During the long period in which he held a seat in this court, both as an associate and as chief justice, it was his happiness to enjoy, as well as to deserve, the undeviating friendship of his associates, and the confidence of the public. Although, during a considerable portion of that period, the community was unhappily divided into parties mutually hostile to each other, between whom prejudices and passions, exasperated by a long course of opposition and mutual recrimination, were excited to a degree, which not unfrequently degenerated into personal animosity, and mingled with the affairs and controversies of private life, yet in no instance has any serious imputation of partiality in the exercise of his functions as a judge, been made against him.

Although he was thoroughly conversant with the passing events of the times, and the great changes which were going on in society, both at home and abroad, and took a deep interest in whatever tended to increase the happiness, and promote the best interests of society, and though he found some time to devote to the cultivation of elegant literature, and much, gathered from the short intervals of severe labor, to yield to the calls of friendship, and to social and domestic enjoyment, yet the predominant object of his life, the leading motive to all his actions, was to be found in a sincere and entire devotion to the great duties of his office, and an unshaken determination to discharge these duties with strict fidelity, to the utmost extent of his power. His industry was exemplary and most praiseworthy. In forming his judicial opinions, he proceeded with the utmost caution, patience, and persevering research, availing himself of all the aids of argument, of all the light to be derived from judicial authority, or the reasonings of others, and not unfrequently relying at last, and relying justly, upon the dictates of a mind, quick to discern, and anxious to allow, the claims of justice and natural equity, and at the same time deeply impressed with the importance of steadily maintaining the established rules of law. He labored to place his judicial decisions upon some tenable ground of principle, which would neither violate the rules of positive law, nor yet lose sight of the real justice and merits of the case. It is probable that his early practice led him to be much conversant with the legal acuteness which exhausts itself in finding defects in legal process; in pleas in abatement, special demurers, and technical niceties; which are intended to effect the

decision of causes, without regard to their merits. To all such applications of legal acuteness and skill, he had an utter aversion; and it may be truly said of him, as he happily said of Parsons, that though fraught with all the technical learning of the bar, and accustomed to a strict adherence to rules in his own practice, he yet, like Lord Mansfield, was averse from suffering justice to be entangled in the net of forms, and he therefore exerted all his ingenuity to support, by technical reasoning, the principles of equity and right.' If it may be thought by some, that sitting in a court of common law, this ingenuity was occasionally carried too far, and that the rules of law were sometimes apparently overlooked, in too ardent a desire to reach the equity of the particular case, it may still be said with great justice, that even his failings leaned to virtue's side.' The ultimate object of all laws, and of all jurisprudence, is, to do justice between parties; and the judge who, by patient research and persevering investigation, can unravel a complicated case, seek out its governing principles with their just exceptions and qualifications, and, without violating the rules, or weakening the authority of positive law, can apply those principles in a manner consistent with the plain dictates of natural justice, may be considered as having accomplished the most important purpose of his office. In the imperfect state of human laws, and the imperfect means of inquiring into the exact state of human transactions, this is not always practicable, but the desire and the effort to accomplish it, are always laudable. But it is believed that a careful and patient examination of his adjudications, and the reasons on which they rest, will satisfy the most scrupulous, that his natural love of justice was never allowed to come in conflict with his clear conviction of the importance, upon the highest ground of principle and utility, of steadily adhering to the known and fixed rules of law, as the basis and ultimate security of all civil and social rights.

After all, his judicial character must stand upon the published reports of his judicial decisions, which now form so large a portion of our legal learning. These will form an enduring monument to his fame, and constitute a large claim upon the respect and gratitude of posterity. May all those who have had the happiness to participate in his private friendship, or to witness and enjoy the benefit of his public services, duly appreciate the excellence

and worth of his private and domestic character, and the virtues and services of his public life. May we all be animated by his example, and strive, to the extent of our powers, to imitate all that was excellent and praiseworthy in his life; and may the sudden death of one so loved in life, so honored and lamented in death, in the midst of his labors, in the maturity of his fame, and in the full strength of his years, impress every mind with the importance of filling up life with usefulness, and by constant benevolence to man, by humble and devout piety towards God — of being at all times prepared for a like instant departure from the labors and cares and anxieties of this transitory life, to the world of rest, of peace, and of hope beyond the grave.

The following sketch of the character of Chief Justice Parker, is by Mr. Justice Story, of the Supreme Court of the United States. It was first published in the Boston Daily Advertiser.

'Mr. Chief Justice Parker brought with him to the bench the reputation of an able, active, and learned advocate. He had well earned that reputation by a course of long and honorable practice in the then district, now state of Maine. His talents (high as they were,) were not his only recommendation. He possessed what talents may adorn, but what talents, however shining they may be, never can supply, the mens conscia recti, an inflexible integrity, a deep-rooted and enlightened virtue. His private life was without reproach, his honor without stain, his political and civil career straight forward and steady. His manners were frank, modest, and winning, without ostentation and without affectation. Nature had given him a mild temperament, a quiet and moderated cheerfulness, an ingenuous countenance, and social kindness, which pleased without effort, and was itself easily pleased. But his most striking characteristic was sound sense, which, though no science, is, in the affairs of human life, fairly worth all, and which had in him its usual accompaniments, discretion, patience, judgment. In his professional harangues he was persuasive and interesting; he had the earnestness of one, who felt the importance of fidelity to his client, and at the same time the sincerity of one, who felt the dignity of truth, and of that jurisprudence, whose servant he was, and whose precepts he was not at liberty to disown, and was incapable of betraying. In the sense sometimes affixed to

the term, he did not possess eloquence, that is, he did not possess that vivid imagination, which delights in poetical imagery, or in rhetorical flourishes, in painting the passions or in exciting them into action. He was not addicted to a rich and gorgeous diction, or to color his thoughts with the lights and shades, or the brilliant contrasts of a variegated style. But in a just sense, if we look to the means or the end, to his power of commanding attention, or his power of persuading, and convincing the understanding, he might be deemed truly eloquent. His reasonings were clear, forcible, and exact; his language, chaste, pointed, and select; his fluency of speech uncommon; his action animated; so that in their actual union they gave a charm to his arguments, which won upon the ears and captivated the judgment of his audience.

'Such was the reputation and character, which he brought to the bench. He took his seat among distinguished men; and he sustained himself as a worthy and equal associate. He did more, and accomplished what few men do accomplish; he moved on with a continual increase of reputation even to the very hour of his death. He lived through times, happily now past, of peculiar delicacy and difficulty, in the midst of great political changes and excitements, when the tribunals of justice were scarcely free from the approaches of the spirit of discord, and the appeals of party were almost ready to silence the precepts of the law. During this period, his firmness, moderation, patience, and candor, secured to him the public confidence. When the office of chief justice became vacant by the lamented death of Mr. Chief Justice Sewall, all eyes were turned towards him as the successor. His appointment gave universal satisfaction. And yet, if he had died at that period, half of his real merits would have remained unknown. His ambition was now roused to new exertions by the responsibility of the station; his mind assumed a new vigor; his industry quickened into superior watchfulness; and he expanded, so to say, to the full reach of his official duties. It was a critical moment in the progress of our jurisprudence. We wanted a cautious, but liberal mind, to aid the new growth of principles, to enlarge the old rules, to infuse a vital equity into the system as it was expanding before us. We wanted a mind to do in some good degree, what Lord Mansfield had done in England, to breathe into our

We wanted a mind, old law, was yet not a

common law, an energy suited to the wants, the commercial interests, and the enterprise of the age. which, with sufficient knowledge of the slave to its forms; which was bold enough to invigorate it with new principles, not from the desire of innovation, but the love of improvement. We wanted sobriety of judgment; but at the same time a free spirit, which should move over the still depths of our law, and animate the whole mass. Such a man was Mr. Chief Justice Parker. And whoever in this age, or in any future age, shall critically examine the decisions of the Supreme Court during the sixteen years, in which he presided over it, will readily acknowledge the truth of these remarks. There was in his mind an original, intrinsic equity, a clear perception of abstract right and justice, and of the best mode of adapting it to the exigencies of the case. He felt, as Lord Ellenborough before him had felt, that the rules, not of evidence merely, but of all substantial law, must widen with the wants of society; that they must have flexibility, as well as strength; that they must accomplish the ends of justice, and not bury it beneath the pressure of their own weight. There is in this respect, much, very much to admire, and, if it were possible in our reverence for the dead, to envy, in his judicial career. Few men have ever excelled him in the readiness of grasping a cause, of developing its merits, or of searching out its defects. He may have had less juridical learning than some men; but no man more thoroughly mastered all that was before him, or expounded with more felicity, the reasons even of technical doctrines. He had an almost intuitive perception of the real principle pervading a whole class of cases, and would thread it through all their mazes with marvellous ability. His written opinions are full of sagacity, and juridical acuteness, at the same time that they possess a singular simplicity and ease. He rarely fails to convince, even when he questions what seems justified by authority. His judicial style is a fine model. It is equally remarkable for propriety of language, order of arrangement, neat and striking turns of expression, and a lucid current of reasoning, which flows on to the conclusion with a silent, but almost irresistible force. In his more studied efforts, in some of those great causes, in which the whole powers of the human intellect, are tasked and measured, he was always found equal to the occasion. There are