of the will, necessary: the mind may freely will not to walk, although it is under a physical necessity to choose to walk. In this way necessity, and freedom can consist together; that is, necessity in choice and freedom in willing; and in this way a man can be bound and free at the same time, but not in respect to the same thing: there is no more difficulty in this, than for the mind to be active and passive at the same time.

Mr. Locke, says, "This then is evident, that in all proposals of present action a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing; liberty consisting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that sets still, is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he will it. But if a man setting still has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; so likewise a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain, that a man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk or give off walking or no: he must necessarily prefer one or the other of them, walking or not walking; and so it is in regard of all actions in our power so proposed, which are the far greater number."1 Essay, Chap. 21, s. 24.

The assertion at the beginning of this section, "This then is evident that in all proposals of present action a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing," is an inference drawn from the reasoning contained in the 23d sec. above quoted. But I have already shown,

that the reasoning in that section proceeded on a mistake, and misuse of words; therefore, this conclusion is not made evident.

In the 23d sec. above, Mr. Locke says, "freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting." And in the 24th sec. above, he says, "liberty con sisting in a power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only"-By these expressions one would suppose, that Mr. Locke intended to be understood, that all the liberty we have consists in a physical power to do, or not to do, as the mind wills. If this be all the liberty, that belongs to man, then to be sure he is not in free willing. But is this all the liberty man has? Is he not as free in willing as he is in doing what he wills? This is the question to be decided, and the following instances pus by Mr. Locke, I think, do not decide it. He says, "But if a man setting still has not power to remove himself, he is not at liberty." That is, if a man setting still has not a physical power to remove himself, he is not at liberty. But does

the want of physical power of body deprive the mind of its moral power to will? Cannot the mind freely will the motion of the body, notwithstanding something without the mind impedes, or hinders the intended external effect of its volition? Certainly the mind has liberty to put forth such volition.

Again he says, "so likewise a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would." That is, he has not physical power to stop the motion; gravity will fetch him down. But does this prove that he cannot freely will to stop the motion? It does not: Nor do I see how it follows from either, or both of these instances put by Mr. Locke, that if a man be walking, and it is proposed to him to give off walking, that he is not at liberty to walk or not to walk. It is certain that he can freely will either, and if he has a physical power to walk, I should suppose he would have to stand still. If he must necessarily prefer one to the oth er, it does not follow, that he must necessarily will to do the one he prefers; for he is at liberty to will to do either, and whichever he does will, he wills freely.

But, if Mr. Locke's meaning was, that a man cannot work a contradiction, that is, will, and at the same time not will; what he has said would.

deserve a different consideration.

But this was

not his meaning; for he is reasoning to prove the negative of the question, " Whether a man be free to will ?" I believe what he has said does not prove the negative. If we attend farther to his reasoning we shall find that he asserts those things, which amount to an affirmative of the question, and so contradicts himself.

To shew this, let us make a few more quotations from other sections in this 21st chapter.

He says in sec. 33d, "that which immediately determines the will from time to time to every vol untary action, is uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good." In sec. 49, "That in this state of ignorance, we short sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in actionThis is standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way: examination is consulting a guide." In sec. 52, "This, as seems to me, is the great privilege of finite intelligent beings; and } desire it may be well considered, whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does. not lie in this, that they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their wills to any

action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs." In Sect. 67 "The first therefore, and great use of liberty is to hinder blind precipitancy; the principal exercise of freedom is to stand still, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires."

Now let us compare these quotations with what is said in the 23d and 24th sections above, and see their disagreement.

Let us suppose, I propose to a man to walk: This is a proposal of a present action, and by what is said in the 23d and 24th sections, the man to whom the proposal is made, is under a necessity to will to walk, or not to walk, the instant he hears the proposal. But according to the subsequent quotations, if the man walks, it is a voluntary action, and his will was determined by the uneasiness of desire. And although he was under a necessity of willing to walk, according to the 23d and 24th sections, still by the subsequent quotations, he was under no necessity; but was entirely at liberty; for he had power to suspend his desire, and keep it from determining his will to that particular action, What