can use, and we do make use of it upon all just occasions. They speak reason and religion in their writings; and when they do so, we have reason to make use of the good things, which by their labours God intended to convey to us. They were better than other men, and wiser than most men, and their authority is not at all contemptible, but in most things highly to be valued: and is at the worst a very probable inducement. Are not the books of the canonists and casuists, in a manner, little else than a heap of quotations out of their predecessors' writings? Certainly we have much more reason to value the authority of the ancient fathers.

And now since J. S. requires an account from me in particular, and thinks I have no right to use them; I shall render him an account of this also. But first let us see what his charge is. He says, indeed, I tell him, that the 'fathers are a good testimony of the doctrine delivered from their forefathers down to them of what the church esteemed the way of salvation.' I did tell them so indeed; and in the same place I said, 'That we admit the fathers, as admirable helps for the understanding of the Scriptures.' I told them both these things together; and therefore J. S. may blush with shame for telling us, that it "appears by the Dissuader,' that the protestants do not acknowledge the fathers infallible or useful." But then in what degree of usefulness the fathers are admitted by us, we may perceive by the instances, of which the one being the interpretation of Scriptures, it is evident, because of their great variety and contrariety of interpretations, we do not admit them as infallible, but yet of admirable use; so in the testimony which they give of the doctrines of their forefathers concerning the way of salvation, we give as great credit as can be due to any relator, except him that is infallible.

Pro magna teste vetustas

Creditur: acceptam parce movere fidem".

Nay, we go something further; for though in asserting and: affirming, in teaching and delivering positively, we do believe them with great veneration, but not without liberty and inquiry; yet when we make use of them in a negative way, we

* Page 312. J

Ovid. Fast. iv. 203. Gierig. p. 206.

find use of them, much nearer to infallibility, than all the demonstrations of 'Sure Footing.' For the argument lies thus: "In the ages succeeding the three first, secular interest did much prevail; the writings of the fathers were vast and voluminous, full of controversy and ambiguous senses, fitted to their own times and questions, full of proper opinions and such variety of sayings, that both sides eternally and inconfutably shall bring sayings for themselves respectively." This ground I lay of the ensuing argument, and upon this I build immediately; that things being thus, that is, in the ages succeeding the three first (the primitive and purest) the case being so vastly changed, the books so vast, the words so many, the opinions so proper, the contrariety so apparent; it is very possible that two litigants shall from them pretend words serving their distinct hypotheses, especially when they come to wrangle about the interpretations of ambiguous sayings; and of things so disputed there can be no end, no determination. And therefore it will be impossible for the Roman doctors to conclude from the sayings of a number of fathers (viz. in the latter and succeeding ages of the church; for of them only the argument does treat), that their doctrine which they would prove thence, was the catholic doctrine of the church. And the reason of this is derived from the ground I laid for the argument, because these fathers are oftentimes gens contra gentem ;' and sometimes one man against himself, and sometimes changing his doctrine, and sometimes speaking in heat, and disputing fiercely, and striving by all means to prevail and conquer heretics; and therefore a testimony of many of them consenting, is not a sufficient argument to prove a doctrine catholic; unless all consent in this case, the major part will not prove a doctrine catholic: of this I have given divers instances already, and shall add more in the section of tradition; for the present I shall only recite the words of the bishop of the Canaries", a great man amongst them, to attest what I say: "Tertia conclusio. Plurium sanctorum autoritas, reliquis licèt paucioribus reclamantibus, firma argumenta theologo sufficere et præstare non valet." If the

t Chap. i. sect. 1. Dissuasive.

" Melch. Canus loc. Theol. lib. vii. c. 3. n. 8..

major part of the fathers consenting be not a sufficient argument (as Canus here expressly says), then no argument from the authority of the fathers can prove it catholic, unless it be universal. Not that it is required, that each single point be proved by each single father, as J. S. most weakly would infer; for that indeed is morally impossible; but that when the fathers of the later ages of whom we speak, are divided in sentence and interest, neither from the lesser number nor yet from the greater can you conclude any catholic consent, "Ecclesia universalis nunquam errat, quia nunquam toto errat;" it is not to be imputed to the universal church, unless all of it agree; and by this, Abulensis* asserts the indefectibility of the church of God; it never errs, because all of it does never err.'

And therefore here is wholly a mistake; for to prove a point de fide' from the authority of the fathers, we require a universal consent. Not that it is expected that every man's hand that writes, should be at it, or every man's vote that can speak, should be to it, for this were unreasonable; but a universal consent is so required, that is, that there be no dissent by any fathers equally catholic and reputed. "Reliquis licèt paucioribus reclamantibus;"" if others, though the fewer number, do dissent," then the major part is not testimony sufficient. And therefore when Vincentius Lirinensis and Thomas of Walden affirmed, that the consent of the major part of fathers, from the apostles downwards, is catholic; Canus expounds their meaning to be, in case that the few dissentients have been condemned by the church, then the major part must carry it: thus when some of the fathers said that Melchisedec was the Holy Ghost, here the major part carried it, because the opinion of the minor part was condemned by the church. But let me add one caution to this, that it may pass the better. Unless the church of that age, in which a minor part of fathers contradicts a greater, do give testimony in behalf of the major part,-which thing I think never was done, and is not indeed easy to be supposed, -though the following ages reject the minor part, it is no argument that the doctrine of the major part was the catholic doctrine of that age. It might, by degrees, become uni

Abulens. Præf. in Matt. q. 3.

versal, that was not so at first; and therefore, unless the whole present age do agree, that is, unless of all that are esteemed orthodox, there be a present consent, this broken consent is not an infallible testimony of the catholicism of the doctrine. And this is plain in the case of St. Cyprian and the African fathers, denying the baptism of heretics to be valid supposing a greater number of doctors did at that time believe the contrary; yet their testimony is no competent proof, that the church of that age was of their judg ment; no, although the succeeding ages did condemn the opinion of the Africans; for the question now is, not whether St. Cyprian's doctrine be true or no, but whether it was the catholic doctrine of the church of that age. It is answered, it was not, because many catholic doctors of that age were against it, and for the same reason, neither was their doctrine the catholic, because as wise and as learned men opposed them in it; and it is a frivolous pretence to say, that "the contrary (viz. to St. Cyprian's doctrine) was found and defined to be the faith and the sense of the church;" for suppose it was, but then it became so by a new and later definition, not by the oral tradition of that present age; and, therefore, this will do J. S. no good, but help to overthrow his fond hypothesis. This or that might be a true doctrine, but not the doctrine of the then catholic church, in which the catholics were so openly and with some earnestness divided. And, therefore, it was truly said in The Dissuasive,' "That the clear saying of one or two of those fathers, truly alleged by us to the contrary, will certainly prove that what many of them (suppose it) do affirm, and which but two or three as good catholics do deny, was not then a matter of faith or a doctrine of the church: if it had, these dissentients publicly owning and preaching that doctrine, would have no catholics but heretics.

Ꮓ

Against this J. S. hath a pretty sophism, or, if you please, let it pass for one of his demonstrations. "If one or two denying a point, which many (others) affirm, argues that it is not of faith; then à fortiori,' if one or two affirm it to be of faith, it argues it is of faith, though many others deny it.” This consequent is so far from arising from the antecedent,

6

that nothing in the world destroys it more. For, because the denial of one or two argues a doctrine is not catholic, though affirmed by many, therefore it is impossible that the affirmation of one or two (when there be many dissentients) should sufficiently prove a doctrine to be catholic. The antecedent supposes that true which therefore concludes the consequent to be false; for, therefore, the affirming a thing to be catholic, by two or three, or twenty, does not prove it to be so, unless all consent, because the denying it to be catholic (which the antecedent supposes) by two or three, is a good testimony that it is not catholic. J. S.'s argument is like this; if the absence of a few makes the company not full, then the presence of a few when more are absent, ́ à fortiori' makes the company to be full. But because I must say nothing but what must be reduced to grounds, I have to show the stupendous folly of this argument, a self-evident principle, and that is, Bonum,' and so, Verum' is 'ex integra causa, malum ex qualibet particulari;' and a cup is broken, if but one piece of the lip be broken; but it is not whole, unless it be whole all over. And much more is this true, in a question concerning the universality of consent, or of tradition. For J. S. does prevaricate in the question, which is, whether the testimony be universal, if the particulars be not agreed; and he instead of that thrusts in another word which is no part of the question: for so he changes it, by saying, "The dissent of a few does not make but that the article is a point of faith;" for though it cannot be supposed a point of faith, when any number of the catholic fathers do profess to believe a proposition contrary to it; yet possibly it will by some of his side be said to be a point of faith, upon other accounts;' as upon the church's definition,' or the authority of plain Scriptures;' but this will be nothing to J. S.'s hypothesis; for if a part of the catholic fathers did deliver the contrary, there was no irrefragable, catholic, oral tradition of the church, when so considerable a part of the church delivered the contrary as their own doctrine, which is not to be imagined they would have done, if the consent of the church of that age was against it. And if we can suppose this case that one part of the fathers should say, this is the doctrine of the church,' when another part of the fathers are of a contrary judgment,