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in them any volitions whatever ; but merely communicates to them the relish for spiritual objects, which has been here mentioned.”

"When God created Adam, there was a period of his existence after he began to be, antecedent to that in which he exercised the first volition. Every man who believes the mind to be something besides ideas and exercises, and who does not admit the doctrine of casualty, will acknowledge, that in this period the mind of Adam was in such a state, that he was propense to the exercise of virtuous volitions, rather than sinful ones. This state of mind has been commonly styled disposition, temper, inclination, heart, &c. In the Scriptures it usually bears the last of these names, I shall take the liberty to call it disposition. This disposition in Adam was the cause, whence his virtuous volitions proceeded ; the reason, why they were virtuous, and not sinful. Of the metaphysical nature of this cause I am ignoBut its existence is, in my own view, certainly proved by its effects. If the volitions of man are not immediately created, they are either caused by something in man, or they are casual. But they are not casual; for nothing is casual. And even if some things were casual, these could not be; because they were regularly and uniformly virtuous : and it is impossible that casualty should be the source of uniformity or regularity. There was,

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therefore, in the mind of Adam, certainly, a cause, which gave birth to the fact, that his volitions were virtuous, and not sinful. This cause, of necessity, preceded these volitions; and therefore, certainly existed in that state of mind, which was previous to this first volition. This state of mind, then, this disposition of Adam existing antecedently to every volition, was he real cause, why his volitions, subsequently existing, were virtuous."

I would remark, that it is to be inferred from the writings of President Dwight, that the soul is a simple spiritual substance having no parts. If this be true, then disposition as he uses the word, must signify the nature of the soul. How this virtuous nature of Adam's soul could be the cause of his volitions, I cannot conceive; it might be the cause of his choice always being for spiritual good, when spiritual good and evil were in his view, and he had a knowledge of them. But his virtuous disposition, could not be the cause of his volitions, unless his soul acted on itself, and therein produced them; but this it could not do, as it was simple, and had no parts. If Adam's soul had an active power, it might will agreeably to the choice, he had in objects with perfect freedom, and yet his volitions not be casual, that is, accidental, or arising from chance. 1 grant that his volitions were regularly and uniformly on the side of virtue, till he sinned;

but then this regularity or uniformity did not produce them. How it happened that Presiden t Dwight thought it necessary to assign a cause for Adam's volitions I cannot tell, unless he slid into it by supposing, that volition and choice are synony

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But upon his own principles, I do not see how human volitions can have a cause, for he says, "All the volitions of all moral agents are-the acts of the agents themselves." He does not allow that human volitions are any more caused, than divine volitions; as appears from what I first quoted from his writings. Now God has a holy disposition, and a right choice in things, and he always wills according to his disposition and choice. But it cannot be said, that any thing, as a cause,` acts on the Divine Mind, and therein produces his volitions; for God is above all passiveness, and always wills with perfect freedom: neither his holy disposition, nor choice in things, produces his volitions, although he constantly, and uniformly wills according to them-His volitions are the actions of His Will as the Active Power of His Mind, and He always does his pleasure.

If the holy disposition of the Divine Mind is not the cause of his volitions, why should the disposition of Adam's mind be the cause of his? I see no reason for the supposition. God, in the creation of

Adam, imparted to his mind the active power, called the will, which he exercised with freedom, and having this freedom, he sinned, notwithstanding his disposition. I ask what produced his first sinful volition? Certainly not his disposition, for this was holy until he sinned. If God does not create any of our volitions as Dr. Dwight uniformly asserts, I ask what does create them? He seems to suppose, that we, ourselves, create them; but I believe it is more proper to say, that volition has no active nor passive cause, that it is not an effect; but an action of the mind, which tends to the produetion of an effect, or actually produces oneIf volition has an active or passive cause, why has it not been discovered by the learned? Why should one say it is uneasiness of desire; another, that it is the strongest motive in the mind's view; another, that it is God; another, that is not God, but disposition of the mind; another, that it is taste or relish of the mind, &c.? I apprehend, that the reason, why there has been such a diversity of opin ions among the learned on this subject, is because they have not been able to discover any productive cause of volition; therefore, all they have said about the cause existing is hypothetical, If there be no such cause, it is certain, that no man has discovered it, for what is not, cannot be seen. And when man undertakes to give a description of the

operations of the mind, I apprehend, it is his duty to describe them in such way, as to have the sinful volitions of his own mind to be his, and not make God, who is most holy, the producer of them.— What remains to be shewed is, that liberty or freedom of the mind in willing is consistent with the doctrines of the Bible. If I shew this, I think it must confirm us in the belief, that we are free agents.

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