❝ture. He concludes, that "increase and multiply is the law of naThe manner in which this precept shall be executed "with the greatest advantage to fociety, is the law of man." So that the only law of nature that he allows in this cafe, is the natural instinct to increafe and multiply. Fornication, adultery, inceft, are all left at large to political confiderations, and human laws, and to what men shall think most for their pleafure and the propagation of the fpecies, without any divine law to restrain or regulate them: Which is to open a wide door for a licentious indulgence to the carnal appetite. The last thing I proposed to confider with regard to Lord Bolingbroke's account of the law of nature is the ground of the obligation of that law, and the fanctions whereby it is inforced. As to the ground of its obligation, or from whence the obliging force of that law arifes, he obferves, that that which makes it properly obligatory is not its being the will and appointment of God, but its being conducive to human happinefs. To this purpose he declares, that "though the Supreme Being willed into existence this fyftem, and by confequence "all the relations of things contained in it; yet it is not this " will, it is in truth the conftitution of the fyftem alone, that 66 imposes these laws on mankind originally, whatever power "made this fyftem."--" The morality of actions, he thinks, "doth not confift in this, that they are prescribed by will, even by the will of God: But it is this, that they are the means, however impofed the practice of them may be, of acquiring happiness agreeable to our nature." And he feems to find fault with those who "think there can be no law of "nature, or at least that it cannot påfs for a law in the fenfe "of obliging and binding, without a God:" Though he owns, "that it is more fully and effectually fo to the Theift, than to "the Atheist d." But though he has here exprefly declared, that it is not the will of God, but it is the conftitution of the human fyftem, which impofes these laws originally on man no great abhorrence of it, yet when he takes notice in a fneering way, of the edifying anecdote of Lot's daughters, he calls that inceft a monftrous crime, and intimateth as if according to the Mofaic account, the goodness of their intention fanctified it. Vol. v. p. 112. But Mofes contenteth himself with relating the fact as it really happened; nor can it poffibly be fuppofed, that he had any defign to fanctify that crime, which is forbidden and condemned in his law in the strongest terms, and cenfured as an abomination. d Vol. iv. p. 283, 284. D 4 kind; kind; yet afterwards, in oppofition to Grotius, he afferts the law of nature to be the pofitive law of God in every fenfe, a law of will; and blames that great man, and others, for diftinguishing between the law of natute, and the pofitive law of God to man e. With regard to the fanctions of the law of nature, he exprefly affirms, that the penalties which make the fanction of natural law, affect nations collectively, not men individually f This is not an occafional thought, but is a fixed part of his fcheme, and which he frequently repeats 8. The only penalties or fanctions which he allows properly to belong to the law of nature, are the public evils which affect nations. With regard to particular perfons there are no divine fanctions to enforce that law. But the punishment of individuals is left wholly to the laws enacted by every community. And it is certain that there are many breaches of the natural law, which do not make men liable to any punishment by the civil laws. There is no punishment provided by thofe laws, nor any, according to our author's account, by the law of nature, for fecret crimes however enormous. Nor do these laws ever punith internal bad difpofitions, any vices of the heart, or irregular and corrupt affections. A man may be fafely as wicked as he pleases, provided he can manage fo as to escape punishment by the laws of his country, which very bad men, and thofe that are guilty of great vices, may eafily, and frequently do, evade. No other penalties has he to fear (for I do not find that he ever reckons inward remorfe or ftings of confcience among the fanctions of the natural law) except he happens to be involved in national calamities; among which he mentions oppreffion, famine, peftilence, wars, and captivities; and in thefe it often happens, that good men as well as the wicked and vicious are involved. So that he allows no punishments as proper divine fanctions of the law of nature, but what are common to those that keep that law, as well as to those who violate it. All that he offers to prove, that this die vine fanction, as he calls it, of the natural law is fufficient, amounts to this, that the fanctions of the law of Mofes, which is pretended to be a pofitive law given by God to his chofen people, confifted only in temporal pains and penalties, and those only such as affected the nation in general, and not individuals. This, as far as the law of Mofes is concerned, will be afterSee particularly Vol. iv. e Vol. v. f Ib. p. 9o. 87.. p. p. 288. Vol. v. p. 452. 474. 494, 495. wards wards examined. At prefent I fhall only obferve, that it is a ftrange way of arguing, to endeavour to prove, that the fanction. of the law of nature is divine, because it is the fame with the fanction of the law of Mofes, which in our author's opinion was not divine h. Allow me, before I conclude this letter, to make a brief representation of that scheme of morality, or of the law of na ture, which his Lordship's principles naturally lead to. The rule he lays down for judging of the law of nature, or of moral obligation, is this: That man is to judge of it from his own nature, and the system he is in. And man according to his account of him is merely a fuperior animal, whofe views are confined to this prefent life, and who has no reasonable profpect of exifting in any other ftate. God has given him appetites and paffions: Thefe appetites lead him to pleasure, which is their only object. He has reafon indeed; but this reafon is only to enable him to provide and contrive what is most conducive to his happinefs; that is, what will yield him a continued permanent feries of the most agreeable fenfations or pleasures, which is the definition of happiness i. And if no regard be had to futurity, he muft govern himself by what he thinks most conducive to his intereft, or his pleafure, in his prefent circumftances. The conftitution of his nature is his only guide: God has given him no other; and concerns himself no farther about him, nor will ever call him to an account for his actions. In this conftitution his flesh or body is his all: There is no diftinct immaterial principle: Nor has he any moral fenfe or feelings naturally implanted in his heart. And therefore to please the flesh, and purfue its intereft, or gratify its appetites and inclinations, must be his principal end. Only he must take care fo to gratify them, as not to expofe himself to the penalties of human laws, which are the only fanctions of the law of nature for particular perfons. He may without any check of confcience debauch his neighbour's wife, when he has an opportunity of doing it fafely; and needs be under no restraint to the indulging his lufts from fhame or modefty, which is only an artificial thing, owing to prejudice or pride. As to the refined fentiments of fubjecting the appetites to reafon, or the facrificing a man's own private intereft, or that of his family, to the public good of the community, this cannot be reasonably done upon his scheme. It is urged indeed, that "the good of individuals is fo closely h Vol. v. p. 91. i Ib. p. 377, 378. 66 con "connected with the good of fociety, that the means of promoting the one cannot be feparated from those of promoting "the other *.' But though it is generally fo, yet it may happen in particular cafes, that these interests may be feparated. It may be more for a man's private intereft to break the laws of his country: And if he can find his own private advantage, or gratify his ambition, his love of power, or of riches, in doing what is prejudicial to the community, there is nothing to restrain him from it, provided he can do it fafely. For felflove is the center of the whole moral fyftem, and the more extended the circle is the weaker it grows. So that the love of a man's country must be far weaker than his love of himself, or regard to his own particular intereft, which must be his fupreme governing principle and end. But I shall not pursue this any farther. How far fuch a syftem of morals would be for the good of mankind is eafy to fee. And it seems to me fairly deducible from Lord Bolingbroke's principles taken in their just connection, though I do not pretend to charge his Lordship with exprefly acknowleging or avowing all these confequences; and fometimes he advances what is inconfiftent with them. * Vol. v. p. 103. LET An examination of what Lord Bolingbroke bath of fered concerning revelation in general. He afferts that mankind had no need of an extraordinary revelation. The contrary fully fhewn. A divine revelation very needful to inftruct men in the most important principles of religion, especially thofe relating to the unity, the perfections, and providence of God; the worship that is to be rendered to him; moral duty taken in its juft extent; the chief good and happiness of man; the terms of our acceptance with God, and the means of reconcili ation when we have offended him; and the rewards and punishments of a future ftate. It may be concluded from the neceffities of mankind, that a revelation was communicated from the beginning. A notion and belief of this has very generally obtained. The wifeft men of antiquity fenfible that bare reafon alone is not fufficient to inforce doctrines and laws with a due autho rity upon mankind. The most celebrated philofophers acknowleged their want of divine revelation. The author's exceptions against this examined. Under pretence of extolling the great effects which a true divine revelation must have produced, he endeavours to fhew that no true divine revelation was ever really given. His fcheme tends, contrary to his own intention, to fhew the usefulness and neceffity of divine revelation. SIR, NY one that reads Lord Bolingbroke's works with attention must be convinced, that one principal design he had in view, was to deftroy the authority of divine revelation in general, and of the Jewish and Chriftian in particular. I fhall confider what he hath offered with regard to each of these, And |