But it may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning in this.

1. By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and, when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have reference to the strength of the whole of that which operates to induce to a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or many things together."

2. "Whatever is a motive in this sense, must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceptive faculty.. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will, or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise, than it is perceived or thought of."

3. "And I think it must be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement to a perceiving willing agent,. has some sort and degree of tendency, or advantage

to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the strength of the motive. That motive which has the least degree of previous advantage or tendency to move the will, or that appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call the weaker motive."

4. "Things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength, tendency, or advantage to move or excite its will from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the mind. that views, and the degree and manner of its view; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But so much I think may be determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by. an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good; nor has it any tendency to invite or engage the election of the soul in any farther degree, than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say that things, that appear, bave a tendency by the appearance they make, to engage the mind to elect them, some other way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true in

some sense, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good. For the right understanding of this, two things must be well and distinctly observed. 1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term, good; namely, as of the same import with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. Certainly nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to engage its inclination, and choice, considered as evil, or disagreeable; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable.

But if it tends to draw the inclination, and move the will, it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense is the greatest apparent good: To say otherwise, is little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction. 2. When I say the will is as the greatest apparent good is, or (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable; it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition; and not some object, that the act of the will has not an immediate, but only an indirect and remote respect

to: many acts of volition have some remote relation to an object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen." Free Will, 14,5,6.

It is evident, that Mr. Edwards used volition and choice as synonymous words; but I do not. What he calls the strongest motive, I call the thing chosen and what he calls, the weaker motive, I call the thing not chosen.

If we repeat what he has said about motives, and alter the phraseology so far, as to omit the words, will, volition, &c., that are operations of the active power of the mind; and substitute the words, choice, choose, chosen, &c. that are operations of the passive power of the mind; also, omit the words, the mind, the strongest motive, and the weaker motive, and substitute the words, the understanding, the thing chosen, and the thing not chosen, we shall have a full explanation of what I call the thing chosen, and the thing not chosen.

With these alterations, the quotation would read, that his strongest motive is the cause of what I call choice, but not of volition. Thus,

1. By the thing chosen, I mean the whole of that. which moves, excites or invites the understanding to a choice, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and unite their strength to induce the understanding; and when it is so, all together are,

as it were, one complex thing. And when I speak of the thing chosen, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular choice, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or many things together.

2. Whatever is a thing chosen in this sense, must be something that is extas. in the view, or apprehension of the understanding. Nothing can induce or invite the understanding to a choice, any farther, than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the view of the understanding; for what is wholly unperceived, and is perfectly out of view, cannot affect the understanding at all. It is most evident that nothing reaches the understanding, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise, than it is perceived, or thought of by the understanding.

3. And I think it must be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a thing chosen, had some sort, and degree of tendency, or advantage to move or excite the understanding, previous to the choice. This previous tendency of the thing chosen is what I call the strength of the thing chosen. That thing which has a less degree of previous ad-vantage or tendency to move the understanding, or that appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the understanding, is what I call the thing not chosen. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to