the understanding, or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to exeite and induce the choice, is what I call the thing chosen. And in this sense, I suppose the understanding is always governed, by the most pleasing thing, in its choice.

4. Things that exist in the view of the understanding have their strength, tendency, or advantage to move or excite the understanding, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the understanding that views, and the degree and manner of its view; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But so much I think may be determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by the understanding, which has the nature and influence of a thing chosen, is considered or viewed as good; nor has it any tendency to invite or engage the election of the understanding in any further degree than it appears such. For to say, otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear, have a tendency by the appearance they make, to engage the understanding to elect them, some other way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the choice always is as the greatest apparent ood is. For the right understanding of this, two hings must be well and distinctly observed.

1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term good; namely, as of the same import with agreeable. To appear good to the understanding, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the understanding. Certainly nothing appears inviting and eligible to the understanding, or tending to a choice, considered as evil, or disagreeable; or indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to a choice, it must be under the notion of that which suits the understanding. that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the view of the understanding, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense is the greatest apparent good.

And therefore

2. When I say the choice is as the greatest apparent good is, it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate object of choice; and not of some object that the mind has not an immediate, but only an indirect and remote respect to.

If by volition Mr. Edwards means nothing more than a choice in things; then the substance of what he has said about motives may be expressed in fewer words; thus, the mind always chooses that thing in the comparison, which is the more pleasing or agreeable to the mind; that both things in the comparison move and excite the mind; but one does

more than the other; therefore it is chosen, and to be chosen means the same as being more pleasing, and agreeable to the mind, and why it is so, may be owing to the state of the mind, and the nature of the two objects, when the mind has a view of them. Here I would remark,

1. That the mind is forced to choose, when two things are compared, and one moves, excites, and pleases the mind more than the other.

2. For the mind to be moved, excited and pleased by the objects in the comparison, is for the mind to be acted upon by the objects; therefore the mind must in some sense be passive in choosing.

3. I would inquire what has the thing chosen to do with the active power of the mind, which was in exercise before, and at the time the thing was chosen? Do external objects, made known to the understanding by way of the senses, and therein producing various sensations of pleasure and pain, affect the active power of the mind, and make that, which is active, act? But if the mind has an active power, it can act, without being made to act.

4. Mr. Edwards says, "I have rather chosen to express myself that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable is, than to say, that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or

pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct." (Free Will, 17.) I grant that appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind; and the mind's preferring and choosing are not distinct; but they mean precisely the same thing. Choice is always caused by the thing, which in the mind's view is the greatest apparent good, and always is as is the good. But it is not so with volition : it cannot be proved that volition is caused by the thing, which is the greatest apparent good. And we know one thing cannot be a greater apparent good than another, before the mind has compared the two things together, and seen their difference; and there cannot be this comparison without volition at the same time. We see then, that the active power of the mind must be in exercise before

choice can exist.

5. We have already quoted from Mr. Edwards, (F. Will, 9,) that "an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice." In page 108, he says, "an act of choice or preference is a comparative act wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things, that are compared." I ask what compared them? The answer must be, the mind compared them. But the mind could not compare them without willing at the same time, and this volition being the same as an act of choosing or choice would require two or more things to be compared, and

there could not be this comparison without another volition, and as this volition is the same as an act of choosing or choice, it would require two or more things to be compared, and this comparison another volition, so on through an infinite series.

Again, one motive cannot be stronger than another in the mind's view until the mind has compared two or more things together, and seen their difference. But there cannot be this comparison of things without a volition of the mind at the same time; and this volition would require another strongest motive to produce it; this motive, to appear the strongest in the mind's view, would require another comparison of two or more things; this comparison another volition, and this volition another strongest motive, so on in infinitum.

How are we to avoid this difficulty? For the mind to will, on Mr. Edwards' scheme, 1 should suppose it would be as impossible, as for the effect to produce its cause. It would be as strange as the movements of the animal discovered in Terre del Fuego "which always took a step before the first step; went with its head first, and yet always went tail foremost, and this, though he had neither head nor tail." (Free Will, 229.)

I think the only way we can avoid the difficulty, is to say volition and choice do not mean the same thing; and that the mind does not always act with reference to two or more things that are compared.