CHAP. VII.

Whether the possession of power be not implied in the distribution of rewards and punishments :—The argument from human responsibility.

WE referred, at the close of the preceding chapter, to the consequences which it has pleased the Most High to connect with the violation of his commandments. As he has issued a law to be obeyed, so he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world. Acts xvii. 31. "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every man may receive according to his works, whether they have been good or evil." 2 Cor. v. 10.

This part of the divine administration is evidently pervaded by a general principle of great importance, namely, that God holds men answerable to him for their conduct; and doubtless, if he does so at all, he does so with indisputable justice. But, in order to just responsibility, there is required a peculiar

and corresponding condition in the parties held to be responsible. No man holds all other men to be responsible to him; why does he hold any to be so? Plainly because of some peculiarity in their condition. In such a condition the possession of power is a uniform and essential element. A person may be my servant, and therefore I may consider him answerable to me for the occupation of his time; but if his power of labour is taken away, his responsibility no longer exists. The awarding of praise and blame, of punishment and reward, proceeds universally upon this principle, so far as it is acknowledged to be just; every deviation from it is an admitted instance of partiality, wickedness, or folly.

The application of these remarks to the divine government will lead us to a very easy and obvious conclusion. The Almighty holds men responsible to him for their conduct; but power over our own conduct is necessary to just responsibility; therefore, men have power over their own conduct.

An imagined necessity of maintaining human inability has induced an unwillingness to admit this reasoning. It is alleged that the subject, like many others, is mysterious,

and that we should not pry into such profound investigations.

Undoubtedly many subjects are mysterious, and it is both our duty and our interest not to push inquiry where God checks it. But upon what authority is the responsibility of man ranked among the mysteries of religion?

Certainly no question can be more important, or more conducive to a practical end, than this:On what ground does God hold me answerable for my conduct? Nor can there be a question better entitled to a plain and convincing reply. Upon the answer to such an inquiry, the complexion of a man's feelings, in reflecting upon his character, obviously depends. If the censure which attaches to him be apparently unjust, or if the justice of it be hidden among divine mysteries, he may be assured indeed of condemnation before God, but he cannot feel any condemnation of himself. Humiliation, shame, penitential sorrow, can spring from nothing but such justice in his condemnation as he himself can understand; and if these features of character be of any excellency or importance, it is not less so, not merely that our responsibility should be just, but

that its justice should be apparent to ourselves. A shadow upon this topic darkens every other; since our views of divine mercy, our joy in salvation, our grateful devotedness, all and every part of christian character, will bear a proportion to the justice we discern in our condemnation and ruin. It ought to be, therefore, with every man, a matter of the utmost anxiety to have clear views of this point. Not that we should be unwilling to leave in mystery what God has placed there, but, respecting the grounds of our responsibility, it is yet to be proved that he has withdrawn them from our cognizance; and when we think of their obvious and fundamental importance, it may be deemed almost, if not altogether incredible that he should have done so.

This is the less to be supposed, because reponsibility is not by any means a mysterious subject in itself. We are in the habit of holding each other responsible continually, and of allotting most readily both praise and censure, punishment and reward. The principles on which we do this are perfectly simple and obvious; and there is a natural and irresistible tendency to apply them to the divine conduct,

as well as to our own. God has made use of our own language in this respect, and has given us reason to suppose, therefore, that he entertains similar ideas, and acts on similar principles; otherwise his declarations are calculated to mislead. If, when he speaks of righteous judgment, he does not mean the same as we do when using the same terms, the language, at best, is useless: what else does he mean? Only give such an unintelligible character to scriptural phraseology generally, and the value of the bible is utterly destroyed.

And why should the principle which regulates human conduct, not be applied to the divine? Is there such a difference between the relations we bear to each other, and those we bear to our Maker? He calls them by the

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very same names. If I be a father," says he, "where is mine honour; if I be a master, where is my fear?" Mal. i. 6. Does he profess to act upon principles different from ours? So far from it, that he draws illustrations from our own conduct to convict us of sin against him; and even calls us in to be judges in the controversy which he maintains with men. "Judge, I pray you, between me and