plated, or the perception of that evidence. But the great difficulty in the present case is this; the nature of the object perceived is disrelished. The more, then, it is perceived, the more it must be dis relished of course, so long as the present taste continues. It seems, therefore, indispensable, that, in order to the usefulness of such superior light to the mind, its relish with respect to spiritual objects should first be changed. In this case, the clearer, and brighter the views of such objects are, the more pleasing they may be expected to become to the mind. This, I apprehend, is the true progress of this work in the human soul. A relish for all spiritual objects, never before existing in him, is communicated to every man, who is the subject of regeneration, by the spirit of God. Before this event, he disrelished all such objects: now he relishes. them all."

I am not disposed to deny this doctrine; for I believe in it: my object is to draw a few inferences from the doctrine itself, to show that we are passive in choice. It appears that good and bad men have different relishes; the good man's relish is communicated to his mind by the power of the Holy Ghost; the bad man's relish is derived from Adam ; it is the carnal mind. Now whether the human mind has the one, or the other of these relishes, the relish itself has a foundation, which may be called

the nature of the mind; that is, the mind is so constituted, or its nature is such, that to the mind some objects are pleasing, or agreeable, while others are not. The good man has a relish for spiritual objects; these are pleasing or agreeable to his mind; the bad man has a relish for sinful objects; and these are pleasing or agreeable to him. Here let us inquire, while the foundation of this relish remains in the good man's mind, and the relish itself is not overpowered by a contrary principle, can he, when spiritual good and evil are fairly presented to his view, and he understands the nature of both, choose the evil? To do this, the evil must be more pleasing or agreeable to his mind, than the good; but this cannot be, as long as he has a relish for the good, and a disrelish for the evil; he must therefore from a physical necessity choose the good. The foundation of this internal choice is the nature of his mind, and the nature of the different objects in the comparison, that affect his mind. After the good and evil have passed an examen, attention, and comparison by the mind, the will has nothing farther to do with them, and what remains to be done, before choice exists, belongs to the understanding, or perceptive power of the mind. To perceive the good to be better than the evil, the mind is passive, as much so, as in any perception whatever. This perception I [call choice, and it is physically necessary, and the

mind has no liberty, or freedom in it, unless necessity and liberty can consist together, and the mind can be bound and free at once in the same thing. But after the mind has come to a choice, then there is room for liberty to display itself, the mind can will the enjoyment of the good, or the possession of the evil. However, if the mind would act consistent with its own nature, which is a desire of happiness, it must will the enjoyment of the good; but if it disregards its happiness, it may, and can will the possession of the evil.

It is hardly necessary to observe, that if the relish of the mind be for sinful objects, the effects of it will be directly contrary to the effects produced by a relish for spiritual good; still the mind is at liberty to act contrary to its vitiated choice, and will the possession, or performance of those things, for which it has no relish.

I think the remarks I have made, do, in one sense, agree with the common notions of mankind; when the question is asked, how came you to do this, the answer often is, because I choose to do it; evidently meaning, that it was more pleasing or agreeable to the mind to do it, than not to do it; therefore, it willed to do it. This is the true reason to be given for most of our volitions; not that choice produces them, but the mind in search of happiness wills according to its choice to obtain that thing, which has

already appeared most pleasing or agreeable to the mind, therefore, in its judgment, is best adapted to promote its happiness.

We owe it to ourselves to do all in our power to furnish the mind with suitable motives, to influence the understanding to come to a right choice. By right choice I mean one, that the will can safely follow to obtain happiness. The use of motives is to influence the understanding in choice, and not to influence the will in volition, as some have imagined. But it cannot be said, that after the mind has chosen an object, it is indifferent about that object; nor if the mind wills the possession of the object chosen, that it cannot offer its choice, as a good reason, why it so willed. But this reason is not the cause of its volition, in the sense I use cause; it only shews, what the mind was in pursuit of, when it willed, and not what acted on the mind, and made it will.

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III. In discoursing upon these words; "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God; neither indeed can be,” President Dwight says, "There is yet no more difficulty in obeying God, than in doing any thing else, to which our inclination is opposed with equal strength, and obstinacy. A child is equally unable to obey a parent against whom his will is as much opposed, as to obey God. This inability of chil dren to obey their parents does not indeed com

monly last through life. But while it lasts the child can no more obey his parents, than his Maker. In both cases his inability is, I apprehend, of exactly the same nature." 4 Theology, 466.

If these two inabilities are alike, and of the same nature, then I conclude whatever would remove one, would remove the other. A rod for the child's back will generally remove his inability to obey his parent; but can it remove his inability to love God? The child is naturally able to obey his parent without the assistance of the Holy Spirit to produce his volitions; but can the child love God without a relish for spiritual objects being first communicated to his mind by the power of the Holy Ghost? If he cannot, then I apprehend that these two inabilities are not exactly of the same na

IV. But let us consider, what President Dwight says, about the cause of volitions. In his sermon upon Regeneration, he says, "It has been frequently supposed, that the Spirit of God regenerates man by immediately creating in him virtuous volitions. "All the volitions of all moral agents are in my view, as will indeed be pre-supposed by those of my audience, who remember the sermons which I delivered on the nature of the human soul, the acts of the agents themselves. The Spirit of God does not, in my view, when he regenerates mankind, create