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without dislike, the mind could not feel displeasure, hatred, or aversion to a vile, and odious object, when presented to its view; and without love, the mind could not feel the exercises of what Dr. Em. mons calls the purest and best affections, in view of the character, perfections, and designs of the Deity. But suppose some Hopkinsian should reply to the above plea, and say "that all the exercises of the affections are free and voluntary, and produce external actions." And Dr. Emmons, to support his plea, should assert, as he has, that the divine law requires nothing but love, which is a free voluntary exercise," (1 Vol. Serm. 173) and "we know that love is a free voluntary exercise, and not any taste, habit, or principle which is totally inactive, and involuntary," (ib. 173.) Now, I apprehend, that this assertion is, a departure from the plea, because Dr. Emmons, in his plea alleges, that the exercises of the affections are excited by the bare perception of objects, which do not produce external actions. And now he asserts, that love is a free voluntary exercise; therefore, it must produce external actions. I believe it would have: been more consistent with truth, if Dr. Emmons. had adhered to his plea in behalf of the affections 95 for, by departing from it, and concluding, that the exercises of love are volitions, he has laid the erro neous foundation for his famous EXERCISE SCHEME
In metaphysics, one error usually leads to another; in this way I would account for his dogma-that the free and voluntary actions of men, whether good, or bad, are inseparably connected with the free and voluntary agency of the Deity, as the cause. is connected with its effect; that when God acts upon the human mind to produce volitions, the mind wills, and at no other time; and that the mind cannot act, any more than matter can move without divine agency to cause action.-This is a wonderful scheme! When Dr. Emmons shews, that the exercise of love is volition, then I can agree with him. If he should undertake it, I request him to use the world love, in a restricted sense, as signifying only an affection of the mind, or its exercise; thus, I love honey: here the word, love, is used as an exercise of the affection, called love, and I ask Dr. Emmons to shew, that this loving is volition. When I see evidence of this, I shall conclude that the mind is a bundle of affections; and when God moves one affection, the mind feels benevolence; another, and it feels complacence; another, and it feels gratitude; another, and it feels aversion; another, and it feels love; and that what is vulgarly called the will, does not exist in the mind; but the exercises of the affection, called love, are volitions that produce external actions. But I believe Dr. Emmons will not be able to furnish the proof,
that loving the honey is volition :-there is certainly this difference, the mind, at the time it has the exercise, called loving, feels; but it never feels in the exercises of the will; for volition is not produced by the operations of external objects upon the mind as loving is produced. Dr. Emmons does not hold that the mind has an active power, called the will, in the sense Mr. Locke has described it : he however says, that "when we put forth any bodily effort, we are conscious of a will or volition, to move or speak," (I. Vol. Serm. 189.) Here he uses will and volition as synonymous words, signifying an exercise of the mind produced by the agency of the Deity, and not an exercise of an active power of the mind, by which it begins, continues and ends volition in itself, without this exercise being an effect of some external cause. I cannot discover, that Dr. Emmons believes, that the mind has any will, beside the affection called love this, when acted upon by external objects, feels, loves, and wills, and produces external actions; and when it produces external actions, its exercises are volitions. If Dr. Emmons' exercise scheme be inge nious, it certainly is not adapted to free moral agents, who inhabit this globe; for it does not, in my opinion, rightly describe the powers and faculties of their minds; it may answer for passive beings, who have no will of their own, and reside on
some other planet. Dr. Hopkins held that the mind has no exercises, only such as are produced by the immediate agency of the Deity; he probably mistook the exercises of the affections for exercises of the will, when he embraced this error.
III. I have said, we have the greatest reason to believe, that God is willing to remove our inability to love him; if we, on our part, will obey the precepts, that should govern our wills. The scripture says, "Ask and it shall be given you; seek and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: for every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth, and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. Or what man is there of you, whom, if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpant? If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father, which is in heaven, give good things to them that ask him? Therefore, all things. whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets."
These precepts are to govern the human will. Here God expresses great willingness on his part, to give good things to them that, ask him. And what can be better for the carnal mind than a new heart, so that it can love God? If any
one says these precepts are not to govern the will of the carnal mind, let him prove it. I believe, if the carnal mind can harden its heart by pursuing one course of conduct, it may, by pursuing another course, soften its heart, and make it better; still it cannot remove its natural depravity, without the special influence of the Holy Ghost. The carnal mind, although it has no love for God, see, attend to the means of grace, and in the sense above required, ask, seek, knock, and do unto others, as it would be done by in like circumstances.
may for aught I
IV. The long controversy between Calvinists and Arminians about the freedom of the mind in willing, has not, to my knowledge, been decided. The Calvinists, who have contended for the negative of the question, have, generally, made no distinction between willing and choosing; nor between the exercises of the affections, and the exercises of the will; but have asserted, that choosing, loving, and disliking objects, are exercises of the will, and are effects produced in the mind by motives, or external objects. They have had no difficulty in proving, that choosing, loving, and disliking objects, are effects, and if they are the same as volitions, then volitions are effects, produced in the mind by motives, or external objects, and the mind cannot be free in willing, according to the Arminian notions. But have Calvinists proved that choos