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Using willing and choosing as synonymous
words has occasioned error in the reason-
ing of Locke, and Edwards.
Sec. 2. Choice may be internal, external, right,
or wrong.
Sec. 3. What causes a difference in our choice
of voluntary actions at different times.
Sec. 4. Our desire of happiness.
PAGE.
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40
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44
The virtuous mind should will according to its
choice in objects.
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His reasoning considered to be erroneous.
More of his reasoning.
The same refuted.
Mr. Edwards' definition of liberty.
The remainder of this Capter is from Burla-
maqui's Principles of Natural Law.
Sec. 4. Use of liberty in our judgement with
respect to truth.
Sec. 5. Liberty has its exercise in things that
are evident.
Sec. 6. Use of liberty in regard to good and evil.
Sec. 7. With regard to indifferent things.
Sec. 8. Why the exercise of liberty is restrain-
ed to non-evident truths and particular goods
Sec. 9. Same reasoning continued.
Sec. 10 The proot of liberty drawn from our
inward sense superior to any other.
CHAPTER VI.
Of cause and effect.
Mr. Edwards' definition of these terms.
70
The absurdity of using negative causes.
CHAPTER VII.
An inquiry whether volition has for its cause, the
greatest apparent good, choice, habit, or Mr.
Edwards' strongest motive in the mind's view.
Sec. 1. It is not an effect of the greatest appa-
rent good.
2. Nor of choice.
3. Nor of habit.
4. What Mr. Edwards calls volition.
What he calls the strongest motive.
His definition of strongest motive means noth-
ing more than the thing chosen.
If volition and choice mean the same, why
does Mr. Edwards so frequently drop one
word, and use the other.
Shewing the impossibility of his motive being
the cause of volition.
CHAPTER VIII.
Further remarks upon Mr. Edwards' reasoning
to show, that volition is not an effect of his
strongest motive.
The impossibility of the mind's willing to take
one of two alike or equal things, on Mr.
Edwards' scheme of motives.
CHAPTER IX.
Same subject continued.
2. Wherein Mr. Edwards does not differ
from Mr. Hume in regard to the free a-
gency of man.
3. Voltaire's notions of liberty, and Dr.
Beattie's reply.
CHAPTER X.
An inquiry whether God be the active cause
of all human volitions, producing them by
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75
76
78
82
85
86
89
96
100
his immediate influence or by the interven-
tion of passive causes.
Sec. I. There can be no sinful volitions nor
liberty of the mind in willing, if God be
such cause.
Our internal sense, or feelings teach us that
we have sinful volitions, and that we will
with liberty.
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105
We must believe our internal sense, or feel-
ings.
107
109
2. President Edwards considers God, the
negative cause of our sinful volitions.
If volition has only a negative cause, then
it has no cause, and it is no effect.
CHAPTER XI.
Sinful volitions existing in the best possible
system of things do not require God for
their active cause.
Sec. 1. That sin is as necessary to the sys-
tem as "Shades are to the beauty of a
picture" considered.
Proof that sin may exist without having
God for it cause.
112
113
In one sense "whatever is is right;" but
we cannot infer from this that we are not
free agents.
2. The Hopkintonian reasoning stated.
3. Dr. Nathanael Emmons' reasoning stated.
The consequences of his scheme considered.
President Dwight's reasoning placed in op-
position to Dr. Emmons' reasoning.
CHAPTER XII.
Remarks upon President Dwight's use of the
words, choice, volition, relish, inability, and
Sec. 1. In the nature and operations of things
there is, inherent, a foundation for pref-
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115
121
123
125
erence or choice.
God was never pleased with, nor desired nor
delighted in the existence of sin; nor
chose its existence, only as a lesser evil.
Choice is not the divine energy, that caused
the existence of things.
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131
135
The distinction between willing and choosing
to be observed.
136
2. President Dwight's definition of relish.
His doctrine respecting the relish of the
mind agreed to.
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139
Inference, that the mind must be passive in
choice.
140
Choice may be assigned as the reason for
our volitions
141
Motives influence the understanding in choice
and not the will in volition, as some suppose. 142
3. President Dwight supposes the inability
of a child to obey God is of the same na-
ture of his inability to obey a parent.
142
This doctrine doubted.
143
4. President Dwight assigns disposition as
the cause for Adam's volitions.
144
The impossibility that disposition should be
the cause of volition shewed.
145
The reason assigned, why the learned have
differed so much about the cause of volition.
147
CHAPTER XIII.
Liberty of the mind in willing is consistent with
original sin, natural depravity, foreknowl
edge, decrees, election and regeneration.
2.
Sec. 1. Liberty consistent with original sin.
with natural depravity.
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152
Liberty or freedom is a reality.
From Burlamaqui, why liberty has ever been
doubted, or disputed.
CHAPTER XIV.
Further observations on the powers and fac-
ulties of the mind.
From Burlamaqui, the understanding to be
furnished with a knowledge of truth.
CHAPTER XV.
Of the Imputation of voluntary actions; Mor-
al obligation; and natural Law.
Sec. 1. Of Impution of voluntary actions:
the substance of this sec. is borrowed of
Burlamaqui.
2. Moral obligation internal.
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external.
180
The vicious mind cannot feel the internal
obligation to worship God.
181
Reason insufficient to make the vicious
mind feel the internal obligation.
Reason has much to do with our external
obligations.
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183
185
186
3. Cicero's notions of natural law incorrect.
Judge Wilson's explanation of natural law.
The precepts of the Bible the best natural laws.
Distinction between the exercises of the af- fections and of the will.
4. The government of the moral world part-
ly by force, and partly not by force.
CHAPTER XVI.
Of the Morality of Human Actions.
Sec. 1. In what the morality of actions con-
sists
2. Actions are, 1. either commanded, or
forbidden, or permitted.
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187 n
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