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TWO DISCOURSES

ON THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINES OF

ATONEMENT

AND SACRIFICE;

DELIVERED IN THE CHAPEL OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, ON
GOOD FRIDAY, IN THE YEARS 1798 And 1799.

DISCOURSE I.

"But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called-Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." 1 Cor. i. 23, 24,

THAT the sublime mystery of the Redemption should have escaped the comprehension both of the Jew and of the Greek; that a crucified Saviour should have given offence to the worldly expectant of a triumphant Messiah, whilst the proud philosopher of the schools turned with disdain from the humiliating doctrine which proclaimed the insufficiency of human reason, and threatened to bend its aspiring head before the foot of the Cross, were events which the matured growth of national prejudice, on the one hand, and the habits of contentious discussion, aided by a depraved moral system, on the other, might, in the natural course of things, have been expected to produce. That the Son of God had descended from heaven; that he had disrobed himself (No. I.) of the glory which he had with the Father before the world began; that he had assumed the form of the humblest and most degraded of men; that, submitting to a life of reproach, and want, and sorrow, he had closed the scene with a death of ignominy and torture; and that, through this voluntary degradation and suffering, a way of reconciliation with the Supreme Being had been opened to the whole human race, and an atonement made for those transgressions, from the punishment of which unassisted reason could have devised no means of escape, these are truths which prejudice and pride could not fail, at all times, to have

rejected; and these are truths to which the irreligion and self-sufficiency of the present day oppose obstacles not less insurmountable than those which the prejudice of the Jew, and the philosophy of the Greek, presented in the age of the apostle. For at this day, when we boast a wider diffusion of learning, and more extensive acquirements of moral knowledge, do we not find these fundamental truths of revelation questioned? Do we not see the haughtiness of lettered scepticism presuming to reject the proffered terms of salvation, because it cannot trace, with the finger of human science, the connection between the cross of Christ and the redemption of man? But to these vain and presumptuous aspirings after knowledge placed beyond human reach, we are commanded to preach Christ crucified : which, however it may, to the self-fancied wise ones of this world, appear as foolishness, is yet, to those who will humble their understanding to the dispensations of the Almighty, the grandest display of the divine perfections -"Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God."

To us also, my brethren, who profess a conviction of this truth, and who are called on by the return of this day, (No. II.) more particularly to recollect the great work of salvation, wrought out for us by the memorable event which it records, it may not be unprofitable to take a short view of the objections that have been urged against this fundamental doctrine (No. III.) of our religion; that so we may the better discern those snares which beset the Christian path, and that, being guarded against the obstructions which are insidiously raised against that true and gospel faith, whereby alone we can hope for accep

tance and happiness, we may be able to place the great pillar of our hopes upon a basis which no force can shake, and no art can undermine.

In the consideration of this subject, which every Christian must deem most highly deserving the closest examination, our attention should be directed to two different classes of objectors, those who deny the necessity of any mediation whatever, and those who question the particular nature of that mediation which has been appointed. Whilst the Deist, on the one hand, ridicules the very notion of a Mediator; and the philosophising Christian, on the other, fashions it to his own hypothesis; we are called on to vindicate the word of truth from the injurious attacks of both, and carefully to secure it, not only against the open assaults of its avowed enemies, but against the more dangerous misrepresentations of its false or mistaken friends. The objections which are peculiar to the former are, upon this subject, of the same description with those which they advance against every other part of revelation; bearing with equal force against the system of Natural Religion, which they support, as against the doctrines of Revealed Religion, which they oppose. And, indeed, this single circumstance, if weighed with candour and reflection—that is, if the Deist were truly the philosopher he pretends to be-might suffice to convince him of his error. For the closeness of the analogy between the works of Nature and the word of the Gospel being found to be such, that every blow which is aimed at the one rebounds with undiminished force against the other, the conviction of their common origin must be the inference of unbiassed understanding.

Thus, when, in the outset of his argument, the Deist tells us, that, as obedience must be the object of God's approbation, and disobedience the ground of his displeasure, it must follow, by natural consequence, that, when men have transgressed the divine commands, repentance and amendment of life will place them in the same situation as if they had never offended; he does not recollect, that actual experience of the course of nature directly contradicts the assertion, and that, in the common occurrences of life, the man who, by intemperance and voluptuousness, has injured his character, his fortune, and his health, does not find himself instantly restored to the full enjoyment of these blessings on repenting of his past misconduct, and determining on future amendment. Now, if the attributes of the Deity demand that the punishment should not outlive the crime, on what ground shall we justify this temporal dispensation? The difference in degree cannot affect the question in the least. It matters not whether the punishment be of long or of

short duration; whether in this world or in the next. If the justice or the goodness of God require that punishment should not be inflicted when repentance has taken place, it must be a violation of those attributes to permit any punishment whatever, the most slight, or the most transient. Nor will it avail to say, that the evils of this life attendant upon vice are the effects of an established constitution, and follow in the way of natural consequence. Is not that established constitution itself the effect of the divine decree? and are not its several operations as much the appointment of its Almighty Framer, as if they had individually flowed from his immediate direction? But, besides, what reason have we to suppose that God's treatment of us in a future state will not be of the same nature as we find it in this- according to established rules, and in the way of natural consequence? Many circumstances might be urged, on the contrary, to evince the likelihood that it will. But this is not necessary to our present purpose. It is sufficient that the Deist cannot prove that it will not. Our experience of the present state of things evinces, that indemnity is not the consequence of repentance here: can he adduce a counter-experience to shew that it will hereafter? The justice and goodness of God are not, then, necessarily concerned, in virtue of the sinner's repentance, to remove all evil consequent upon sin in the next life; or else the arrangement of events in this has not been regulated by the dictates of justice and goodness. If the Deist admits the latter, what becomes of his Natural Religion?

Now let us inquire whether the conclusions of abstract reasoning will coincide with the deductions of experience. If obedience be at all times our duty, in what way can present repentance release us from the punishment of former trangressions? (No. IV.) Can repentance annihilate what is past? Or, can we do more, by present obedience, than acquit ourselves of present obligation? Or, does the contrition we experience, added to the positive duties we discharge, constitute a surplusage of merit, which may be transferred to the reduction of our former demerit? And is the justification of the philosopher, who is too enlightened to be a Christian, to be built, after all, upon the absurdities of supererogation? "We may as well affirm," says a learned divine, "that our former obedience atones for our present sins, as that our present obedience makes amends for antecedent transgressions." And it is surely with a peculiar ill grace, that this sufficiency of repentance is urged by those who deny the possible efficacy of Christ's mediation; since the ground on which they deny the latter, equally serves for the rejection of the former: the necessary connection between the merits of one being, and

the acquittal of another, not being less conceivable than that which is believed to subsist between obedience at one time, and the forgiveness of disobedience at another.

Since, then, upon the whole, experience (as far as it extends) goes to prove the natural inefficacy of repentance to remove the effects of past transgressions; and the abstract reason of the thing can furnish no link, whereby to connect present obedience with forgiveness of former sins; it follows, that, however the contemplation of God's infinite goodness and love might excite some faint hope that mercy would be extended to the sincerely penitent, the animating certainty of this momentous truth, without which the religious sense can have no place, can be derived from the express communication of the Deity alone, (No. V.) But it is yet urged by those who would measure the proceedings of divine wisdom by the standard of their own reason, that, admitting the necessity of a revelation on this subject, it had been sufficient for the Deity to have made known to man his benevolent intention; and that the circuitous apparatus of the scheme of redemption must have been superfluous for the purpose of rescuing the world from the terrors and dominion of sin; when this might have been effected, in a way infinitely more simple and intelligible, and better calculated to excite our gratitude and love, merely by proclaiming to mankind a free pardon, and perfect indemnity, on condition of repentance and amendment."

To the disputer, who would thus prescribe to God the mode by which he may best conduct his creatures to happiness, we might, as before, reply, by the application of his own argument to the course of ordinary events; and we might demand of him to inform us, wherefore the Deity should have left the sustenance of life depending on the tedious process of human labour and contrivance, in rearing from a small seed, and conducting to the perfection fitting it for the use of man, the necessary article of nourishment, when the end might have been at once accomplished by its instantaneous production. And will he contend, that bread has not been ordained for the support of man, because, instead of the present circuitous mode of its production, it might have been rained down from heaven, like the manna in the wilderness? On grounds such as these, the Philosopher (as he wishes to be called) may be safely allowed to object to the notion of forgiveness by a Mediator.

With respect to every such objection as this, it may be well, once for all, to make this general observation. We find, from the whole course of nature, that God governs the world, not by independent acts, but by connected system. The instruments which he employs, in the ordinary works of his providence, are not physically necessary to his operations.

He might have acted without them if he pleased. He might, for instance, have created all men, without the intervention of parents: but where then had been the beneficial connection between parents and children; and the numerous advantages resulting to human society, from such connection? The difficulty lies here: the uses, arising from the connections of God's acts may be various; and such are the pregnancies of his works, that a single act may answer a prodigious variety of purposes. Of these several purposes we are, for the most part, ignorant: and from this ignorance are derived most of our weak objections against the ways of his providence; whilst we foolishly presume, that, like human agents, he has but one end in view, (No. VI.)

This observation we shall find of material use, in our examination of the remaining arguments adduced by the Deist, on the present subject. And there is none to which it more forcibly applies than to that, by which he endeavours to prove the notion of a Mediator to be inconsistent with the divine immutability. It is either, he affirms, (No. VII.) agreeable to the will of God, to grant salvation on repentance, and then he will grant it without a Mediator; or it is not agreeable to his will, and then a Mediator can be of no avail, unless we admit the mutability of the divine decrees.

But the objector is not, perhaps, aware how far this reasoning will extend. Let us try it in the case of prayer. All such things as are agreeable to the will of God must be accomplished, whether we pray or not; and, therefore, our prayers are useless, unless they be supposed to have a power of altering his will. And, indeed, with equal conclusiveness it might be proved, that repentance itself must be unnecessary. For, if it be fit that our sins should be forgiven, God will forgive us without repentance; and if it be unfit, repentance can be of no avail, (No. VIII.)

The error in all these conclusions is the same. It consists in mistaking a conditional for an absolute decree, and in supposing God to ordain an end unalterably, without any concern as to the intermediate steps whereby that end is to be accomplished. Whereas the manner is sometimes as necessary as the act proposed; so that if not done in that particular way, it would not have been done at all. Of this observation abundant illustration may be derived, as well from natural, as from revealed religion. "Thus, we know, from natural religion, that it is agreeable to the will of God, that the distresses of mankind should be relieved; and yet we see the destitute, from a wise constitution of Providence, left to the precarious benevolence of their fellow-men; and if not relieved by them, they are not relieved at all. In like manner, in Revelation, in the case of Naaman the Syrian, we find that God was willing he should

be healed of his leprosy; but yet he was not willing that it should be done, except in one particular manner. Abana and Pharpar were as famous as any of the rivers of Israel. Could he not wash in them, and be clean? Certainly he might, if the design of God had been no more than to heal him. Or it might have been done without any washing at all. But the healing was not the only design of God, nor the most important. The manner of the cure was of more consequence in the moral design of God, than the cure itself: the effect being produced, for the sake of manifesting, to the whole kingdom of Syria, the great power of the God of Israel, by which the cure was performed." And, in like manner, though God willed that the penitent sinner should receive forgiveness, we may see good reason, why, agreeably to his usual proceeding, he might will it to be granted in one particular manner only,-through the intervention of a Mediator, (No. IX.)

Although, in the present stage of the subject, in which we are concerned with the objections of the Deist, the argument should be confined to the deductions of natural reason; yet I have added this instance from Revelation, because, strange to say, some who assume the name of Christians, and profess not altogether to discard the written word of Revelation, adopt the very principle which we have just examined. For what are the doctrines of that description of Christians, (No. X.) in the sister kingdom, who glory in having brought down the high things of God to the level of man's understanding? That Christ was a person sent into the world to promulgate the will of God; to communicate new lights on the subject of religious duties; by his life, to set an example of perfect obedience; by his death, to manifest his sincerity; and by his resurrection, to convince us of the great truth which he had been commissioned to teach, - our rising again to future life. This, say they, is the sum and substance of Christianity. It furnishes a purer morality, and a more operative enforcement; its morality more pure, as built on juster notions of the divine nature; and its enforcement more operative, as founded on a certainty of a state of retribution, (No XI.)—And is, then, Christianity nothing but a new and more formal promulgation of the religion of nature? Is the death of Christ but an attestation of his truth? And are we, after all, left to our own merit for acceptance; and obliged to trust, for our salvation, to the perfection of our obedience? Then, indeed, has the great Author of our religion in vain submitted to the agonies of the cross; if, after having given to mankind a law which leaves them less excusable in their transgressions, he has left them to be judged by the rigour of that law, and to stand or fall by their own personal deserts.

It is said, indeed, that as by this new dispensation the certainty of pardon, on repentance, has been made known, mankind has been informed of all that is essential in the doctrine of mediation. But, granting that no more was intended to be conveyed than the sufficiency of repentance, yet it remains to be considered in what way that repentance was likely to be brought about. Was the bare declaration, that God would forgive the repentant sinner, sufficient to ensure his amendment? Or was it not rather calculated to render him easy under guilt, from the facility of reconciliation? What was there to alarm, to rouse, the sinner from the apathy of habitual transgression? What was there to make that impression which the nature of God's moral government demands? Shall we say, that the grateful sense of divine mercy would be sufficient; and that the generous feelings of our nature, awakened by the supreme goodness, would have secured our obedience? that is, shall we say, that the love of virtue, and of right, would have maintained man in his allegiance? And have we not, then, had abundant experience of what man can do, when left to his own exertions, to be cured of such vain and idle fancies? What is the history of man, from the creation to the time of Christ, but a continual trial of his natural strength? And what has been the moral of that history, but that man is strong only as he feels himself weak?-strong, only as he feels that his nature is corrupt, and, from a consciousness of that corruption, is led to place his whole reliance upon God? What is the description, which the Apostle of the Gentiles has left us, of the state of the world at the coming of our Saviour? - "Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful-who, knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them," (Rom. i. 29-32.

Here were the fruits of that natural goodness of the human heart, which is the favourite theme and fundamental principle with that class of Christians with whom we are at present concerned. And have we not, then, had full experiment of our natural powers? (No. XII.) And shall we yet have the madness to fly back to our own sufficiency, and our own merits, and to turn away from that gracious support, which is offered to us through the mediation of Christ? No: lost as men were, at the time Christ appeared, to all sense of true religion; lost as they must be to it,

and arbitrary theories, were not first to be formed, and then the Scripture pressed into the service of each fanciful dogma. If God has vouchsafed a Revelation, has he not thereby imposed a duty of submitting our understandings to its perfect wisdom? Shall weak,

at all times, when left to a proud confidence in their own sufficiency; nothing short of a strong and salutary terror could awaken them to virtue. Without some striking expression of God's abhorrence of sin, which might work powerfully on the imagination and on the heart, what could prove a sufficient counter-short-sighted man presume to say-"If I action to the violent impulse of natural passions? what, to the entailed depravation, which the history of man, no less than the voice of Revelation, pronounces to have infected the whole human race? Besides, without a full and adequate sense of guilt, the very notion of forgiveness, as it relates to us, is unintelligible. We can have no idea of forgiveness, unless conscious of something to be forgiven. Ignorant of our forgiveness, we remain ignorant of that goodness which confers it. And thus, without some proof of God's hatred for sin, we remain unacquainted with the greatness of his love.

The simple promulgation, then, of forgiveness on repentance, could not answer the purpose. Merely to know the condition, could avail nothing. An inducement, of sufficient force to ensure its fulfilment, was essential. The system of sufficiency had been fully tried, to satisfy mankind of its folly. It was now time to introduce a new system, the system of humility. And for this purpose, what expedient could have been devised more suitable, than that which has been adopted? - the sacrifice of the Son of God, for the sins of men : proclaiming to the world, by the greatness of the ransom, the immensity of the guilt, (No. XIII;) and thence, at the same time, evincing, in the most fearful manner, God's utter abhorrence of sin, in requiring such expiation; and the infinity of his love, in appointing it.

To this expedient for man's salvation, though it be the clear and express language of Scripture, I have as yet sought no support from the authority of Scripture itself. Having hitherto had to contend with the Deist, who denies all Revelation, and the pretended Christian, who, rationalising away its substance, finds it a mere moral system, and can discover in it no trace of a Redeemer, to urge the declarations of Scripture, as to the particular nature of redemption, would be to no purpose. Its authority, disclaimed by the one and evaded by the other, each becomes unassailable on any ground, but that which he has chosen for himself the ground of general reason.

But we come now to consider the objections of a class of Christians, who, as they profess to derive their arguments from the language and meaning of Scripture, (No. XIV.) will enable us to try the subject of our discussion by the only true standard, the word of Revelation. And, indeed, it were most sincerely to be wished, that the doctrines of Scripture were at all times collected purely from the Scripture itself; and that preconceived notions,

find the discoveries of Revelation correspond to my notions of what is right and fit, I will admit them but if they do not, I am sure they cannot be the genuine sense of Scripture: and I am sure of it on this principle, that the wisdom of God cannot disagree with itself?" That is, to express it truly, that the wisdom of God cannot but agree with what this judge of the actions of the Almighty deems it wise for him to do. The language of Scripture must, then, by every possible refinement, be made to surrender its fair and natural meaning, to this predetermination of its necessary import. But the word of Revelation being thus pared down to the puny dimensions of human reason, how differs the Christian from the Deist? The only difference is this: that whilst the one denies that God hath given us a Revelation, the other, compelled by evidence to receive it, endeavours to render it of no effect. But in both, there is the same selfsufficiency, the same pride of understanding, that would erect itself on the ground of human reason, and that disdains to accept the divine favour on any conditions but its own. In both, in short, the very characteristic of a Christian spirit is wanting - Humility. For in what consists the entire of Christianity but in this - that, feeling an utter incapacity to work out our own salvation, we submit our whole selves, our hearts and our understandings, to the divine disposal; and, relying on God's gracious assistance, ensured to our honest endeavours to obtain it, through the mediation of Christ Jesus, we look up to him, and to him alone, for safety? Nay, what is the very notion of religion, but this humble reliance upon God? Take this away, and we become a race of independent beings, claiming, as a debt, the reward of our good works, (No. XV ;) a sort of contracting party with the Almighty, contributing nought to his glory, but anxious to maintain our own independence, and our own rights. And is it not to subdue this rebellious spirit, which is necessarily at war with Virtue and with God, that Christianity has been introduced? Does not every page of Revelation peremptorily pronounce this? And yet, shall we exercise this spirit, even upon Christianity itself? Assuredly, if our pride of understanding, and self-sufficiency of reason, are not made to prostrate themselves before the awfully mysterious truths of Revelation; if we do not bring down the rebellious spirit of our nature, to confess that the wisdom of man is but foolishness with God, we may bear the name of

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