustrated by Rommel's photograph Montgomery's wall. When asked why constantly kept a photograph of Romm on his wall during the African Campaig Montgomery replied: "So I can look at and say to myself, 'What would I do this situation if I were Erwin Rommel? Had Montgomery gone one step furth and evaluated the philosophies to whi Rommel had been subjected in his yout he may have ended the campaign mu sooner. Rommel's papers state: "I car understand why he never destroyed when he first had the chance."

National Thinking

What are some of these philosophi that mold national thinking? First, in ou own country we are subjected to the ph losophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau fro our first day in school, and even earlie than that, for we are exposed to our pa ents who were exposed to it as were ou grandparents, and so on back. How man times does the vein of "life, liberty, an the pursuit of happiness," "all men ar created free and equal," and "inalienabl rights" appear in our sacred documentsthe Constitution and Declaration of Ir dependence? Their source? The Foundin Fathers had read Rousseau.

But as many psychiatrists will verify If an individual's actions were as strang as our actions as a nation, he'd spend lot of time on the couch taking treat ments. Why? Because of basic inconsist encies; for example, our Government i endowed basically with the thoughts o Rousseau and Voltaire but our economi life is more pragmatic than William Jame and Pierce ever conceived. Truth (an right) are functions of practicability i our business world, whereas idealism dom inates over national heritage. Visualiz the German, as an ally, trying to under stand the things we do as a nation!

But the Germans can understand the Russians far better than they can under stand us, for both peoples have been in

fluenced widely by the writings of Kant who changed the color of his philosophies from "green" to "brown" as required. At one moment Kant is for freedom of the will; at the next moment he is for captivity of the will. Here he is for idealism; there he refutes idealism; today he is atheistic; tomorrow he says, "If there were no God it would be necessary to invent one." Small wonder that the average American, trained in a philosophy of "black" and "white," is baffled by the actions of Communists whose policies resemble Kant's philosophy.

A good intelligence staff officer practices the principle of "empathy"; he projects his mind into that of the enemy commander. But how can a mind based on one philosophical tradition be projected into one of a divergent philosophical bent? Montgomery tried this with Rommel with a degree of success greater than most of us have been able to accomplish. The surprise achieved by Hitler's last desperate gamble the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944-resulted from our inability to capture Hitler's philosophy when our G2's projected their minds into his. They failed to realize the measures Hitler would resort to driven by a philosophy of desperation.

Similar comparisons between the American "way" (philosophy) and that of our allies could be made profitably in an attempt to strengthen our alliances by understanding what underlies their actions.

Reflection on the divergent philosophies -or subphilosophies-that appear in different places in the "American way" seems advisable. The United States Army

has a pragmatic philosophy. Practical results not theory and falderal are the measurement of efficiency. "Get the job done," "mission type orders," and "the principle of the objective" all reflect our practical approach. We measure worth by whether the theory or idea has a practical value and can be implemented.

Absolutism

Yet there will be found, in and out of the Armed Forces, a few loud voices preaching the philosophy of absolutism. "No way is right but my (our) way." "The rest of you are just here for convenience. WE will win the war-you are obsolete." Lest we fall a prey to an absolutist philosophy, remember how the Prussians put all their eggs in the "oblique order" basket at Jena in 1806 and were conquered and occupied by Napoleon. Avoid "one and only" philosophies. The next war is not going to be won by the B-52 alone, armor alone, "A" weapons alone, or any other thing or group alone. If it comes (and we all hope it can be perpetually deterred), it will be won only by the joint and combined efforts of all services, branches, and allies fighting in three dimensions: land, sea, and air. Let that be our philosophy as members of the Armed Forces.

To show all aspects of the impact of philosophy on national strategy is beyond the scope of this article. It would be well, however, if the philosophies that shape the thinking of our allies, ourselves, and our potential enemies were made a part of the required education of all our responsible leaders in this age, be they in or out of uniform.