the aforefaid Elifabeth Toovey shall have the use of all my goods, plate, &c. during her life, as alfo the ufe and intereft of all the fums of money I die poffeffed of in prefent, as also what fhall be due to me from the Government, during her natural life; excepting always the five thousand pounds which I give my fifter, and what legacies hereafter follow, and debts paid, and my horfes and arms exclufive. I do appoint Captain William Toovey my fole executor and trustee, to fee this my will executed punctually, and to act in behalf of my fifter, his mother, brother, and himself, and to state my accompts with my agent for the time being, and all others concerned. As to his brother Lieutenant-colonel John Toovey, I give and bequeath to him one thousand pounds out of the money the Government owes me, when paid. I alfo give him all my horfes and arms. I alfo give him up the writings and money which his brother Captain William Toovey owes me, lent him for his feveral preferments in the regiment. I give and bequeath to Elifabeth Burkett, fpinfter, one hundred pounds, as a legacy, fhe having been a useful agreeable handmaid to me; but upon this condition that fhe never marries Lieutenant-colonel J. T. if she does, I give her nothing. Likewife, if Lieutenant-colonel J. T. fhould be fool enough ever to marry her Elifabeth Burkett, I difannul whatever relates to him and her, and I give nothing either to Lieutenantcolonel T. or her. And if after all this they should be both fools, and marry, I do hereby give (what I had given to them) I fay, I give it to my fifter Anne Hawley, and her heirs; and order her or them to fue for the fame. I once more appoint Captain William Toovey my executor and trufee; and I òrder him to adminifter: There are no debts will trouble him, or his mother: What there is, fhe will pay: And that he immediately wait on my fifter with a copy of this will, if the furvives me; if not, what I give her is his. In cafe I have not time to make another will, my house in the Mews, which leafe is almoft out, my fifter has already by my gift. My houfe at Charlton I fhall fell; fo do not mention it. I have no other will but this, which is my laft. In witness whereof I have hereunto fet my hand and feal, having writ it all with my own hand, and figned each page: And this I did, because I hate all priests of all profeffions, and have the worst opinion of all members of the law. This the 29th of March, in the 24th year of the reign of King George the Second, and in the year of our Lord 1749. (L. S.) HE. HAWLEY., Signed, fealed, and delivered by Lieutenant general Henry Hawley in our prefence, who likewife in his prefence have fubfcribed our names as witneffes. J. Wilkinson. Sam. Mofs. Pat. Maguire. This will was proved at London, with four codicils, the 24th of March, 1759, before the worshipful George Harris, Doctor of Laws, and Surrogate, by the oath of William Toovey, Efq; the fole executor named in the said will, to whom administration was granted, having been first sworn duly to administer. March 27, 1759. Wm. Legard, Deputy The MONITOR. Number CXCVI. Concordiâ parvæ res crefcunt: Discordiâ maximæ dilabuntur. SENECA. SIR, TH To the MONITOR. HE truth of the motto has one time or other been exemplified in every ftate and nation: So long as unanimity prevailed, the poor and the diftreffed have got the better of their enemies; and the moft powerful and flourishing have funk down into mifery and flavery, when divifion and faction reared up their heads. It is not the wealth, nor the ftrength of the people, that we are to depend on, for fafety and honour. Their riches may be immenfe, their arms invincible; and yet their honour fhall be tarnished, and their liberty endangered. They may readily contribute to the fupport of large fleets and armies, and glory in the fuccefs of victory and conqueft; but thefe advantages may ferve only to exhaust their money, cramp their trade, unpeople the nation, and expose them to ridicule and contempt. What a fight would it be, to fee a peace proclaimed, by which the many millions expended in the prefent war, and the acquifitions obtained by our arms, fhould be facrificed to the caprice of faction, or to the corruption of an antiminifterial junto Yet this is most likely to be the cafe, if fome artificial measures to compel the K— and his Minifter to fubmit to the conditions pra ropofed by France be not fufficiently atended to, and defeated by the lovers of their country. How difhonourable and ruinous would that peace be found, which should be purchafed with the restoration of Cape Breton, and of our other conquefts, upon which our afety depends in America? How can we propofe to clip the power of France, fhould we replace her in that full extent of trade, which Providence has enabled us to add to our own commerce and navigation in Africa and the fugar iflands? Such a peace would be to renounce the juftice of the war, and to lay the foundation of another rupture. Yet, what can the Minifter do, if he be overcome by the intrigues of a frenchified faction? All that he has added to the luftre of the crown, and to the ftrength and glory of the nation, may probably be undone by a factious oppofition to his fuccefsful meafures. All the wisdom, forefight, and refolution in the world, are not fufficient to steer clear of the numberless obftacles, which partyfpirit, ambition, and avarice, can invent to obftruct the operations, and to fruftrate the equitable effects of a profperous war. We have feen the delays in the equipping of our fleets expofe our trade and navigation to the power of the enemy. We have known the best provided expeditions rendered abortive by ignorance, or by fome worfe quality in the Commanders. We can remember that the best of Minifters, and the wifeft Councils, have been depreciated and ridiculed; and when all other arts have failed to divide the Councils of the nation, and to create a difguft against the Administration, the laft refort has been to question the juftice of our cause, to spirit up a foreign oppofition to our proceedings, to leffen the value of our acquifitions, and even to deprive the Government of the means to carry on a juft and neceffary war, by joining with our enemies in ways and means to fink the public credit. Yet these very men fhall be the first in the clamour against the Ministry, for fubmitting to fuch an ill-timed, dishonourable, and ruinous peace. This evidently appears in the treaty of Utrecht. No-body will venture to reproach the memory of Bollingbrooke with incapacity. He was an able politician; and, let the facts fpeak for him, he was for pufhing the war with the utmoft vigour, till France could be reduced to a state of fubmiffion; and had, in a fhort time, effectually convinced the enemy of his fuperior abilities to his predeceffors in the Miniftry; but the difgraced cabal could not look upon thefe meafures without envy. They were refolved to stop his career; and, instead of purfuing the war with advantage, compel him to fubmit to any fort of a peace. For this end they fcrupled not to contrive means to blatt the credit of the nation, which frightened the people into a diflike of the war; and deprived the Miniftry of the fupplies necessary to maintain it: And when as good a peace, as was poffible to be made under those restraints, was concluded, thofe very men were the firft that condemned it. Thus, by discord, the nation, which before was in a condition to give laws to Europe, was reduced to this alternative, either to accept of fuch a peace as her ambitious enemy would give, or to expose itself to the ravages of foreign invafions, and to inteftine broils. From this example we have great reason to draw fuch reflections, as are neceffary to obviate the like proceedings, fhould there be any fo abandoned to their paffions, or forgetful of their duty to their King and country, as to tread in the iniquitous fteps of those who blafted the public credit in the year 1712, and from this epocha we may date the fetting of that glory, with which England had fhined in the annals of Europe. Had Queen Anne been left at liberty to pursue the advantages gained over France; had the not been forced by the intrigues of her difcontented Courtiers to lay down her arms, Britain would have been in a capacity to fettle her American provinces and iflands, in fuch a manner, as to fear nothing from her competitors; to reftrain the trade and navigation of all other nations; to ex'tend her commerce; and to eafe herself of that expenfive and unconftitutional method of internal defence by a ftanding army. Thus, through a factious oppofition at Court, the nation was diftreffed by a bad peace, which expofed us to incroachments upon our rights and privileges, as the first maritime power; railed up new competitors in navigation and trade; opened a way to ruin our plantations, and to reduce our commerce; and embroiled us in every quarrel, which has happened in Europe. Have not the French confirmed thefe truths by the fortifications of Louisburg and St. John's, and in other parts of North America? All their incroachments and hoftilities may be properly placed to the account of that treaty, which gave them a right to the island of Cape Breton. Had they never been poffeffed of a fortress in that fituation, they would never have attempted to ufurp upon the fettlements of their 1 their powerful neighbours; nor have built that chain of forts, which now require fo much money and blood to demolish. It is notorious, that fince our hands have been tied, or the British lion has been muz. zled, by that treaty, Britain has been obliged to put up with many indignities and loffes. The interruption of our navigation in the Weft-Indies; the breach of the Affiento contract by the Spaniards; the neceffity of keeping up a ftanding army, and main taining a large fleet at home; and of a fubfidiary army of mercenaries abroad, in time of peace; were the unhappy effects of that treaty. Yet, when the time is come for Britain to affert her natural right; when the wifdom and resolutions of her Councils, and the force of her arms, have once more refcued her from thofe embarraffments, and enabled her to retrieve her ancient glory, to demolish the obftacles of her power, and to remove the incroachments upon her property; there still seems to remain a spirit of oppofition, determined to force the Ministry into a precipitate and dishonourable peace. The measures, purfued by thofe at the helm of State, have wrefted the chief of the American fortreffes out of the hands of France; they have intirely driven our French competitors in trade from the coaft of Africa; they have made large advances towards destroying their power and riches in the Welt-Indies; they have reduced their navy to an incapacity of acting offenfively; they have obliged them to feek protection for their trade by clandeftine passports and open perjury; and there is no doubt but our Ministry, if they are not undermined by iniquitous practices of the difcontented and invidious, will be able to rectify the mistakes, overfights, and defects of the treaty of Utrecht, and others, so as to fix our right upon a fure and lafting foundation. Why then do we hear of fo much difcontent at C? Such complaints against these measures, which have brought us into fo eligible a fituation? Why fo many, in high life, treating thofe meafures as mere knight-errantry, and their projector no better than a Quixot? Why is every means tried to embroil the nation in fresh quarrels, to deceive the people into an ill-grounded fufpicion of the Minister, and to difpirit the people? If ever unanimity and concord are neceffary in a state, certainly they should chiefly be preferved, when the leaft difcord amongst Statesmen ruins the fuccefs of arms; deprives them of the opportunity to compel the foe to an equitable peace; and en rages the enemy to do us juftice. Why then do we find fuch an inclinat in our anti-ministerial Courtiers, to eng the Dutch to quarrel with us? When es degree of lofs in the friendship betw Britain and the United Provinces is a gree of gain to the French, our enemi For, though the Dutch could not inj their liberty more, than by joining w France against England, it is certain, fuch an alliance would be the greatest ftacle to an equitable accommodation, our prefent circumftances. Therefore abettors of the French Dutch carriers oug to be looked upon as enemies to their cou try; who, under the name of justice, e courage a claim of free trade, with a vie to provoke the Dutch, and to fpirit the up to fuch measures, as may back thei own scheme to force us into a disgracefu peace. Hence it is we may account for thos remonstrances against the captures of thei fhips laden with French property; for thei feveral refolutions in the States intended to hurt the credit of Britain, and to ferve our enemies; and for the feveral attempts they have made to lower our ftocks. Or, why fo much pains difcovered amongst the emiffaries of our difcontented Courtiers, to wrong the Minifter in the good opinion of the people? One time, they tax him with an intention to inflave them with the Walpolian chain of excise. When that is found to be of no weight to deceive the people, thefe authors of falfe reports tax him roundly with impoverishing the nation, purely for the fake of Germany, and to fupport a continental war. And, when this argument is confuted by the furprifing fucceffes of our arms by fea, behold! they fly to the dernier refort of those who, by leffening the credit of the nation, did cut the finews of war, and forced the Minifter to disgrace himself with an untimely peace. I fay, Mr. Monitor! untimely; becaufe, if the end, proposed by our taking up arms, is not obtained, and it appears to be in our power to force the enemy to do us juftice in the matter contended for, the time cannot be come for laying them down. The object of this war is no lefs than the reftraining the power of France within fuch bounds, that it may not, for the future, invade nor moleft its neighbouring states by fea or land. The means for effecting this restraint is to attack her dominions and fettlements in the diftant parts of the world; to interrupt her navigation and commerce; and to cut out fuch work for her at home, as may deve her of the means to counteract our rations against her colonies and ships. How far care has been taken to purfue s plan, we need only recollect the diftrefs rarms have driven the French to in eve place, by fea and land. We have got ir flave-trade in poffeffion, without which ir fugar colonies must be ruined; we ve reduced the key to their northern coies; and have but one ftroke more to e, before they will be driven intirely out America, and be obliged to relinquifh Britain both the fur, indico, and fugar de; their navy is in no capacity to give 7 to the ocean; their commerce is in the A precarious fituation; their coafts are continual alarm; and the best of their troops are obliged to guard their own country from the incurfions of our forces and allies on the fide of Germany. In these circumstances, we have the greatest reafon to expect a peace answerable to the end propofed in this war: But, if there be means used at home to force a fubmiffion to terms, before our work is complete; if we lay down our arms, and commit the final decifion of the contest to negociations; we must expect no better conditions, than at Utrecht and Aix la Chapelle: Our conquefts to be given up for fallacious promifes; the honour of the Crown made to bow to the caprice of a faction, and the trade and ftrength of the nation facrificed to private refentment. The BRITISH Mufe, containing original POEMS, SONGS, &c. The Second ELEGY of TIBULLUS tranflated into English Verse. is Elegy was written by the Poet upon his being disappointed in getting Admittance into the Apartments of Delia. WITH ITH wine, more wine, my recent pains deceive, I creeping flumber fend a foft reprieve: ep, take heed no whifper ftirs the air, wak'd, my boy, I wake to heart-felt care. is my Delia watch'd by ruthless spies, the gate, bolted, all accefs denies. entlefs gate! may ftorms of wind and rain, h mingled violence, avenge my pain! y forky thunders, hurl'd by Jove's red hand, it every bolt, and shatter every band! no! rage turns my brain; the curfe recal; me, devoted, let the thunder fall! en recollect my many wreaths of yore, ➡oft you've seen me weep, infenfate door! longer then our interview delay; , as you open, let no noife betray. vain I plead !-Dare then my Delia rife! e aids the dauntless, and will blind your fpies! fe who the Godhead's foft behefts obey, from their pillows unobferv'd away ; iptoe traverfe unobferv'd the floor, key turn noiseless, and unfold the door. ain the jealous each precaution take, Ir fpeaking fingers affignations make. will the God impart to all his aid; es hates the fearful, hates the lazy maid; through fly windings and unpractis'd ways,' Bold knight-errants to their with conveys; hofe whom he with expectation fires, mbush frightens, and no labour tires; ed the dangers of the dark they dare, obbers ftop them, and no bravoes scare. wint'ry tempefts howl, by love fecure, howling tempeft I with eafe endure: watching hurts me, if my Delia fmile, turn the gate, and beckon me the while. e's mine. Be blind, ye ramblers of the night, angry Venus fnatch your guilty fight: The Goddefs bids her vot'ries joys to be fear; Your Lord (a forceress swore) should give no ear! And, re-enliven'd, clafps his wond'ring friends! Us, in foft dalliance, should your Lord surprise, I ftopp'd the fpell; I must not, cannot part; A DRINKING |