gressing the laws of its good Creator, and the best system of things required it should so will.

But to prevent sin, which, in the best system of things, is more like putrid sores on the human body, than shades to the beauty of a picture, God in his word, holds up to the mind's view, future rewards, and punishments; and if, notwithstanding these, the mind sins, God suffers it. But from his suffering it, we are not to infer that our sinful volitions are effects produced by God: they are the prohibited acts of his creatures, and are a great evil. The infliction of future punishments on impenitent sinners will be God's work, which we have reason to believe will do as much good to the universal whole, as their sinful volitions do harm; so, that on account of their sinful volitions and punishments, the universal system of things is not the worse, but all together make one perfect whole, In this sense, we may say, whatever is, is right; that is, their sinful volitions, though a great evil, taken in connexion with their punishments, which counterbalance the evil with great good, are right in the system. Or to leave their sinful volitions out of the system, and have their punishments in, would render the system imperfect, and to leave their punishments out of the system, and have their sinful volitions in, would make the system equally imperfect. But because all make one perfect whole, we are not to infer, that we are not free agents.

II. The dogma, that sin is as necessary to the perfection of the system, as shades are to the beauty of a picture, I believe was first advanced by Leibnitz, a German philosopher, who contended that God was the author of sin, and will produce as much of it, as will be for the greatest possible good to his system of things, and no more. nitz, the same sentiments were advanced in NewEngland, by Dr. Hopkins, in his system of Divinity, published a short time before the beginning of the eighteenth century. His disciples took the name of Hopkintonians. To prove their doctrine they reason nearly as follows.

After Leib

"It properly belongs to the Supreme and abso⚫ "lute Governor of the Universe, to order all im"portant events within his dominions, by his wis"dom; but the events in the moral world are of "the most important kind, such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their conse66 quences.

These events will be ordered by some thing. They will either be disposed by wisdom, "or they will be disposed by chance; that is, they "will be disposed by blind, and undesigning causes, "if that were possible, and could be called a dispos"al. Is it not better, that the good and evil which "happens in God's world, should be ordered, regu"lated, bounded and determined by the good pleas

ure and infinite wise Being, who perfectly com

"prehends within his understanding and constant "view, the universality of things, in all their extent "and duration, and sees all the influence of every "event, with respect to every individual thing, and "circumstance through the grand system, and "the whole of the eternal series of consequences; "than to leave these things to fall out by chance, "and to be determined by those causes which have "no understanding or aim? Doubtless, in these "important events, there is a better and a worse, "as to the time, subject, place, manner, and cir"cumstances of their coming to pass, with regard "to their influence on the state and course of things. "And if there be, it is certainly best, that they "should be determined to that time, place, &c. " which is best. And therefore it is in its own na"ture fit, that wisdom, and not chance, should or"der these things. So that it belongs to the Being, "who is the possessor of infinite Wisdom, and is "the Creator and owner of the whole system of "created existences, and has the care of all; I say, "it belongs to him to take care of this matter; and "he would not do what is proper for him, if he "should neglect it. And it is so far from being "unholy in him to undertake this affair, that it "would rather have been unholy to neglect it, as it

would have been a neglecting what fitly apper"tains to him; and so it would have been a very

"unfit and unsuitable neglect.

Therefore the sov

"ereignty of God doubtless extends to this matter; "especially considering, that if it should be suppos"ed to be otherwise, and God should leave men's "volitions, and all moral events, to the determina"tion and disposition of blind and unmeaning " causes, or they should be left to happen perfect"ly without a cause; this would be no more con"sistent with liberty, in any notion of it, than if "these events were subject to the disposal of Di"vine Providence, and the will of man were deter"mined by circumstances, which are ordered and "disposed by Divine Wisdom; as appears by what "has been already observed. But it is evident, "that such a providential disposing and determin"ing men's moral actions, though it infers a moral "necessity of those actions, yet it does not in the "least infringe the real liberty of mankind; the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to moral agency; that is, there being "nothing to oppose our doing as we will.

6

"On the whole, it is manifest, that God may be, "in the manner which has been described, the or"derer, disposer, and even producer of that event, " which in the inherent subject and agent, is moral and yet his so doing is not moral evil in

66 evil;

"Him."

This reasoning is so plausible, and contains so

much truth, that I have no doubt, it has made many believe, that God governs the moral world by producing all our volitions. I would grant that it properly belongs to the Supreme and absolute Governor of the universe to order all important events within his dominions by his wisdom in his own way; and that his way is the best possible. I would concede that the events in the moral world are of the most important kind, such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their consequences. I would also admit that God perfectly comprehends within his understanding, and constant view, the universality of things, in all their extent, and duration, and sees all the influence of every event, with respect to every individual thing, and circumstance throughout the grand system, and the whole of the eternal series of consequences. And for aught I know, in moral events, there may be a better and a worse, as to the time, subject, place, manner, and circumstances of their coming to pass with regard to their influence on the state and course of things. Yet I do not see that it will follow from all this, that God causes our volitions, or that they come to pass by chance.

If God's best plan to govern the moral world was to promulgate laws, and have the human mind will with liberty; that is, without any thing to act on the mind, so as therein to produce, or prevent volition;