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not free to fly; because the gravity of his body, hinders, or impedes the intended external effect of his volition. If one be locked up in prison, and wills to stay in, his mind is free in willing, and the man is free in staying ; that is, there is nothing that hinders or impedes him, in doing as he wills. But if he wills to go out, his mind is free in willing, and were it not for locks and bolts, he would be free-in going out; but these hinder or impede him in doing as he wills; therefore, he is not free, he has not liberty to go out.

The mind is always free in willing; but the man is not always free in doing what he wills-external objects frequently hinder, or impede the intended external effect of his volition.

The phrase, to exercise one's liberty, when speaking of the mind, must mean there is nothing acting on the mind, so as therein to produce, or prevent volition, and the mind is exercising its active power in willing-and when speaking of the man, it means he is doing what his mind wills, without

any thing to hinder, or impede him. In this sense, we daily exercise our liberty-we will, and are free in it--we do as we will, and here again we are free.

II. A sensible writer says, “ Our actions and the determinations of our will, are generally accompanied with liberty. The name of liberty we give to,

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that power of the mind, by which it modifies, regulates, suspends, continues, or alters its deliberations, and actions. By this faculty, we have some degree of command over ourselves : by this faculty we become capable of conforming to a rule: possessed of this faculty, we are accountable for our conduct.

But the existence of this faculty has been bodly called in question. It has been asserted, that we have no seuse of moral liberty; and that, if we bave such a sense, it is fallacious.

“With regard to the first question, let every one ask it of himself. Have I a sense of moral liberty? Have I a conviction that I am free? If you have this sense--this conviction is a matter of fact, object of intuition ; and vain it is tú reason against its truth or existence.

“If it exists; why is it to be deemed fallacious ? Are there peculiar marks of deception discoverable in it? Can any reason be assigned why we should suspect it, and not every other sense or power of our nature ? He that made one, made all. If we are to suspect all ; we ought to believe nothing.

“ But by what one especial power are we told that we ought to suspect all others ? On which is this exclusive character of veracity impressed ? If nature is fallacious; how do we learn to detect the cheat? If she is a juggler by trade; is it for us to attempt to

penetrate the mysteries of her art, and take upon us to decide when it is that she presents a true, and when it is that she presents a false appearance ? If she is false in every other instance, how can we believe her, when she says she is a liar?

6 But she does not say so. She is, and she claims to be honest; and the law of our constitu. tion determines us to believe her. When we feel, or when we perceive by intuition, that we are free; we may ass:me the doctrine of moral liberty, as a first and self evident, though an undemonstrable principle.” ” (1 Wilson's Works, 254–5.)

The definition of liberty given by Judge Wilson, does not expressly admit, nor exclude a physical cause operating to produce our volitions; but from the mind having a power to modify, regulate, &c. it may be inferred, that it was his meaning, that nothing acts on the mind so as therein to produce or prevent its volitions, at the time it modifies, regulates, suspends, or alters its deliberations, and actions. Taken in this sense, his definition of the liberty of the mind in willing, is as good a one as can be given ; it agrees with what I would be understood by it.

III. Mr. Locke observes, that "it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not free to will, as he is to act what he wills.-

Concerning a man's liberty there yet therefore is raised this farther question, Whether a man be free to will?" Mr. Locke undertakes to answer this question in the negative; he says “ That willing or colition being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of wijling, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable, that the action depending on his will should exist, or not exist, and its existence or not existence followirg perfectly the determination, and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action : it is absolutely necessary that he will one or the other, i. e. prefer one to the other; since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice, and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be.-So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act, or not act; which in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not, For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing, or forbearance of an action in a man's power which is once so proposed to his thoughts: a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which

preference or volition, the action, or its forbearance, certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition or prefering one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under a necessity, and cannot be free; unless necessity, and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once.” 1 Essay, Chap. 21. s. 23.

Here Mr. Locke uses the words, determination, volition and willing, wherein the mind is active, as synonymous with the words, preference, prefer, choice, and choosing, wherein the mind is passive. And I apprehend, that the error in his reasoning was partly occasioned by his not making a distinction in these words. By making this distinction it becomes obvious, that a man may choose or prefer the doing of an action proposed to his mind presently to be done, to not doing it, and at the same time not will to do it. Suppose walking is proposed; now walking may be more pleasing or agreeable to one's mind than not to walk, therefore as soon as it is proposed, he may prefer or choose to walk, and at the same time he may set still because he does not will to walk. The choice or preference to walk may necessarily exist in the understanding, when the mind has compared walking with not walking ; but the necessity of choice, or preference does not make volition, which is an act

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