certainly above" the power of motion and figure, according "to all the ideas we have of them; and therefore, faith he, I "embrace very readily the opinion of those who affume, that "God has been pleased to fuperadd to feveral fyftems of matter, in fuch proportions as his infinite wifdom has thought fit, the power of thinking P." This is an hypothesis he feems fond of; he frequently refers to it, and fays it is little lefs than blafphemy to deny it 9. Mr. Locke, as he obferves, fuppofed, that God might if he pleased, give to certain systems of created fenfelefs matter, put together as he thinks fit, fome degree of fenfe, perception, and thought. But what Mr. Locke had advanced as barely poffible, for aught he knew, to almighty power, our author affumes as having been actually done, and as continually done in the ordinary course of things. But I think we may fafely leave it to any unprejudiced judgment, whether it be not more reasonable and more philofophical, to affign different fubftances as the fubjects of properties fo intirely different, than to fuppofe properties merely fuperadded by Omnipotency to fubftances to which they do not naturally belong? Why fhould Lord Bolingbroke have been fo backward to acknowlege a diftinct fubftance from matter as the fubject of these properties, when he himself was obliged to acknowlege, that the idea of thought is not included in the idea of matter, and that intellect is above the power of motion and figure according to all the ideas we have of them? Is it agreeable to the divine wifdom, or to the order of things, to fuppofe that God, in the general course of his providence, continually fuperadds preternatural or fupernatural properties and powers to things not naturally fitted to receive them, rather than that he hath produced fpiritual fubftances, to which by the original conftitution of their natures these properties and powers do belong? It hath been often fhewn by those that have treated this fubject, that the effential properties of body and spirit are not only distinct, but incompatible, and that therefore they cannot belong to the fame substance, but must be the properties of different fubftances. Matter being a folid, figurable, divisible fubftance, confifting always of feparable, nay of actually separate and diftinct parts, it is evident from the very nature of it that it is not one indivisible substance, but is compounded of innumerable little fubftances, which are really diftinct, though contiguous; fo that if the intelligent fubftance in us were corporeal, it would be a compound of many intel1 Vol. iii. p. 364. P Vol. . P. 35. ligences ligences and consciousneffes, which could not be one and the fame individual intelligence and confcioufnefs. Matter therefore is not a fubject capable of an individual consciousness, which confequently muft have fome other fubject to refide in. This argument is purfued with admirable clearnefs and force by the learned Dr. Clarke in his letter to Mr. Dodwell, and in his feveral defences of it against Mr. Collins, who pushed the argument for the materiality of the foul as far as it could bear. Nor do I find that Lord Bolingbroke hath advanced any thing that can be called new upon this fubject. He supposes but does not prove all the fpecies of intellectual beings to be material, and talks of an intellectual spring common to them all which, he says, is the fame fpring in all, but differently tempered, fo as to have different degrees of force and elasticity in fome from what it has in others; and he refoives the furprizing variety of its effects into the apparent difference in the conftitutions or organizations of animals r. But it is juftly argued on the other hand, that it is abfurd to fuppofe, that that which is unintelligent and infenfible before organization, can become intelligent and felf-conscious by organization, fince organization does not alter the nature and effence of things. ; Thefe obfervations feem to me fufficient to take off the force of what Lord Bolingbroke hath advanced, to fhew that the foul is not an immaterial fubftance diftinct from the body.-His view in it is plain; it is to destroy the proof of its immortality, and to bring in this conclufion, that fince it is not a diftinct fubftance from the body, it must die with it. He pretends indeed that the opinion of the foul's immateriality adds no ftrength to that of its immortality; and blames the metaphyfical divines for clogging the belief of the immortality of the foul with that of its immateriality; and that by refting too much on the latter they weaken the former. But the true reafon of his finding fault with it is, that the immateriality of the human foul furnisheth a strong prefumption in favour of its immortality, or at least that it may furvive when the body is diffolved. That he himself is fenfible of this, appears from what he acknowleges, that "on fuppofition of the foul's being "a different fubftance from matter, philofophers argue ad mirably well a priori, and prove with great plausibility. "that this mind, this foul, this fpirit, is not material, and "is immortal." He urges indeed, that "this affumption can"not stand an examination a pofteriori; " that is, as he t 1b. p. 509. Vol. iii. p. 526, 527. $ 16. p. 535. 539, 3 else elsewhere obferves, all the phenomena, from our birth to our death, feem repugnant to the immateriality and immortality of the foul. But all that these phenomena prove, is not that body and foul are one and the fame fubftance, but that there is a clofe union between them, which there may be, and yet they may be fubftances of very different natures; and that they really are so appears, as has been already fhewn, from their different, effential properties. The laws of this union were appointed by the author of the human frame; and by virtue of thofe laws foul and body have a mutual influence upon one another whilft that union fubfifts. But it by no means follows, that when this union is diffolved, both thefe fubftances, so different from one another, do alike fall into the duft. Nor can this be concluded from the phenomena.We fee indeed what becomes of the fleshy corruptible body, but we cannot pretend to decide that therefore the thinking immaterial substance is diffolved too; or to determine what becomes of it. But he urgeth, that "though thinking and unthinking sub"stances should be fuppofed never fo distinct from one an"other, yet, as affumed fouls were given to inform bodies, "both are neceffary to complete the human fyftem; and that "neither of them could exift or act in a state of total fepara"tion from the other "." And he obferves, that Mr. Wollafton is fo fenfible of this, that he fuppofes that there is befides the body which perishes, fome fine vehicle that dwells with the foul in the brain, and goes off with it at death. Our author has not offered any thing to fhew the abfurdity of this fuppofition, except by calling fuch a vehicle the shirt of the foul, and talking of the foul's flying away in its fbirt into the open fields of heaven: Which may, for aught I know, pafs with fome perfons for witty banter; but has no argument in it, Very able philofophers, both antient and modern, have fuppofed, that all created fpirits are attended with material vehicles. But whatever becomes of this fuppofition with regard to the human foul, I do not fee how it follows that a fubftance which is effentially active, intellective, and volitive, fhould lose all intellect, action, and volition, merely on its being separated from a material fubftance to which it was united, and which is naturally void of these qualities. However it might be bound by the laws of that union for a time, there is no reason to think it should be still fubject to thofe laws, and that it should be unable to act or think at all, after this union is diffolved. • Vol. iii. p. 517 The The other thing farther which hath any appearance of argument is, that" if the philofopher afferts, that whatever thinks ** is a fimple being, immaterial, indissoluble, and therefore immortal.- -We must be reduced, if we receive this hypothefis, to fuppofe that other animals befides, have immaterial or immortal fouls." And if it be allowed, that other animals have immaterial fouls too, I do not fee what abfurdity follows from it; or why it may not reasonably be fuppofed, that there may be innumerable gradations of immaterial beings of very different capacities, and intended for different ends and ufes. But our author urges against thofe who fuppofe fenfitive fouls in brutes, and a rational foul in man, that "the power of thinking is as neceffary to perception. " of the flighteft fenfation, as it is to geometrical reafoning: "And that it manifeftly implies a contradiction to say, that a "fubftance capable of thought by its nature in one degree or "inftance, is by its nature incapable of it in any other y." But I fee not the leaft abfurdity in this; except it be faid, that it neceffarily follows that a fubftance capable of thought or fenfe in the loweft degree, must be effentially capable of thought or fenfe in the higheft degree. I can easily conceive that a nature may be fuppofed capable of the former, and not of the latter. And must not he fay fo too, fince he afferts, that brutes think, and yet I believe will hardly affirm that they are capable as well as men of geometrical reafoning? There is no abfurdity in fuppofing immaterial fouls, which have fenfitive perceptions, and are capable of sensitive happiness, without ever rifing beyond this, or being properly capable of moral agency. And fuppofing the brutes to have immaterial fenfitive fouls which are not annihilated at death, what becomes of them after death, whether they are made use of to animate other bodies, or what is done with them, we cannot tell. Nor is our not being able to affign an ufe for them fo much as a prefumption that they anfwer no end at all, or that they do not exift. There may be a thousand ways which the Lord of nature may have of difpofing of them, which we know nothing of. It appears from what hath been offered, that there is a real foundation in reason for the doctrine of the foul's immortality, and that therefore there is no need to refolve it, as this writer feems willing to do, into the pride of the human heart. It is his own obfervation, "That men were confcious ever fince "their race exifted, that there is an active thinking principle "in their compofition.That there are corporeal natures, "we have fenfitive knowlege: that there are fpiritual natures " distinct from all thefe, we have no knowlege at all. We only infer that there are fuch, because we know that we “think, and are not able to conceive how material systems can think "." And this certainly is a very reasonable inference, as reasonable as it is to infer a material fubftance from the affections and properties of matter. 66 But though it is agreeable to reafon to believe that the human foul is immaterial and immortal, this doth not imply, as his lordship is pleafed to infinuate, that "it is immortal by the neceffity of its nature, as God is felf-existent by the "neceffity of his "." Nor is it fo understood by those who maintain the natural immortality of the human foul. What they intend by it is only this: That God made the foul originally of fuch a nature as to be fitted and defigned for an immortal duration, not naturally liable, as the body is, to corruption and diffolution: but not, as if it were rendered fo neceffarily exiftent as to be independant of God himself. Still it is in his power to annihilate it, if he feeth fit to put an end to its existence; though there is no reafon to think that he will ever do fo. For fince it was fitted for immortality by his own original conftitution, this may be regarded as an indication of his will, that it shall continue in immortal being, though still in a dependence on the power and will of the Creator. It is proper to obferve here, that our author hath acknowleged feveral things which furnish a very reasonable prefumption in favour of the doctrine of the immortality of the foul. One is, the univerfal prevalence of that doctrine from the eldest antiquity. For this feems to fhew, that it is agreeable to the natural fentiments of the human mind; or at least that it was derived from a primitive univerfal tradition received from the firft ancestors of the human race, and which was originally owing to divine revelation. Both thefe may probably have contributed to the general fpreading of this notion. This writer, according to his cuftom, varies on this head. For after having exprefly afferted, that this doctrine was inculcated from time immemorial, and that it began to be taught long before we have any light into antiquity b; he pretends to affign the original of it, and afcribes the invention of it to Egypt, and that it came from thence to the Greeks, to whom it was brought by z Vol. iii. p. 536. a Ib. P. 559. Vol. v. p. 237. 308. Orpheus |