find khenems, "relationship, or function, tutor; " khenems, "relationship, or function, tutor;" then three groups reading khenem, and out of place, and khenems, "title, function, tutor;" khenems, "title, function." Had the different forms been placed together, it might have been possible to have given them consistent and clear meanings. We also greatly regret the absence of the Coptic equivalents, for we cannot yet afford to kick away the ladder by which we had climbed up to our present knowledge. The danger of abandoning Coptic may be easily shown. We find a word which, when read, presents exactly the radical letters of a Coptic word, the sense of which fits its use. After a time we find we have read this word incorrectly, and must abandon the Coptic equivalent. If we have omitted to place the Coptic word by the Egyptian, we are apt to retain the signification of the former when its identity has been disproved. The Grammar is unsatisfactory in the arrangement of its details, and is disfigured by a strange style, and by needless pedantry. What, for instance, is the advantage of this remark? "The verb 'to be,' represented in the Romanic language by two distinct verbs, is represented in hieroglyphs by three distinct forms" (v. p. 646). The translation of the Book of the Dead is chiefly faulty in its English, and we cannot but regret that the difficult task of bringing the remarkable document before English readers has fallen into the hands of one who does not soften its harsh style. What can we say for such phrases as "living off," "I feed off," "I have made road." "Oh the very tall hill in Hades," no one of which is English, or even Egyptian. These faults are much to be regretted, as they injure the value of the best dictionary and grammar yet published, and of the great achievement of Dr. Birch, the translation of the Book of the Dead, by all of which he has rendered a truly important service to Egyptology. Here then we have the best means for the comparative work Bunsen attempted, some part of which unhappily he did not live to use.

66

The comparison of Egyptian with Semitic was in a position which we shall endeavor to define before Bunsen attempted to carry it further and to add a comparison of the former with Indo-Eu

ropean. It was well known that though the Egyptian roots were monosyllabic, wholly or for the most part, yet the pronouns, both isolated and affixed to nouns and verbs and used for indicating the persons of verbs, were identical with the Semitic. So far is clear enough. But Bunsen, wishing to prove the complete identity of Egyptian with Semitic, as indeed nothing but an older stage of the languages of the Semitic group, is not contented without an agreement of roots. To prove this he gives in the fifth volume a comparative glossary of Egyptian and Semitic, adding to the latter, Iranian roots, and also a comparison of old Egyptian and Semitic roots, the second by Professor Dietrich. These two lists strangely associated are of very different merits. The first is a headstrong attempt to prove a foregone conclusion, the second a systematic and learned juxtaposition of Egyptian and Semitic roots which are seemingly identical. It is utterly useless to attempt any comparison of languages without a theory of the phonetic laws regulating their relation, and Bunsen makes this impossible by taking as his basis the Coptic sounds. Thus under one head he has the Coptic s equivalent to the Semitic ss (hard s), s, and sh, and under another the Coptic ts equivalent to the Semitic z, s, sh, 'h, 'h (whatever these last two letters may mean), and the first Coptic letter equiv alent to the old Egyptians, the latter to the old Egyptians and sh, so that the relation of the two ancient languages is regulated by the modern form of one of them! Professor Dietrich's labor is far more satisfactory, but it wonderfully reduces the number of correspondences, the whole number of Egyptian roots being about the same as Bunsen gives under a single letter. We must reduce Dietrich's list by what are obviously borrowed from Semitic, after the formation of the Egyptian language, and by names of objects or animals that would proba-bly be so borrowed by the Shemites or Egyptians; but even in its full extent it is not sufficient to prove the radical identity of the languages.

But though it is difficult to prove the identity of the roots of the two languages, the identity of the most important elements of their grammar is unquestionable, and upon this, perhaps,

Bunsen would have been content to base his philological theory, had he not been sanguine enough to believe he could carry the identity from grammar to vocabulary. At present we must found our reasoning upon the fact that the Egyptian pronouns, as already mentioned, are clearly Semitic. How is this to be explained? Bunsen insists that Egyptian is really old Semitic; others assert that their distinction is so marked that Egyptian must have borrowed its. pronouns from Semitic to fill up its primitive deficiencies. The main arguments are simply these. Is there any other instance of a language which borrows its grammar from one source, its vocabulary from another? If all languages spring from a single origin, what more naturai than that one of the oldest we know should actually mark the transition from the rudimentary monosyllabism of Nigritian to the complicated inflection of Semitic, crystallized as it were at the moment of transition. Bunsen's opponents may reply by asking whether our knowledge of language is sufficient to isolate the case of Egyptian, if it is conjectured to be a stationary language; that the hypothesis of one origin must be proved before it is laid down as an axiom; and that the exceptional case of a language finally crystallized in a moment of transition is quite as daring an hypothesis as that Egyptian is mixed. The probabilities on each side are balanced by the fact that each party requires the concession of an isolated case in the phenomena of language. Bunsen and his supporters have to account for this extraordinary arrest of development, their opponents have to account for the marvel of a manifestly mixed language. Neither can show a parallel case. Stationary languages there may be, and languages of mixed roots there undoubtedly are, but the stationary languages do not show an arrest between two groups, as

between Turanian proper and Iranian or Iranian and Semitic; nor do the languages of mixed roots show a mixture of grammar and vocabulary pointing to two independent origins from different families. The case being thus balanced, it has become necessary to look ontside the main line of argument for collateral support for the two theories, and we would beg the reader to observe that in doing

so Bunsen forces the facts, whereas his opponents are driven back by the facts to their hypothesis. Bunsen, having determined that Egyptian stands directly between primitive Turanian, by which term he understands something much wider than Turanian proper, and Semitic, constructs a vast chronological scale of the growth of language, in which the first elements are primitive Turanian, Egyptian, and Semitic.

Semitic scholars in general absolutely refuse to accept this hypothesis. To them the pedigree proposed is simply monstrous. Why, in the first place, should a Semitic migration into Egypt produce a stationary language, and a Semitic stock in Asia develop the same language which in Egypt is half Nigritian, in Asia wholly what we ordinarily call Semitic? But allowing that such might be the case, is any length of time enough to explain this prodigious development of Semitic from Egyptian? Bunsen, like a desperate bankrupt, asked for time. He knew well enough that in the limits of any ordinary chronology this development was obviously impossible, and therefore he imagined an enormous period during which he supposed it could have taken place. But if the impossibility is absolute, as there are no degrees in impossibility, this extension of time is worse than useless; it is an unintentional deception. The dates proposed by Bunsen-B.c. 15,000 for the inorganic language (Sinism, primitive Chinese); B.C. 10,000 for the complete formation of primitive Turanism, Khamism (Egyptian), forming (v. p. 103), are so vast that we feel that they are the resource of an impracti cable theory sheltering itself behind a series of impossibilities. For Semitic scholars will reply that a scale with Chinese at one end and Hebrew at the other, Egyptian being placed between as the connecting link, is simply incredible, without reference to any idea of its length. Bunsen's opponents, though their case by itself is not any stronger perhaps than his, are able to fortify it by collateral facts of great significance. Egypt, they say, lies between the homes of the Shemites and of the Nigritians. Still Arabs and races allied to the blacks race is partly Shemite, partly Nigritian; are its close neighbors. The Egyptian

marked by the leading characteristics of the Shemites, yet notwithstanding the constant influx of Shemite blood, with strong indications of Negro influence. It is clear from the monuments that the tendency to the Negro type was anciently stronger. The old religion of the Egyptians presents the same mixed characteristics. Its main features are cosmic worship mixed with the lowest fetishism, the religions of the heathen Shemites and of the Nigritians. It is strange that the physical type and the religion should point to a double origin, and that the like evidence in the language should be disregarded.

We have, as we anticipated, but little space for the minor questions Bunsen discusses in connection with this great problem. We can scarcely do more than state their heads. His object is to test and confirm his main theory by the examination of chronological, historical, traditional, and mythological evidence bearing upon it. Of the portions relating to Scripture chronology and history we have little to say. They are not, as many English scholars have supposed, intentionally sceptical, for Bunsen, though a very speculative critic, was not a rationalist; yet his conjectures can only lead either to scepticism, or to that extremely fanciful interpretation that seems hereditary in his family. Bunsen's investigation of the Chinese chronology and of the Assyrian and Babylonian are interesting, but we doubt their novelty or certainty. His examination of the Vêndidâd and of the Indian data for the remote history of the Arians is far less satisfactory, for in these cases he is endeavoring to extract chronological and historical information from data wholly or generally mythical. We are even less disposed to agree with his comparisons of mythologies and heathen cosmogonies. In all these inquiries his fatal habit of forcing facts is apparent. He has fixed on a period during which the one language of mankind inorganic, and another during which it was only beginning to separate and had not yet developed the Arian type. Consequently Chinese, Egyptian, Semitic, Arian, must be referred to certain ages in his scale, and it becomes necessary to fit the facts of the history of the races speaking them to those ages.

was

Bunsen's third problem, the acquisition of a more certain basis for the history of mankind, can only be resolved if this second one is first resolved. With the failure of the solution of the second, that of the third is of course relegated to the domain of impossibilities, where we must admit we are glad to leave it.

We now bring this long notice of Bunsen's second and greater enterprise to a close, with a mixed feeling of admiration and disappointment-admiration for the author's learning, energy, and patience; disappointment at their second and more complete failure; a failure due to the vastness of the scheme and the radical ults of Bunsen's mind— his love of theory, hasty theorizing, and fatal confidence in his results-which have made his enormous labor fruitless, and left the most learned and largest minded of Egyptologists without a single follower. Some may defend his philological views, others may think a special chronological speculation worthy of their adhesion, but no one has been found to give him an unqualified support. Yet the failure is a magnificent one, and it will render a great service to Egyptology in showing how large a subject is opened by the study of the monuments of Egypt. Let us reverse the exclusiveness of the old Egyptians, the Chinese of the ancient world, and by their records, shut to all their neighbors, unlock the history of those very neighbors. When that is done, Bunsen's place in the Walhalla of scholarship will be that of the first Egyptologist who dared to have larger ideas than an Egyptian, and who, when he looked at the ancient monuments of Egypt, could not forget that they were the oldest monuments of civilized man-perhaps, indeed, the oldest monuments of the human race.

Macmillan's Magazine.

ON THE CORRELATION OF FORCE IN ITS BEARING ON MIND.

BY PROFESSOR BAIN.

THE doctrine called the Correlation, Persistence, Equivalence, Transmutability, Indestructibility of Force, is a generality of such compass, that no single

vidual. (The immateriality of this higher intellectual agent was not, however, that thorough-going negation of all material attributes which we now understand by the word "immaterial.") How such a self-subsisting and purely spiritual soul could hold communication with the body-leagued souls, Aristotle was at a loss to say: the difficulty reappeared after him, and has never been got over.

That there should be an agency totally apart from, and entirely transcending, any known powers of inert matter, involves no difficulty; for who is to limit the possibilities of existence? The perplexity arises only when this radically new and superior principle is made to be, as it were, off and on with the material principle; performing some of its functions in pure isolation, and others of an analogous kind by the aid of the lower principle. The difference between the active and the passive reason of Aristotle is a mere difference of gradation: the supporting agencies assumed by him are a total contrast in kind-wide as the poles asunder. There is no breach of continuity in the phenomena, there is an impassable chasm between their respective foundations.

Fifteen centuries after Aristotle, we reach what may be called the modern settlement of the relations of mind and body, effected by Thomas Aquinas. He extended the domain of the independent immaterial principle from the highest intellectual soul of Aristotle to all the three souls recognized by him -the vegetable or plant soul (without consciousness), the animal soul (with consciousness), and the intellect throughout. The two lower souls-the vegetable and the animal-need the coöperation of the body in this life; the intellect works without any bodily organ except that it makes use of the perceptions of the senses.

A. Vegetable or Nutritive Soul. Incorporates an immaterial part, although unconscious.

The animal soul, B, contains sensation, appetite, and emotion, and is a mixed or two-sided entity; but the intellect, C, is a purely one-sided entity, the immaterial. This does not relieve our perplexities; the phenomena are still generically allied and continuous-sensation passes into intellect without any breach of continuity, but as regards the agencies, the transition from a mixed or united material and immaterial substance to an immaterial substance apart, is a transition to a differently constituted world, to a transcendental sphere of existence.

The settlement of Aquinas governed all the schools and all the religious creeds until quite recent times; it is, for example, substantially the view of Bishop Butler. At the instance of modern physiology, however, it has undergone modifications. The dependence of purely intellectual operations, as memory, upon the material processes, has been reluctantly admitted by the partisans of an immaterial principle; an admission incompatible with the isolation of the intellect in Aristotle and in Aquinas. This more thorough-going connection of the mental and the physical has led to a new form of expressing the relationship, which is nearer the truth, without being, in my judgment, quite accurate. It is now often said the mind and the body act upon each other; that neither is allowed, so to speak, to pursue its course alone: there is a constant interference, a mutual influence between the two. This view is liable to the following objections:

1. In the first place, it assumes that we are entitled to speak of mind apart from body, and to affirm its powers and properties in that separate capacity. But of mind apart from body we have no direct experience, and absolutely no knowledge. The wind may act upon the sea, and the waves may react upon the wind; but the agents are known in separation; they are seen to exist apart before the shock of collision; but we are not permitted to see a mind acting apart from its material companion.

2. In the second place, we have every reason for believing that there is an unbroken material succession, side by side with all our mental processes. From the ingress of a sensation, to the