do no good, otherwise than God turns them to answer his purposes, which are good, but the volitions themselves are directly opposed to the boundless, and perfect benevolence of God; and his choice of the existence of sin, as the lesser evil, was not the cause of its existence; but it first made sure of existence by the free voluntary actions of moral agents, and in this way it daily comes into being. I do not say, that President Dwight intended to prove, that God is the author of sin, or that sin is a good. He says his doctrine "makes God an author of an universe in which he knew sin would

does no more, I cannot object to it.

exist." If it

But I appre

some persons

hended, that from his 4th position would attempt to prove, that God is the author of sin, and that sin is a great blessing. To discourage such reasoning I have made these, and my former observations.

President Dwight observes,

"5. This choice of God, that things should exist is the only divine energy, and the only cause of exist ence."

He says "The energy of the mind is its will ; and this is synonymous with its choice generally understood; each act of the will being no other than an act of choice. What is true of every finite mind is eminently true of the Infinite Mind, In the Infinite Mind, there are no successive acts of

choice, but one universal, and unchangable pleasure, which gives birth to every thing.”

I fully agree with President Dwight, "that in the nature and operations of things, there is, inherent, a foundation for preference or choice;" but I cannot agree with him, that choice is the divine energy, which caused the existence of things. If choice mean the existence of one thing being more pleasing to the Divine Mind, then the existence of another thing, as was proved under the 2d position, certainly, choice could not be the divine energy; for there is no more efficiency in choice than in perception; in short, it is nothing but perception, that is, the Divine Mind perceiving the existence of one thing to be more pleasing, than the existence of another. Now, who can say, that perception, which is an act of the Divine Understanding, and not an act of the Divine Will, ever produced any thing? I agree with Dr. Dwight, that the energy of the mind is its will; but I cannot agree, that will is synonymous with choice, or that choice has any energy; or that there is one universal and unchangable pleasure, which has given birth to things; for there is no more efficiency in pleasure, to produce things, than in choice. But President Dwight observes,

"6. The Scriptures directly assert the doctrine of this discourse."

To prove this he refers to his text, Job, xxiii. 18. "But he is of one mind, and who can turn him? and what his soul desireth even that he doeth."

If this shows that God does what his soul desireth, it does not prove that choice is the divine energy. If the verb desire, is synonymous with the verb choose, the text only shews, that God does as he chooses, or in other words, that he wills and acts according to his choice. Where the choice is right, and it must be in the Divine Mind, to will and act agreeably to choice, is to will and act in the most perfect way. The other texts referred to, which have any bearing on this subject, may be construed as this is. On the whole, I see no reason for abandoning the obvious distinction there is between choice and volition choice has its foundation in the nature of the mind, and the operations of things; and it is the mind perceiving one thing to be more pleasing or agreeable than another; but volition is an act of the will.

II. Let us now attend to the reasoning of Dr. Dwight in his sermon on Regeneration, beginning at the 62 page of the 3 Vol. of his Theology. He says,

1st. "This change of heart consists in a relish for spiritual objects, communicated to it by the power of the Holy Ghost."

He says "By spiritual objects, I intend the Crea

tor, Redeemer, the Sanctifier, Heaven, Angels, the word, and the worship of God, virtuous men, virtuous affections, virtuous conduct, and all the kinds of enjoyment found in the contemplation of these objects; the exercise of these affections, and the practice of this conduct. The existence of these objects every man admits; and every man at all conversant with human life, must admit, that a part of mankind profess to relish them, and to find in them real and sincere pleasure. A sober man must further admit, that, as the Creator of all things is infinitely more excellent than any other being, so his excellence must be capable, in the nature of things, not only of being perceived, but also of being relished by intelligent creatures. No man, who has any regard for his character as a man of sound understanding, will acknowledge, that excellence exists, and yet deny, that it is capable of being perceived and relished. Nor will any such man deny, that intelligent creatures may perceive the excel lence of the Creator to be plainly superior to that of any other being, and may relish it accordingly. It must also be easily and certainly seen, that, if we relish the excellency of the Creator himself, we cannot fail to extend the same relish to every thing, in which this excellence is displayed: since this will be no other than relishing the excellence itself, as it is manifested in different forms. It must be obvi

ous, therefore, that this relish for the Divine excellence, ouce existing, must of course be extended to ali the objects, in which it is displayed, and to all those intelligent beings, by whom it is relished."

2dly. This change of heart is the commencement of holiness in the mind.

"The carnal mind, that is, the original, natural disposition of man, is enmity against God; not subject to his law; neither indeed can be. Before this change, therefore, there is no holiness in the character; no relish for spiritual good; no exercise of virtuous volitions; no pursuit of virtuous conduct."

"Without a relish for spiritual objects, I cannot see, that any discoveries concerning them, however clear and bright, can render them pleasing to the soul. If they are unpleasing in their very nature, they cannot be made agreeable by having that nature unfolded more clearly. He, who disrelishes the taste of wine, will not relish it the more, the more distinctly, and perfectly he perceives that taste.Nor will any account of its agreeableness to others, however clearly given, and with whatever evidence supported, render the taste agreeable to him. To enable him to relish it, it seems indispensable, that his own taste should be changed, and in this manner fitted to relish the pleasantness of wine. Light is either evidence, or the perception of it; evidence of the true nature of the object, which is contem