Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

1860.]

third October, 1857,) your servant had the honor to forward to your Majesty various particulars of his administration of barbarian affairs during the seventh and eighth moons, (August and September,) as it is recorded.

"Since the engagement of the tenth of the fifth moon, (first June,) a period of more than six months, the English barbarians have made (It no disturbance up the Canton river.* should be known,) however, that in the defeat sustained by Elgin at Mang-ga-tat in the seventh moon, he was pursued by the Mang-ga-la (Bengal) barbarian force to the sea-shore. A number of French men-of-war, which happened to be passing, fired several guns in succession, and the force of the Bengal barbarians falling back, the Chief, Elgin, made his escape. The Chief, Elgin, was very grateful to the French force for saving his life, and on the arrival of the French minister, Lo-so-lun, who, in the beginning of the ninth moon, had also reached Quang-Tung, he, the Chief, Elgin, fêted the Chief, Gros, at Hong-Kong, (lit. merrily feasted and prayed him [to drink] wine,) and consulted him upon the present position of affairs in China.

"The Chief, Gros, said: 'I was not an eyewitness of last year's affair, but the story current among people of different nations who were by at the time, has made me familiar with the whole question. You see, when the forts were taken, the Chinese Government made no retaliation; when the houses of the people were burned, it still declined to fight. Now, the uniform suppression, three years ago, of the Quang-Tung insurrection, in which some hundreds of thousands were engaged, shows the military power of China to be by no means insignificant. Will she take no notice of her injuries? (No.) She is certain to have some deep policy which will enable her so to anticipate us, that before we can take up any ground she will have left us without the means of finding fault with her, while she, on the other hand, wiil oblige the foreigners to admit themselves On the last occasion completely in the wrong. that your nation opened fire, it was but for some days, and people came forward, (as mediators,) but this time you did your utmost for three months. (You fired) four thousand rounds and more from great guns, as well as three thousand rockets. The high authorities of Canton, it is plain, have all along made their minds up, (or have seen their way.) They understand the

*The affair of the first June is the destruction of Heoang's fleet up Fatschau Creek, doubtless reported to Pekin as a victory. The manner in which the next sentence is introduced, shows that Lord Elgin's return had been already announced, but without full particulars.

441

character of all classes, high and low, in our
foreign states. This is the reason why they
have been so firm and unswerving. When I
was leaving home the instructions my own
sovereign gave me, with affectionate earnestness,
were these:

"There is a quarrel with the English in
Quang-Tung; when you go thither, confine
yourself to the observance of the treaty and
pacific communications. You are not to avail
yourself of the opportunity to commit acts of
aggression or spoliation. Do not make China
hate the French as a band of hostile wretches
who violate their engagements. The circum-
stances, too, are so different (from those of the
last war of the English with China,) that it is
There is no analogy, I ap-
essential you should judge for yourself what
course to pursue.
prehend, between the present case and the opium
question of some ten years since, in which they
had some wrong to allege.""

"It appears that in the country of the five
Indies appropriated by the English barbarians,
they have established four tribal divisions
three along the coast, and one in the interior.
One of the coast divisions is Mang-ga-la, (Bengal,)
the country in the extreme east; one is Ma-ta-la-
say, (Madras,) south-west of Bengal; and one is
Mang-mai, (Bombay,) on the western limit of
India. That in the interior is A-ka-la, (Agra,)
lying midway between east and west. About
the end of last summer, it is stated, twelve marts
(or ports) in Bengal which had revolted, were
Since the eighth moon, the marts in
lost.
Bombay have all been retaken (sc. from the Eng-
lish) by (Indian) chiefs; and since Elgin's re-
turn after his defeat, the leaders of the English
barbarians have sustained a succession of seri-
ous defeats. The Indian chief drove a mine
from bank to bank of a river, and by the intro-
duction of infernal machines (lit. water-thunder)
On shore they en-
blew up several large vessels of war, killing
above one thousand men.
ticed (the English) far into the country, and
murdered above seven thousand of them, killing
a distinguished soldier named Pu-ta-wei-ka-lut,
and many more.

"Elgin passes day after day at Hong-Kong, stamping his foot and sighing; his anxiety is increased by the non-arrival of dispatches from his government."—Oliphant, vol. i. p. 143.

The time was, however, at hand when a very different aspect was about to be given to affairs. Reinforcements at length arrived; Baron Gros, the French Commissioner, actively coöperated with Lord Elgin; an ultimatum was sent in; the bombardment of Canton opened on the twenty-eighth December; the Braves were routed and the walls carried by the The French ambassador's name is elsewhere allied troops; and on the last day of the given as Go-lo-so, (Gros;) his title of baron is evidently taken to be his name, and is put in Chi-year Lord Elgin himself ascended by a neso fashion after his surname-lun representing, scalding ladder the south-east angle of the city wall, and entered the streets of that doubtless, pa-lun for baron.

+ Mang-ga-ta is clearly a compromise between Mang-ga-la, Bengal and Calcutta.

proud Canton which had never been trodden by an European. A few days later Yeh himself was seized, and the city was placed under the joint authority of its Chinese magistrates and a military commission. These events have already been narrated with so much spirit by another eye-witness, that Mr. Oliphant has passed over them with greater brevity than their importance would otherwise deserve; but, not to linger over a twice-told tale, we shall at once accompany him to the mouth of the Peiho, where the principal objects of the mission were to be attained.

No sooner had the blockade of Canton been raised and the trade reöpened, at the urgent entreaty of the Chinese authorities as well as of our own merchants, than a letter was dispatched by Lord Elgin to Yu, the senior secretary of state. This communication, dated the eleventh February, 1858, informed the Court of Pekin of the events which had occurred at Canton, and announced the intention of the Allies to continue the occupation of that city until their demands were satisfied. At the same time the Chinese were invited to send an Imperial Plenipotentiary to Shanghai before the end of March, and they were told that the non-arrival of such a negotiator would be held at once to justify the British Plenipotentiary to proceed nearer the capital, and to have recourse to such measures as he might think fit to adopt. Mr. Oliphant and M. de Contades were dispatched with this mission and its French counterpart; and their successful expedition from Shanghai to Soochou for the purpose of delivering these dispatches, is one of the most interesting chapters of the present work.

Soochou lies on the Imperial Grand Canal, which at the period of Sir H. Pottinger's expedition was the great artery of the internal commerce and navigation of the empire. But Mr. Oliphant speaks of it as that once celebrated channel of

commerce.

"For since the bursting of its banks by the Yellow River, and the destruction in consequence of a section of this canal, it has not been used for the last five years. The vast supplies of grain which were annually conveyed along it to the capital are now sent in sea-going junks from Shanghai, and other ports of the Yan-tse Kiang, round the promontory of Shantung, and up the Peiho river. The expenses incidental to the rebellion have prevented the Government from spending any money in repairing this magnificent work. The consequence is, that

the enormous imperial grain junks formerly employed now line the bank in a rotting condition."

This sudden and extraordinary change in the line of communication of the grain fleet, on which Pekin depends for its subsistence, increased the importance attached by Lord Elgin to the command of the month of the Peiho, and he was especially anxious that a sufficient naval force should be assembled there to interrupt, if necessary, the junks which bring their innumerable cargoes to that stream immediately after the monsoon. With this view, as early as the second March, he had called upon the Admiral to collect before the end of that month at Shanghai as large a naval force as possible, especially of gunboats drawing little water; and in the Admiral's reply to this requisition the Ambassador was assured that measures had already been taken to meet his wishes, and that Sir Michael Seymour himself would sail for Shanghai in the Calcutta on or about the sixteenth March. On the third April intelligence was received from the south that the Admiral had postponed his departure for ten days; but on the tenth April Lord Elgin, in company with Baron Gros, and such vessels as had been collected, resolved to proceed to the mouth of the Peiho, convinced that any appearance of wavering at so critical a juncture might entail the most serious consequences, and defeat the main objects of the Mission. The weather was lovely, and nothing impeded the advance of the squadron up the Yellow Sea, until it reached the bar at the mouth of the Peiho, which was scarcely within sight of land. Although at that time the British squadron had no less than eighteen gunboats in the Chinese seas, adapted for this particular service, and although the speedy appearance of Admiral Rigault de Genouilly with the whole French force demonstrated that the voyage could be made with ease and safety, it was not till the twentieth May that Admiral Seymour had brought up his forces. Five weeks were spent by the Ambassador and by our allies in deplorable inaction at the mouth of the Peiho, in consequence of the non-arrival of the British gunboats; during the whole of this period the Chinese were actively engaged in constructing stockades and abattis to strengthen the forts which might have been taken in April without a blow. Nine hundred grain junks were

computed to have passed the spot where the Furious lay, and to have entered the river; and at one time it seemed probable the allied squadron might have entered the Gulf of Pechelee without an attempt to force a passage. As it was, although the blow was eventually struck and the treaty of Tientsin signed, yet the most favorable season for operations in China was lost, and it became impossible to complete the design of Lord Elgin by advancing to Pekin-a circumstance which has doubtless powerfully contributed to the renewal of hostilities by the Chinese, and the subsequent disastrous result of Admiral Hope's attack on the Peiho forts.

Mr. Oliphant has touched very lightly on these facts; and he has not made the remarks upon them which they are well calculated to call forth, probably from a laudable desire to bury in oblivion acts of misconduct, which must have occasioned the deepest annoyance to Lord Elgin. We think these acts have not yet been visited with the reprobation they justly deserve in this country. We are aware that Admiral Seymour, having been called upon to explain his conduct, did so in a dispatch to the Admiralty, in which he alleges the dangers of navigating the Chinese seas in the monsoon, and similar excuses for his procrastination. This explanation was accepted by the Admiralty; but, having carefully weighed all these circumstances, we must be permitted to retain and to express our opinion that the unjustifiable delay of Sir Michael in bring ing up the gunboats as he had promised to do, was in the highest degree detrimental to the objects of the mission and to the public service, and that it placed our squadron in a position of humiliating contrast with that of our allies: we may add that the ulterior consequences of our apparent vacillation and weakness on that occasion, have probably contributed to encourage the Chinese to fresh acts of resistance, which will render necessary another campaign. We are the more desirous to call the attention of the country to this subject, because it is not the first time that the naval authorities at home have shown what we must consider a very culpable disposition to screen the shortcomings and misconduct of admirals employed on active service abroad; and inore than one such officer has received a ribbon who would in former times have

[blocks in formation]

The principal concessions obtained by the Treaty of Tientsin were, the right to send a Minister Resident to Pekin, and permission for British subjects to travel and trade in all parts of the empire. The new ports of Teng-chow in the province of Shantung, and of New-chwang in Manchooria, were opened to foreign commerce, as well as the important trading posts on the Yang-tsi-kiang, after the rebels are expelled from its shores. The onerous transit duties on merchandise were commuted for a pass or certificate to be purchased once, for all, by a payment of two and a half per cent ad valorem ; and an idemnity of about £1,300,000 sterling was stipulated for losses at Canton and the expenses of the war. These remarkable and satisfactory results, obtained within a year from Lord Elgin's first arrival in China, and obtained under many discouraging circumstances, were due in great measure to the spirit and judgment of the Ambassador; and although subsequent events have unhappily shown that our future prospects in China are less clear and brilliant than they appeared to be when this treaty was signed, it still remains the basis of the rights we may have to enforce.

We can not, however, take leave of this part of the subject without remarking that there appears to be something radically erroneous in the attempt to place our relations with the Chinese on the footing of our relations with states which acknowledge the obligations of international law. Mr. John Stuart Mill observes, in the course of some pages on our foreign policy which have recently proceeded from his able pen, that to suppose the same rules of international morality, and the same reciprocity of international obligation, which obtain between one civilized nation and another, will also obtain between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error. The history of our treaties with the Chinese authorities demonstrates that the conditions we have attempted to

impose on them by a diplomatic instrument have no binding force at all; and that they will be evaded and broken the moment it appears that their stipulations can be set at naught with impunity. Probably a Chinese statesman thinks that when concessions galling to the national pride, or adverse to the national policy, have been extorted by force of arms, and as it were under duresse, he is doing no more than his duty in regarding the treaty as a nullity, when the force that imposed it is removed. Accordingly, the more extensive the concessions are which we think we have obtained, the more certain is it that they will be violated, and the less practical benefit shall we derive from them thus the opening of Canton promised in 1843 was never obtained till the place had been reduced and occupied by force; and the stipulation for sending a Resident Minister to Pekin will be either resisted or rendered nugatory, unless he be accompanied by an army. As for the engagements of Mandarins with blue buttons, or even the strokes of the Vermilion Pencil, they are absolutely without binding force, and the formalities of diplomacy become ludicrous if they fail to constitute a substantial engagement. We find ourselves, therefore, in a vicious circle; for when one expedition has exacted and obtained certain concessions, another and more powerful expedition is required to enforce them; and our diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet on the spot to back it. The conclusion we draw from these facts is, that far from seeking to blind the Chinese government to greater concessions, and consequently to interfere still more directly in their internal affairs, the wiser course both for them and for us, in the interests of peace and commerce, would be to confine ourselves strictly to that superficial contact on certain points of the coast, which the trading propensities of both nations will keep up under any circumstances. Lord Elgin himself is known to have arrived at the conclusion that the principal value of the right of sending a British Minister to Pekin is the dread which the bare possibility of the execution of such a threat inspires in the breast of every thoroughbred Mandarin; and recent experience has proved that the presence of a permanent European corps diplomatique in Pekin would be a constant source of irritation and outrage; indeed, far from be

ing a pledge of peace, it would probably give rise to incessant disputes and hostilities. Although, therefore, it is probably necessary to avenge the recent defeat of the squadron at the mouth of the Peiho, we trust that we shall not find ourselves hereafter fettered by additional liabilities under the name of privileges and rights. Notwithstanding the events which have occurred, we are by no means disposed to rely on force as the best, or the sole, mode of placing our relations with China on a more satisfactory footing. On the contrary, the destruction of semi-barbarous forts, and the discomfiture of Mantchou soldiers-nay, even the military occupation of great cities by a handful of troops, can have but a transient effect. The Chinese are a crafty and sagacious people, on whom a more lasting impression may be made by their interests than by their fears; and we believe that the opinion we express is precisely that to which Lord Elgin's own experience and good sense have led him, in deprecating any hasty and violent attempt to destroy what it would be impossible for us to restore, and scarcely less difficult for us to replace.

The spirits of Lord Elgin and his companions, both civil and naval, appear to have risen when a happy combination of circumstances, of which the Ambassador promptly availed himself, enabled the mission to pass from the wearisome and oppressive scene of their labors in China to the unexplored island-empire of Japan. Accordingly Mr. Oliphant's work rises rapidly in vivacity and in interest: his second volume is in every respect more entertaining and more curious than the first. He finds himself on new, and one may almost say enchanted, ground-so unforseen are the incidents, so beautiful the scenery, so bewitching the reception which awaited the mission in Japan. There at least war had not preceded the messengers of peace, and the engagements contracted by the Japanese rulers were not accompanied by humiliation or extorted by fear. A long series of quarrels and mutual injuries had not tainted either side with animosity or distrust; and in treating with the Japanese, the British Ambassador was forcibly struck by their immeasurable superiority to the Chinese in all that constitutes the government of a great nation and the dignity of the human character. The ministers of Japan,

Let us accompany the mission, in the first instance, as the Furious steamed up the bay of Nagasaki, and caught its first view of Japan.

acting under the most singular political | appears to have excited in his own constitution that exists in the world, and mind.* in the name of an emperor who realizes one of the fanciful conceptions of the Abbé Sièyes, showed themselves to be men of a high sense of personal dignity; they resorted to none of those puerile equivocations and artifices which are common to most of the Asiatics, and preëminent among the Chinese; their administration is singularly free from corruption; their great ingenuity and acuteness are not applied, as in China, to surround themselves with an imaginary halo of unapproachable superiority, but on the contrary, to penetrate with singular rapidity the intentions and habits of the foreigners with whom they were thus suddenly brought into contact; and the effect on Lord Elgin's Embassy was that during the whole period of his visit, every incident that occurred tended to highten the wonder and interest and respect which the conduct of the Japanese was calculated to inspire in our countrymen.

China was long ago selected by M. de Tocqueville as the most striking example of the degradation a nation would probably arrive at, in which an entire equality of conditions prevails, and the absolute power of the sovereign predominates over a purely democratic state of society. Japan is, on the contrary, as far as we can judge from the slight knowledge already acquired there, an aristocratic State, not without some admixture of popular municipal institutions. Its hereditary nobles are its real governors, for the authority of the spiritual and temporal emperors is purely formal. Accordingly the policy of the country is not determined by the caprice or ignorance of a court, but by the will of a body of men, whose interests, convictions, and passions act upon and control each other. The entire action of the administrative power is not that of pure despotism, but of mutual checks; and the demeanor of the Japanese statesmen is not that of the mere slaves of a barbarous absolutism, but that of the members of a national government. It is long since any spectacle has been disclosed to the observer of politics and of manners so novel and so interesting as that which Mr. Oliphant affords us of the internal condition of Japan; and we can not lay down his second volume without in some degree sharing in the enthusiasm and astonishment the aspect of the Japanese Empire

"The distance from Shanghai to Nagasaki is not above four hundred and fifty miles; but if oceans rolled between the two empires, Japan could not be more thoroughly isolated than it is from the rest of the world. We steamed smoothly and rapidly over this narrow strip of sea, so rarely traversed by craft of any sort. There was not a speck of foam to ruffle its glassy surface, scarce a fleece of cloud to checker the deep blue overhead: well might we imagine ourselves gliding across these solitary waters to some dreamland, securely set in a quiet corner of another world, far away from the storms and troubles of this one. On the afternoon of the second of August we first saw symptoms of land, and passed close to some high pointed rocks of picturesque form, in places covered with verdure, but not affording standing ground for an inhabitant. These bold landmarks are out of sight of the Japanese coast, and are called the Asses' Ears. Early on the

following morning the highlands of Japan were Iwosima. As we approached it, the first object in sight, the nearest land being the islands of visible was an evidence of civilization unknown among the Chinese; on its highest summit a flagstaff at once telegraphed our appearance to the mainland. We did not then know that cannon, placed at intervals the whole way to the capital, were noisily repeating this signal, so that erberating almost from one end of the empire to intelligence of our approach was even then revthe other; and his majesty the Tycoon at Yedo, six or seven hundred miles away, was informed that we had entered the Bay of Nagasaki by the time that we had dropped our anchor in it.

"The high green islands of Iwosima conceal from view the entrance to the bay until you other islands and projecting promontories make round their westernmost point: even then it somewhat uncertain. The overhanging promontory above us is crowned by a battery of guns, round which a few soldiers are grouped, gazing curiously; beyond it more batteries appear on sundry other projections of the shore, which is here and there indented with bays, from which deep-wooded valleys run up into the cottages, with their high thatched roofs, the island. They seem thickly populated, for cluster up the hill-side, and peep out from under the dark foliage. In places the islands are precipitous, and masses of towering rock deny even to the hardiest shrubs holding ground.

*For a succinct but animated account of what was known of Japanese government and institutions previous to Lord Elgin's visit, we may refer xcvi. p. 348.) And we rejoice to find that the our readers to our own pages. (Ed. Review, vol. prognostications expressed in that article have been so speedily fulfilled.

« ZurückWeiter »