NUMB. 107. TUESDAY, November 13, 1753. Sub judice lis eft. And of their vain difputings find no end. HOR. T has been fometimes afked by thofe, who find the appearance of wisdom more eafily attained by questions than folutions, how it comes to pass, that the world is divided by fuch difference of opinion; and why men, equally reasonable, and equally lovers of truth, do not always think in the fame manner? With regard to fimple propofitions, where the terms are understood, and the whole fubject is comprehended at once, there is fuch an uniformity of fentiment among all human beings, that, for many ages, a very numerous set of notions were fuppofed to be innate, or neceffarily co-exiftent with the faculty of reafon: it being imagined, that univerfal agreement could proceed only from the invariable dictates of the univerfal parent; In questions diffufe and compounded, this fimilarity of determination is no longer to be expected. At our firft fally into the intellectual world, we all march together along one ftraight and open road. but as we proceed further, and wider profpects open to our view, every eye fixes upon a different fcene; we divide into various paths, and, as we move forward, are still at a greater diftance from each other.. As As a queftion becomes more complicated and involved, and extends to a greater number of relations, difagreement of opinion will always be multiplied; not because we are irrational, but because we are finite beings, furnished with different kinds of knowledge, exerting different degrees of attention, one difcovering confequences which efcape another, none taking in the whole concatenation of caufes and effects, and moft comprehending but a very fmall part, each comparing what he obferves with a different criterion, and each referring it to a different purpose. Where, then, is the wonder, that they who fee only a small part fhould judge erroneously of the whole? or that they, who fee different and diffimilar parts, fhould judge differently from each other? Whatever has various refpects, muft have various appearances of good and evil, beauty or deformity; thus, the gardener tears up as a weed, the plant which the phyfician gathers as a medicine; and "a gene ral," fays Sir Kenelm Digby, " will look with plea"fure over a plain, as a fit place on which the fate " of empires might be decided in battle, which the "farmer will defpife as bleak and barren, neither "fruitful of pafturage, nor fit for tillage." Two men examining the fame question proceed commonly like the physician and gardener in selecting herbs, or the farmer and hero looking on the plain; they bring minds impreffed with different notions, and direct their inquiries to different ends; they form, therefore, contrary conclufions, and each wonders at the other's abfurdity. We We have lefs reafon to be furprised or offended when we find others differ from us in opinion, because we very often differ from ourselves. How often we alter our minds, we do not always remark; because the change is fometimes made imperceptibly and gradually, and the last conviction effaces all memory of the former: yet every man, accustomed from time to time to take a furvey of his own notions, will by a flight retrospection be able to difcover, that his mind. has suffered many revolutions; that the fame things have in the feveral parts of his life been condemned and approved, pursued and fhunned: and that on many occafions, even when his practice has been fteady, his mind has been wavering, and he has perfifted in a fcheme of action, rather because he feared the cenfure of inconftancy, than because he was always pleased with his own choice. Of the different faces fhewn by the fame objects as they are viewed on oppofite fides, and of the dif ferent inclinations which they must conftantly raise in him that contemplates them, a more ftriking example cannot easily be found than two Greek epigrammatifts will afford us in their accounts of human life, which I fhall lay before the reader in English profe. Pofidippus, a comick poet, utters this complaint: "Through which of the paths of life is it eligible to pass? In publick affemblies are debates and "troublesome affairs: domeftic privacies are haunt"ed with anxieties; in the country is labour; on "the fea is terror: in a foreign land, he that has "money muft live in fear, he that wants it must pine in diftrefs; are you married? you are trou 36 bled "bled with fufpicions; are you fingle? you languish "in folitude; children occafion toil, and a childless "life is a state of deftitution; the time of youth " is a time of folly, and gray hairs are loaded with infirmity. This choice only, therefore, can be "made, either never to receive being, or immediately "to lofe it." Such and fo gloomy is the profpect, which Pofidippus has laid before us. But we are not to acquiefce too haftily in his determination against the value of exiftence for Metrodorus, a philofopher of Athens, has fhewn, that life has pleafures as well as pains; and having exhibited the present state of man in brighter colours, draws, with equal appearance of reason, a contrary conclufion. "You may pass well through any of the paths of "life. In publick affemblies are honours and tranf" actions of wifdom; in domeftick privacy is ftill"nefs and quiet; in the country are the beauties of "nature; on the fea is the hope of gain; in a 36 foreign land, he that is rich is honoured, he that is poor may keep his poverty fecret; are you married? you have a cheerful houfe; are you fingle? you are "unincumbered; children are objects of affection, to "be without children is to be without care; the time "of youth is the time of vigour, and gray hairs are "made venerable by piety. It will, therefore, never "be a wife man's choice, either not to obtain ex"istence, or to lofe it; for every ftate of life has its "felicity." In thefe epigrams are included moft of the questions which have engaged the fpeculations of the enquirers after happiness; and though they will not not much affift our determinations, they may, perhaps, equally promote our quiet, by fhewing that no abfolute determination ever can be formed. Whether a publick ftation, or private life be defirable, has always been debated. We fee here both the allurements and difcouragements of civil employments: on one fide there is trouble, on the other honour the management of affairs is vexatious and difficult, but it is the only duty in which wifdom can be confpicuoufly difplayed: it must then fill be left to every man to choose either eafe or glory; nor can any general precept be given, fince no man can be happy by the prescription of another. Thus, what is faid of children by Pofidippus, "that they are occafions of fatigue," and by Metrodorus, "that they are objects of affection," is equally certain ; but whether they will give most pain or pleasure, muft depend on their future conduct and difpofitions, on many caufes over which the parent can have little influence: there is, therefore, room for all the caprices of imagination, and defire must be proportioned to the hope or fear that fhall happen to predominate. Such is the uncertainty in which we are always likely to remain with regard to queftions, wherein we have most intereft, and which every day affords us fresh opportunity to examine: we may examine, indeed, but we never can decide, because our faculties. are unequal to the fubject: we fee a little, and form an opinion; we see more, and change it. This inconftancy and unfteadinefs, to which we muft fo often find ourselves liable, ought certainly to teach us moderation and forbearance towards 3 thofe |