Harsh and paradoxical as the assertion may seem, we believe that the abandonment of Venice was the pledge for the future of Italy. It is most painful to behold the condition of the unhappy provinces of Venetia weighed down by ruthless taxation, oppressed by a hungry and disappointed soldiery ;* it is grievous to think of noble women cast into solitary confinement like Madam Contarini; of peaceful citizens torn from their homes at dead of night and shut up in the dungeons of German fortresses, their goods confiscated, and their families left in penury; but if we can divest ourselves of individual sympathy, we may deem that all the tears shed in Venetia are almost necessary to water the infant tree of Italian unity and independence. In the narrative of the Evangelist, Christ suffers for the redemption of the world-in ordinary life, individual woe is often the source of the general weal, and heavy as is the cross that Venetia now bears, it may prove the symbol of the salvation of all Italy. None could have wished this heavy burden to be cast on a city so endeared to every student of historic or artistic lore, that Venice appeals to our sympathy with a charm only less than that of our native homes. However beneficial the consequence that may ultimately ensue, yet as fate has decreed that the burden shall be borne yet awhile, it were well that none should let sorrow blind them to what compensation circumstances may admit, and we will briefly state the reasons that tend to mitigate our regret. of Italian independence-long live Victor | might have been taken with less sacrifice Emmanuel, our king!" the shout went of life and time than had been anticipated. forth from the narrow limits of the Alpine The armaments of Verona are now known camp and was echoed back from the banks to have been incomplete, and the Hungaof Arno and the forests of Romagna. rian and Polish garrison of Mantua had arranged to open the gates at the first demonstration of an attack. Every thing was agreed upon and the day fixed, when the sudden conclusion of the armistice obliged the officer who had conducted the negotiations to send word to his confederates within the fortress, that the execution of the scheme must be delayed, and a few days later it was, of course, necessarily abandoned. Had independence been won by so slight and short an effort, had the Austrian power thus suddenly and entirely collapsed, would the Italians have been united in taking the measures necessary to prevent its return at some future period? We know that the great mass of the Italian nation is ready to make any sacrifice for independence, and that the noblest minds among her sons do not scruple to declare, that if, once freed, Italy were unable to defend her liberties and guard them with her own sword, she would deserve to fall back into slavery, but too easy victory might have engendered contempt for the foe, and opened a door to many municipal and provincial jealousies and rivalries. In the rejoicings for the conquests of a potent ally, the necessity for self-sacrifice might have been forgotten and have thrown many difficulties in the way of a strong organization of Italy. Now, the consciousness that the enemy is near, looking down from the ramparts of Mantua and Verona, to profit by any sign of disunion, comes home to every true Italian heart, and before many years have passed, the spirit now working will weld the different provinces so thoroughly together, that the differences between Tuscan and Piedmontese will become as little dangerous to their common character as Italians as those between Alsatian and Gascon are to the unity of France; and the union will be far more likely to prove satisfactory if the provinces join Sardinia by their own solemn and deliberate choice, rather than in obedience to the fortune of war. History shows, that the more easily a nation wins its liberty, the less likely it is to maintain what it has acquired. Had the war continued, in all human probability the Austrians would have been driven back from the Mincio to the Isonzo even more rapidly than from the Ticino to the Lombard frontier, nay, there is great reason to believe that the celebrated quadrangle On the 5th of July last, the city of Venice was ordered by the governor, Count Bissingen, to pay 1,200,000 florins (£120,000) in six days. The yearly taxes imposed on Venetia amount to 37, 288,320 lire. This year there were additional war taxes, and a forced loan of 45,000,000 of florins. The estinated income of Venetia is 65,433,361 lire. VOL. XLIX.-NO. I. No greater proof is needed than the events that have just taken place in Cen tral Italy. But a few months since, the withdrawal of the Austrians, and the flight of the quasi-native authorities, left the populations entirely to themselves. They were unused to self-government, and mili 7 tary power alone had restrained their pas- | Cipriani. History presents few spectacles sions for years. The people sent to Turin more grand than that we have so lately for Italian rulers, and a remarkable symp- witnessed. Even our own revolution of tom soon made manifest their aptitude for 1688 can hardly stand a comparison. An order. Brigandage suddenly ceased, poli- elective law on the broadest base was tical assassination disappeared, even ordi- promulgated, and all classes hastened to nary crime diminished in a striking de- the poll, even the less educated displaying gree. A Sardinian governor and a few an eagerness to take advantage of their half-drilled national guards achieved in a privilege, rare in our own country. The few hours what thousands of Austrian men most distinguished for birth, name, soldiers, aided by troops of gens-d'armes beneficence, science, wealth, were returned and a powerful police, had failed to do in by large majorities. The elections were ten years. At first sight this fact appears unsullied by the slightest excess, and so surprising as to baffle all explanation. when the assemblies met, they with sinIf we reflect, however, we may perceive gular unanimity voted the expulsion of that the people had been going through their ancient rulers, and the union with a course of education ever since 1848. Sardinia; and then, their task accomUnder every disguise and pretext the plished, prorogued themselves, wisely disecret agents of Austria were constantly vining that in such troubled times a dicurging them to disorder and revolt, while tatorship alone could hope to obtain a her organs in the German press never favorable solution. ceased to portray the anarchical tendencies and municipal dissensions of the Italians. Thus the populations were enabled to see their own former errors as in a glass, they were struck by the deformity of the portrait, and perceiving at the same time that the real object of the "agents provocateurs" must be the advantage of Austria, they discovered what they were henceforth to avoid, under pain of eternal servitude. So deeply rooted was this conviction, that not even the deep calculation of their flying rulers, who, (with the exception of the Duchess of Parma,) anxious to conduce to the fulfillment of their own prophecies of anarchy, ordered all the persons employed under their government immediately to interrupt their labors, could sting them into momentary forgetfulness. Thus, the order and moderation we are now admiring are the direct result of the calculations and over-strenuous efforts of the Hapsburgh Dukes. Whatever the secret motive of the Emperor Napoleon in drawing up the preliminaries of Villafranca, the clause permitting the return of the self-exiled sovereigns has had an effect he could scarcely have anticipated, unless, indeed, his design was to provoke a fresh and more striking manifestation of the wishes and capacities of the Italian nation. No disorder followed the recall of the Piedmontese commissioners. Modena and Parma quietly united themselves under the dictatorship of the Roman Farini; Tuscany was governed apart by Baron Ricasoli; Romagna, by Colonel That the smaller duchies should arrive at this decision need excite no surprise. Forming part of the vast Valley of the Po, their geographical and commercial tendencies lead them to seek union with Lombardy and Piedmont, and for the last ten years they have aspired to realize the wish revealed by universal suffrage in 1848. The Legations so abhor their priestly rulers, that even in the last century they hailed with delight their transfer to republican France by the treaty of Tolentino; and whatever Mr. Bowyer and other Irish members may be pleased to think or say, we can not doubt that they would prefer any government whatsoever to that of the Vicar of Christ. But we own that we scarcely ventured to anticipate the unanimity of the Tuscan Assembly; and we appeal to it as a testimony to the truth of our remarks on the indirect beneficial consequences of the peace of Villafranca. The autonomy of Tuscany had for centuries been strongly marked; the people had few positive grievances to complain of; and though the princes of Hapsburg Lorraine had conferred no lasting benefits on their subjects, they were undistinguished by the positive and individual wickedness of the Dukes of Parma and Modena, and had they yielded with a good grace to the request urged by Cavaliere Buoncompagni,* on the twenty * His dispatch of the above date reflects equal honor on the Minister who ordered and the representative who drew it up, and is the best proof of Many of these men have lived in familiar intercourse with the Grand-ducal family, yet not a voice was raised in defense of the princes who had sought shelter in the Austrian camp, and gone forth to battle with the vanquished of Solferino. Not even under shelter of the ballot was a single vote recorded in their favor. With peculiar tact the Assembly assigned, as the motive for its vote, the simple fact that the ruler had abandoned his country at the commencement of a national war. Thus every citizen who had not quitted Tuscany was enabled consistently to adhere to the vote of exclusion. The farther question then remained-Should Tuscany unite herself to Northern Italy, or seek to become the center of a kingdom to be offered to Prince Napoleon, whose matrimonial alliance with the House of Savoy might make him almost appear an Italian prince? We are ready to acknowledge that the personal dislike of, and contempt for this candidate, dating from his earliest years, may have had something to do with the unanimity of fourth of April last, they might at this hour have reigned undisturbed, under shelter of an alliance with Victor Emmanuel. They refused, and went their way, the departure of the Grand-ducal family making as little sensation in the country it had governed for one hundred and twenty-two years, as that of any ordinary traveler. The protectorate of the "honest" king was sought as a means of assisting in the war, but few then really thought of a fusion under his scepter, and those few had but little hope of seeing their wishes realized. The Tuscans were content to await events, and had Venetia been freed as speedily as Lombardy, we will venture to say they would never have been willing to sacrifice their administrative independence. The peace carried to all hearts the stern conviction that self-sacrifice alone could enable Italy to resist the still remaining power of Austria, and annul her influence in the Confederation, if that strange conception were ever destined to see the light. This belief bore speedy fruits; the electors asked but one pledge of the representa- the decision; but we believe that, after tives to whom they confided their destiny; and when the descendants of the grand old republicans of Florence met again in the hall of the Cinque-Cento, in that palace which is as a very temple of historic grandeur, the issue was not doubtful. There they stood once more, the bearers of names that adorn the pages of Guicciardini and Sismondi. Gino Capponi, descended from that Pietro who once bearded the French monarch in his tent; Strozzi, of yet more princely line; Ugolino della Gherardesca, whose name can never die while the verse of Dante lives; with many more of kindred, if not equal fame. The old spirit of Florence seemed to descend upon them as they left that ancient hall so replete with glorious memories, and went in solemn procession to pray the blessing of God in the fane that Brunelleschi raised and Michael Angelo admired, with humble doubt of his own power to emulate. May their prayer be heard both in heaven and on earth, and the double decision they came to with such calm dignity, such resolute courage, such disdain both of secret menace and of deceit ful lures, avail for the good of Tuscany and the future of Italy. Villafranca, the union would, in any case, have been voted by a large majority. Italy for the Italians, is the one thing aspired to; and all classes have a strong persuasion, that were they once united under a single scepter, the Austrian tenure of Venetia would not be of long duration. But all these signs of the temper of men's minds in Italy would be of small avail for the future were they not accompanied by other symptoms of far deeper import. We have no wish to depreciate the abnegation displayed by the Assemblies, or the order maintained among the people. We know how difficult a task is national sacrifice, since vanity may readily oppose it under the cloak of patriotism; we are aware how hard it was to rouse the despondent, and to bridle the indignant; to maintain order, and to unite all classes in a common effort, embarrassed as the dictators necessarily were by the uncertainties of the future, and by the intrigues of the Mazzinians, and of the priestly party, both of whom saw their only hope in disturbance. All honor is due to the populations, to their representatives, and to the dictators, men who unite great talent with singular firmness of character, the disinterestedness of Piedmont in the Italian and steadfast clearness of vision; but we question. say again, that were these the only signs visible, so many virtues would but serve to adorn the victim, and render its fate more lamented, not to avert the final sacrifice. mutual support, and have united their armies under a single chief. There are many leaders in Italy whose talents and honesty are beyond dispute, but one man only was to be found above all suspicion or cavil. That man was Garibaldi. It is not his talents, however signally proved, that give him his unequaled influence. It is his moral character that makes him the only man able to tame or bend the wild spirits that are gath Were the provinces of Central Italy content with sending deputations to offer their crowns to Victor Emmanuel, did they rest satisfied with the formal and often-repeated assurance of Napoleon III., that he will neither undertake nor sanction any armed intervention, we should even yet despair of the future of Italy.ering for the defense of Central Italy.* There is, indeed, a moral certainty that He has lived with the life of his people, the French Emperor will not endeavor to and born of their breath, his turn has now coerce the nation he has so lately delivered, come to sway their passions at his will. and if Austria be thoroughly convinced The boldest shrink from his displeasure, that any attempt at violence on her part and submit without a murmur to the stern will be opposed by France, the lesson discipline he enforces, for all know his intaught at Solferino will probably induce flexible severity whenever he deems his her sullenly to acquiesce, for the present, anger just. The calmer spirits confide in in the aggrandizement of Sardinia. But his fatherly care, and all know that whenthis moral certainty is not enough, and ever the trumpet sounds, he will seek his the real test of the fitness of the Italians place in the van, with his usual haughty for freedom is the union of the menaced defiance of death. The personal intrepidprovinces, and the readiness of the inhab-ity of a leader is always sure to endear itants to give money and life in support of their decisions. Fortunately this test is not wanting. In the spirit of the old Lombard league, that once saved Italy from the spoiler, the modern Italians have united themselves for a common resistance. The governments are well aware that besides the Austrians, there are many elements of mischief abroad; that the Pope, whose name in the older time to which we have alluded, was synonymous with resistance to the foreigner, has now gone over to the foe. Alexander III. formed the Lombard League, the town erected for its defense, Alessandria della Paglia, received his name, and by a strange coïncidence has even lately proved a solid bulwark against German invasion. Pius IX. allowed Perugia to be sacked, and rewarded those who did the bloody deed. His troops are even now assembling at La Cattolica, and might any day invade Romagna. The banished dukes may perhaps attempt mischief with the secret assistance of Austria, and we know that the few, yet active and reckless, partisans of Mazzini are doing their best to excite troubles within the border. Union is the only defense against these divers dangers, and, in our opinion, nothing augurs better for the future, than that the three governments should have hastened to conclude a league for their him to his soldiers, and is a necessary qualification in the chief of bands so motley as those Garibaldi now commands. But even this is not the chief cause of that general's magic power. The secret lies in the knowledge that his life is one devoted to Italy, for his readiness to engage the trained troops of Austria, or the Swiss mercenaries of the Pope, can not be questioned, and condemnation of all republican attempts come with double force from the lips of him who so long fought the battles of the republic, and first suffered for his participation in the plots of Mazzini. Some may be disposed to mistrust the troops now united under command of Garibaldi, on account of the various elements from which they are composed. The three governments who appointed him, have, however, confidence in his ability to weld the mass into a compact army, as a skillful swordsmith forms a fine and sharp-edged blade out of what seemed General Fanti has also been appointed to a command in Central Italy, but it has not been officially stated whether he will be under the orders of Garibaldi or superior to him. The well-known patriotism of the general makes us hope and beacquirements will no doubt be of the greatest serlieve the former. His great talents and scientific vice in that case, but they could hardly replace the moral ascendency which Garibaldi alone possesses, a rough lump of iron. The elements he Will these sacrifices be indeed required at their hands? Will the rich be called upon to offer up their gold? the young and brave, of every rank, their lives, to secure the liberty of their native land? We trust not; yet we can not disguise from ourselves that great peril menaces the young independence of Italy from many quarters, and that if even the present question be settled to the entire satisfaction of her citizens, they must yet sleep with their armor on, like the knights of yore, for many a long year, and daily gird up their loins for strife, for the foreign foe lies in his Venetian leaguer; the more secret and deadly enemy has his citadel at Rome, and a struggle must sooner or later ensue. This is the future in the most favorable case, and perhaps it is not to be regretted. With all their many virtues, the Italians still need the baptism of fire; and it is well that they should feel the absolute necessity of organizing a strong military force. But this future is still remote, and need not now concern us. Enough for the day is the evil thereof, and the present question is sufficient to occupy the wisest heads. The answer to it lies mainly with the English government and nation. One of the most curious results of the convention of Villafranca was the sudden revulsion of feeling towards England. Up to that period idolatry of France generally prevailed, deep resentment was expressed for the severe language Lord Malmesbury had held to Sardinia, and his successor seemed half included in the unforgiving censure. But as soon as the clang of arms was stilled, and the constitutional phase of the revolution began, this sentiment underwent a change. The people divined that their conduct would be better appreciated in England than in France. They saw that the direct protec. tion of Napoleon III. was for the time withdrawn, that the Italian war had been but a part of, perhaps a prelude to, far greater enterprises, that his chief attention would henceforth be directed elsewhere; and though they hopefully trusted that he would defend them from external aggression if they were but able to suppress internal disorder, they yet yearned for a warmer sympathy with constitutional aspirations than a despotic sovereign could ever be likely to feel, and despite many previous disappointments they yet sought it from England. Some writers have hastily stigmatized this change as ingratitude. We do not think it deserves this name, or that it necessarily implies mistrust of the French Emperor, who was himself the first to admit that disappointment was natural, and to excuse its manifestations. At this stage it would be impolitic to express mistrust of him, for the game has not yet been played out; it is clear that no confidence or amity at present exists between the courts of Vienna and Paris; and it has not been sufficiently remarked that how |