: in the judgment our own confciences naturally pafs upon our actions Thefe and other things that might be mentioned, feem to fhew, that man was not defigned merely for this prefent ftate. And fince there are feveral reasons which leads us to look upon a future ftate of existence as probable, it is a moft natural thought, that then the feeming inequalities of this prefent ftate will be rectified; and that the confideration of that ftate is to be taken in, in forming a judgment concerning God's providential difpenfations. And if with all this there be an express revelation from God, affuring us of a future state, the evidence is complete, and there is all the reafon in the world to draw an argument from that ftate to folve prefent contrary appearances. I am Yours, &c. LET ·. LETTER XXVI. Obfervations on Lord Bolingbroke's account of the law of nature. He afferts it to be fo plain and obvious to the meanft understanding, that men cannot be mistaken about it. The contrary fhewn from his own acknowlegement. He makes felf-love the only original fpring from which our moral duties and affections flow: yet fupposes universal benevolence to be the fundamental law of our nature. He declares that we are obliged by the law of nature to place our hope and trust in God, and address ourselves to him. This hewn to be inconfiftent with the principles be bad advanced. He afferts polygamy to be founded in the law of nature. He will not allow, that there is any fuch thing as natural fhame or modefty. The account be gives of the fanctions of the law of nature, confidered. He admits no fanctions of that law with respect to individuals. The ill confequences of his fcheme to the interests of morality and virtue, reprefented. SIR, ROM the obfervations that have been made in the fore Fgoing letters, I think it fufficiently appears that Lord Bo lingbroke hath endeavoured to fubvert, or at least to perplex and confound fome of the main principles of what is ufually called natural religion. I fhall now proceed to examine the account he hath given of the law of nature. confidered as a rule of duty. He frequently fpeaks in the highest terms of the clearness, the fufficiency, and perfection of that law. He reprefents it as the only ftanding revelation of the will of God to mankind, and which renders every other revelation needlefs. Very learned and able men have treated of the law of nature: But our author feems not at all fatisfied with what they have written on that fubject. He fays, they have been more in"tent to fhew their learning and acutenefs, than to fet their "subject 66 66 66 1 subject in a clear and fufficient light :-That instead of fet"ting up a light fufficient to enlighten a large room, they go "about with a small taper, and whilft they illuminate one corner, darken the rest :-That they puzzle and perplex the plaineft thing in the world, fometimes by citations little to "the purpose, or of little authority; fometimes by a great apparatus of abftract reafoning, and by dint of explanation."Read Selden and Grotius, read Cumberland, read Puffendorf, "if you have leisure or patience for it. There are many curi"ous researches, no doubt, and many excellent observations "in these writers; but they feem to be great writers on this "fubject by much the fame right, as he might be called a "great traveller who fhould go from London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope." I think it is not eafy to convey a more contemptible idea of any writers, than he hath here done of these great men. It is to be fuppofed therefore, that he proposes to lead men a more clear and direct way to the knowlege of the law of nature; especially fince he hath declared, that all that can be faid to any real or useful purpose con"cerning that law, is extremely plain'." Befides occafional paffages in which he makes mention of the law of nature, this is the principal fubject of feveral of the Fragments and Effays of which his fifth volume confifts, particularly of the third, fifth, fixth, feventh, eighth, ninth, fixteenth, feventeenth, eighteenth, and twenty-fecond, of these Fragments and Effays. But all thefe together are far from making up any thing that can with the leaft propriety be called a treatife on the law of nature; and as his Lordship generally feems to think himself above treating things in a methodical way, we are left to collect his fentiments by comparing feveral parts of his works together, and forming a judgment as well as we can. He has neither diftinctly explained the principles of that law, nor purfued thofe principles to their regular confequences, nor formed any deductions from them that can be of great ufe for the direction and inftruction of mankind. As to the law of nature in general, he tells us, that "the law of nature is the law of reafon. A right use of that fa"culty which God has given us, collects that law from the nature of things, as they ftand in the system which he has "conftituted m." Or, as he elfewhere expreffeth it, "It is a law which God has given to all his human creatures, en acted in the constitution of their.natures, and discernible by "the use of the faculties he has given them"." He calls it "the "revelation God has made of his will by his works. And "what is the will of God, faith he, is a queftion eafily an"fwered. To anfwer this we need go no higher than the "moral obligations that arife in our own fyftem, and of which we have very adequate ideas. The nature of the human fyftem is independent on man, and yet he is obliged to de"rive the rules of his conduct from it. By employing our " reafon to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature physical and moral, and by contemplating frequently and "ferioufly the laws that are plainly and neceffarily deducible " from them, we may acquire not only a particular knowlege "of thofe laws, but a general, and, in fome fort, an habitual "knowlege of the manner in which God is pleased to exercife "his fupreme power in this fyftem, beyond which we have no "concern "." This law he reprefents as abfolutely certain, and obvious to all mankind.' "Natural revelation, for fo, faith he, I will "call it, produces knowlege, a feries of intuitive knowlege, "from the first principles to the laft conclufions. The phenomena of nature are the first principles: And reason, i. e. a real divine illumination, leads us from one neceffary truth "to another, through the whole course of these demon"ftrations. In all these cafes we know, we do not believe P.” He afferts, that "we more certainly know the will of God in "this way than we can know it in any other 9." And that "the tables of the natural law are hung up in the works of God, and are obvious to the fight of all men, fo obvious "that no man who is able to read the plainest characters can "mistake them "." And accordingly he declares, that "the will "of God fignified by the law of nature, and revealed by his "works, is a revelation that admits of no doubt, and fhews the road to happiness to all mankind." I shall only mention one paffage more, among many that might be produced to the fame purpose. Having afferted, that "natural religion is the original revelation which God has made of himself, "and of his will, to all mankind in the conftitution of things, and in the order of his providence; he observes, that "human reason is able to discover in the original revelation every conceivable duty that we owe to God as our Creator, "and to man as our fellow-creature: That this fyftem of duty " is fully proportioned by infinite wifdom to the human ftate, "and to the end of it human happiness.-Natural religion "therefore is relatively perfect: It is immutable: As long as "God and man continue to be what they are, and to stand in "the fame relations to one another." He adds, "if it does not "follow neceffarily from this, fure I am that it follows proba"bly, that God has made no other revelation of himself and "of his will to mankind "." This is evidently the main point our author had in view in extolling fo mightily as he has done the abfolute perfection, certainty, and clearness of the law of nature. From the feveral paffages which have been produced, it appears, that by the law of nature he understands what we may collect by our reafon concerning the will of God, and our duty, from the confideration of his works, but especially from the conftitution of the human fyftem, or as he expreffeth it, from the fund of our nature, physical and moral. Let us therefore enquire what account he gives of the human fyftem. He obferves, that "man has two principles of determination, af"fections, and paffions, excited by apparent good, and reafon, "which is a fluggard, and cannot be fo excited. Reason must "be willed into action; and as this can rarely happen, when "the will is already determined by affections and paffions, fo "when it does happen, a fort of compofition generally happens "between the two principles: And if the affections and paf"fions cannot govern abfolutely, they obtain more indulgence from reafon than they deferve; or than fhe would fhew "them if he were entirely free from their force, and free "from their conduct "." He exprefly declares, that "the appe- tites, paffions, and the immediate objects of pleafure will be "always of greater force to determine us than reafon x." And that amidst the contingencies that must arife from the confti"tution of every individual, he needs not go about to prove "that the odds will always be on the fide of appetite; from "which affections arife, as affections grow up afterwards into "paffions, which reafon cannot always fubdue in the strongest "minds, and by which he is perpetually fubdued in the "weakeft y." At the fame time that he speaks in fuch ftrong terms of the great power and prevalency of the appetites and Vol. v. p. 543, 544. "Ib. p. 150. See alfo Ib.. 137. 227 y Ib. p. 479. P. 116. paffions, |