then it belonged to the Being, who is the possessor of infinite wisdom, and is the Creator and owner of the whole system of created existences, and has the care of all, to take care of this matter; that is, to promulgate his laws, and to create, and impower the human mind to will with liberty in regard to them: and, it seems, He would not do what is proper for him, if he should neglect it. Therefore, the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to the government of the moral world in this way; especially, considering, that if it should be supposed to be otherwise, and that God does by his agency produce all human volitions, it lays the mind under a physical necessity of willing, deprives it of liberty, and makes God, the agent, actor, or doer, of all that is called moral evil, in the world. Then to suppose he punishes the soul for this evil, makes him a cruel arbitrary Being, which is repugnant to our ideas of that holy, wise, perfect, and just God, whom we worship, and adore as such.

If God has promulgated laws, and has created and empowered the human mind to will with liberty in regard to these laws, we see how He governş the moral world, and how our volitions come to pass. He does not govern the will by force, nor does He, nor blind undesigning causes produce our volitions; nor do they come into being by chance: By chance, I mean there being no assignable reason

for a thing's existence. It is not so with our volitions, there is a good reason for their coming to pass; viz. the active power of the mind. The mind having this power acts; it can begin, continue and end action in itself; it is a free agent. How different is this free agent from the free agent of Liebnitz, and his followers? Their free agent cannot begin motion, or action in itself; but is driven about by force. It can act only as it is acted upon and made to act. It is like a puppet fastened with a wire; and as the wire is drawn by some unknown hand behind the curtain, (they say it is God) the puppet moves, and is made to act different scenes on the theatre of the world. Yet they say, this puppet has liberty, because nothing opposes its motions, as it is moved; it is not a machine because it thinks; it is accountable for its miscarriages, because the motions are his, although they are effects produced in it by an unknown hand: In short, they say this passive being is a free agent. These things they would prove concerning us, by reasoning from what they call the best possible system of things, or God's best plan to govern the moral world. But it is obvious, that if volitions be effects, they belong to the best system of things as effects; if they are not effects, but mere actions of the mind, then they belong to the best system of things as such. So if our volitions are effects pro

'duced by God, they, as effects, belong to his best plan to govern the moral world; but if God has promulgated laws to govern the will, and has created and empowered the mind to will with liberty in regard to these laws, this is his best plan to govern. Then, let us in the first place, settle the question, in what way the mind wills? In doing this, we must not take for granted, as Leibnitz and his disciples do, the very thing in controversy, to wit, that volitions are effects; but we must prove them so, and then we shall know, that they, as effects, belong to God's best possible system of things; and that his best plan to govern the will is by force. But until this evidence is clearly exhibited to the understanding, and it never can be, let vain philosophy be silent; let man humble himself, and believe, that God has promulgated laws to govern his will, and has created, and empowered his mind to will with liberty, in regard to these laws.

III. I cannot close this chapter without remarking upon the writings of Dr. Nathanael Emmons. Two volumes of his sermons are before the public. In volume 1st page 27, he says, "The inspired writers relate not only the free and voluntary actions of men, but represent them as inseparably connected with the free and voluntary agency of the Deity."-In page 31 he says, "Mankind are creatures, and by the law of nature absolutely de

pendent upon God. We cannot conceive, that even Omnipotence is able to form independent agents, because this would be to endow them with divinity. And since all men are dependent agents, all their motions, exercises, and actions must originate from a divine efficacy. We can no more act, than we can exist without the constant aid, and influence of the Deity." In pages 39, and 40, he says, " Since the Scripture ascribes all the actions of men to God as well as to themselves, we may justly conclude, that the divine agency is as much concerned in their bad as in their good actions. Many are disposed to make a distinction here, and to ascribe only the good actions of men to the divine agency, while they ascribe their bad ones to the divine permission. But there appears no ground for this distinction in scripture or reason. Men are no more capable of acting independently of God, in one instance than another. If they need any kind, or degree of divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind and degree of divine agency in doing evil."-In page 40, he says "He (God) wrought as effectually in the mind of Joseph's brethren, when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared these persons to act; but made them act. He not only exhibited motives of actions before their minds; but disposed their minds, to comply

with the motives exhibited.

But there was no pos

sible way in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts." In page 41 he says, "But since mind cannot act any more than matter can move without divine agency, it is absured to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will to act, or not to act independently of divine influence."

That mankind are creatures, and by the law of nature absolutely dependent upon God, I do not deny-but the kind of creatures, and the manner, in which they are dependent, are facts about which I cannot agree with Dr. Emmons. He says, God produces all our sinful volitions, and that the human mind cannot act any more than matter can move without divine efficacy to produce action. But, I hold, that God has made both soul and body, and formed a mysterious connexion between them; that He has endowed the soul with an active and passive power, and through the inlets of the body does daily make impressions upon the mind, and furnish it with materials for knowledge.-God has also endowed the soul with a faculty to examine, compare, and attend to these impressions, and to will with liberty in regard to them. If this be human nature, it is manifest we are dependent creatures:-we are dependent on God for the formation, con