good; and if I have not such ability, no actions morally good, can be required of me.' This is not at all an unnatural or unreasonable interpretation of the terms, but the idea itself is altogether erroneous; moral ability in this sense, or ability to perform actions morally good, consisting merely in the possession of intelligent faculties and the power of moral judgments, which are possessed by every man of a sane mind.

We are very willing to admit that the term inability may be applied to the want of disposition in an analogical sense, as cannot, impossible, and others frequently are; but we must maintain that it is only in an analogical sense it can be so applied. This is the pivot of the whole dispute. If it be as we affirm, then the combination of terms in question is inappropriate; it is not literally and strictly true, that is, it is not true in its ordinary and apparent sense. We do not deny that words may be, and often are, used out of their strict and literal meaning; but words should not be so used in argument, and most especially not the words which express the very ground of debate, and the precise point of contention. Metaphors and analogies are excel

lent for illustration of an admitted sentiment, but wretchedly confounding in the examination of a contested one. If we wish any clearness or conclusiveness of argument, nothing is more important than to reduce every principal word we employ to its strict and literal meaning, and never to use it in any other; but above all things is this desirable, we may say it is indispensable, with the primary terms. On this ground we conceive the phrase moral inability should be altogether dropped, inasmuch as it proceeds upon an analogy which is extremely likely to mislead; let us rather know in plain terms what is meant by it, and make that the subject of our discussions. There is no difficulty in this. The terms moral inability mean a want of disposition, a phrase which ought in all cases to become its substitute. What must we think, if the clearness and simplicity which it throws into the argument should be felt as an objection to this proposal? If the terms moral inability are to be retained on any reasonable ground, it must be because they are strictly and properly applicable to a want of disposition; an opinion which we shall be extremely happy to see any one attempt to establish.

If the term inability be in strictness inap propriate to the subject, there is the more reason it should be abandoned, because there is a perpetual and irresistible tendency in all upon whom the argument bears to understand it literally. Thus when we urge a sinner to repent, he replies, But you tell me I am unable ; in this case plainly taking the word unable in its strict and not in its analogical sense. If we have used it in that sense, he fairly repels our exhortation, and may defy us to meet his argument: if we have not used it in this sense, it behoves us then to tell him so, and say, I do not mean that you are really unable; you are strictly and truly able to repent. And if this is the point to which a single observation of an ungodly man may drive us, why should we set out with the tenacious and prominent use of a phrase which we must so soon abandon, and even apparently contradict?

The names of those who originated and conducted the great and important discussion respecting the duty of man, called the modern question, deserve to be had in everlasting remembrance, nor can the author ever forget, or fail most gratefully to acknowledge, his deep obligations to them. But he feels no apology

due for differing from them. One thing they taught him was to think for himself; and he is sure they would be happy, in having led others to a view somewhat clearer and more accurate than their own. He has no name to add weight to his opinions; but he claims not to be judged at a human bar. Why would his readers inquire whether he agrees with Mr. Fuller? Let them ask only whether he is consistent with the oracles of God.

If it were of any importance, however, (and to the writer it is certainly matter of gratification,) it might be stated, that in this sentiment he is far from being alone. He has reason to believe, that not a few of the most able and most useful ministers of the gospel in various denominations mainly, if not entirely, agree with him; and that the same sentiments are entertained by many judicious christians in private life, who are longing to see their teachers escape from the loosening bonds. He has a cheering confidence that the bonds are loosening, and is sorry that any worthy men. should identify themselves with a falling system.

CHAP. XVII.

Considerations for those who may not be convinced.

HOWEVER willing we may be to hope that the preceding pages may have carried conviction to some of our readers, it were too much to suppose this to have been the case with them all. We shall probably part with some of them without having produced this result. Concerning them we have no wish, but that they would give repeated and serious examination to whatever may seem to them adapted to the attainment of truth. If, after all, they retain the opinion which we have combated, we leave two points for their consideration.

1. Those who find it hard to admit that a sinner can turn to God, should consider whether it is not quite as hard to maintain firmly that he cannot. The position we have taken is this; that a sinner can come to Christ, whether he will or not; that is, suppose either case, that he will, or that he will not, still he can come.