CHAPTER VIII.

FURTHER REMARKS UPON MR. EDWARDS' REASONING TO SHEW, THAT VOLITION IS NOT AN EFFECT OF HIS STRONGEST MOTIVE.

SPEAKING of equal, or alike things, Mr. Edwards says, "The question they dispute about is whether the mind be indifferent about the objects presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the question to be considered, is whether the person be indifferent with respect to his own actions; whether he does not, on some consideration or other, prefer one act with respect to these objects before another.

"The mind in its determination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant about the objects.

"The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them: But the next act of the will being about ex

ternal actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. these may not appear equal, and one action may properly be chosen before another.

"In each step of the mind's progress, the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly, and improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons, than any preference of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects." Free Will, 76.

If the objects were unequal, it seems, there would be no difficulty in finding the strongest motive in the objects themselves; but here is a case, where the objects are equal, and "the mind may never properly make any choice between them."

If one of these objects is to be taken, touched, &c. the mind, before it can put forth a volition to take or touch, must, according to Mr. Edwards, consider external actions, and if in these the mind can see a difference, it may find the strongest motive to produce its volition; but if the mind can see no difference in external actions, then it cannot will to take or touch one of the alike, or equal objects.

I think it is obvious, that if the mind has to take into consideration external actions before it can will to take, or touch one of the alike or equal objects, it must in some degree divert its attention from the objects, and place it on external actions. But the mind cannot so divert its attention without willing at the same time, and this volition as

much as any other would require a strongest motive to produce it. Where can the mind go to find this strongest motive? Must it compare the act of diverting with its opposite, and see the difference, before it can divert? But there cannot be this comparison without a volition, and this volition would require another strongest motive, and this motive another comparison, and this comparison another volition, so on in infinitum. Upon Mr. Edwards' scheme, I do not see, that the mind could ever will to take one of the alike or equal objects; for when the mind has once fixed its attention upon the objects, it can have no choice in them, consequently there is no strongest motive to induce the mind to will the possession of one object before the other. And the mind cannot divert its attention from the objects, and place it on external actions without running into an infinite series of volitions. These considerations furnish us with additional reasons for rejecting Mr. Edwards' scheme of strongest motive to produce our volitions. Experience teaches us, that there is no more difficulty in taking one of two alike or equal objects, than in taking one of two unequal objects; and external actions are not taken into consideration in one case, more than in the other. The truth is, the mind can always will the possession of either object in the comparison, whether chosen or not.

CHAPTER IX.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

I. Bur Mr. Edwards has stated a case wherein, if the mind act, it can act without his strongest motive to produce volition. He says, "An act of choice or preference is a comparative act wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's view. If the mind in this comparative act, prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts absolutely without motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatever. Then if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food, both which he finds an appetite to, but has a stronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no cicumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite: If in the choice he makes between them, he chooses that which he has the least appetite to,

and refuses that to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made absolutely without previous motive, excitement, reason or temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either : Because this volition in this case is a comparative act attending and following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses, viewing it as related to, and compared with the other sort of food, in which view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and motive.

And if there be any principle in man from whence an act of choice may arise after this man. ner, from the same principle, volition may arise wholly without motive on either side. If the mind in its volition can go beyond motive, then it can go without motive: For when it is beyond the motive, it is out of the reach of the motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without motive, If volition goes beyond the strength and tendency of motive, and especially if it goes against its tendency, this demonstrates the independence of valition on motive." Free Will, 108, 9.

Here I would remark, that if we omit, in this quotation, the word, volition, where it is used, and substitute the word, choice, it would not injure the sense, if volition and choice mean precisely the same thing. And if they do, why is it, that Mr.