was not pofitive, but conditional, pofing he intended to go there. He en afked, whether my objections refton the difficulties of the navigation of Chefapeak? I replied, they did not. was a very little while with Sir William owe, and I don't recollect any thing that paffed.

Q. When it was known in Philadelthat that city was to be evacuated, hat effect had it on the minds of the habitants?

A. The inhabitants of that city, a vefew excepted, were faithful and loyal bjects of the crown; many of them ad taken a very decifive and active part the behalf of the crown; a measure that kind could not fail, therefore, to rike them with great dismay and diftrefs. Q. Did you, or any other perfon, to our knowledge, apply to the commandin chief, upon this occafion, for adice, refpecting the meafures proper to e purfued for your personal fafety? and what was the advice given ?

A. Sir William Erikine came down to ne from Sir William Howe and Sir Heny Clinton, to give me notice, as fuperinendent of the city, that it was to be eacuated. I sent for the magiftrates that vere acting under me, immediately, to confult them refpecting our own fafety, and that of the inhabitants, who had taken a decifive part on behalf of the crown. In our conversation, Mr Schoemaker reeated what he had told me a few days efore, that Sir William Howe had adifed him to go over to Washington, and nake his peace. It was natural for us o confult together upon the confequenes of that advice, and we all refolved ot to follow it. However, we thought neceffary, as our fafety was ftill unrovided for, (our lives being attainted, nd all that we had in the world confifated), ftill to know what was to be ome of us. The magiftrates, therefore, quefted I would wait on Sir William Howe on the occafion; which I accordgly did immediately; when he gave us he fame advice. Iftarted a difficulty especting the practicability of it; upon hich he advised us to apply to Sir Heny Clinton to procure a flag to go out for at purpose. I returned to the magirates, and reported what had paffed; nd we then seriously debated and condered among ourselves, whether we hould follow the advice. One of the magiftrates did not say so much on the

fubject as the two others did, which induced me to put the question fingly, whether we fhould follow the advice or not? I put it to the magiftrate who had faid little firft. His anfwer was immediately in the negative, and we unanimously agreed not to follow it. We however refolved, before we parted, to communicate our circumftances to Sir Henry Clinton, with the advice that was given to us, as we knew upon him, in a few days, the command of the army would devolve. I wrote a letter to Sir Henry Clinton, requesting an interview upon a matter which highly concerned the magistrates and citizens of Philadelphia. Not receiving an answer from Sir Henry Clinton fo foon as I expected, and Col. Innis, a confidential friend of Siv Henry Clinton, calling on me, I communicated the whole that I have mentioned to him, and requested he would fpeak to Sir Henry Clinton on the occafion. A good deal paffed between us. He feemed alarmed that we should be advifed to go over to the enemy, and point. ed out the confequences that would attend it; and immediately offered to go to Sir Henry Clinton, and bring us an anfwer relative to our perfonal fafety. He foon returned, and informed me, that what he fhould fay I was not to understand as official from Sir Henry Clinton, (he did not fay fo-but I underftood, at the time, it was because the command had not then devolved on Sir Henry Clinton), and informed me, that Sir Henry faid, he could not have granted a flag on fuch an occafion, had we requested it;-that the game was not up;-that the war was not over, but would ftill be carried on vigorously; and defired that we would not entertain a thought of going over to the enemy.

Q. If the magiftrates of Philadelphia had gone over to the rebels, what effect would that measure have had in America?

A. If the magiftrates of Philadelphia had gone over to the rebels under that advice, it would certainly have had eve ry pernicious effect. The people in ge neral would have believed, what the rebels at that time industriously propagated, that the contest was given up, and that America was to be evacuated: They would, or at leaft great numbers of them would, have taken the oaths of abjuration, and allegiance to the States, and become their perfect fubjects.

Q. Did

Q. Did you attend the army from Brunswick to Trenton in 1776 ?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time did the army march from Brunswick? and at what time did it arrive at Prince-town that day?

A. I lodged with Gen. Vaughan the evening before, and understood the orders were to march at four o'clock.-The army did march very early; they arrived at Prince-town about four o'clock in the afternoon.

Q. Where was Washington and his army at that time?

A. The main body of his army was at Trenton, a part at Prince-town, and I believe a few advanced nearer to Brunfwick, to obferve the motions of the Bri tish army.

Q. Had you information which you had reason to believe, with regard to the time of Washington's leaving Princetown that day?

A. I was informed by feveral of the inhabitants of Prince-town, and particularly by the gentleman with whom I lodged, that Washington had left it about an hour before the van of the British army arrived.

Q. At what hour the next morning did the army march from Prince-town to Trenton? and at what time did the army arrive at Trenton?

A. To the beft of my recollection, the army marched between eight and nine o'clock in the morning, and arrived at Trenton about three in the afternoon.

Q. Do you know what was Gen. Wafhington's force at that time, and by what means do you know it?

A. I have faid before [462.], that Gen. Washington's force confifted at that time of about 3300 men. A number of the inhabitants of Trenton made his force lefs; but Maj. Barnes, of the provincial corps, who lived in Trenton at the time, and at whofe houfe Washington took up his head quarters, informed me, that by a return made to Washington the day before he paffed the Delaware, his whole army, excepting Lord Sterling's brigade,

A Heron's Ring: An anecdote. Ord Orford, about ten years ago, loofed a heron, and fet his hawks after it. The conteft between the heron and the hawks was long, and full of fport; but, at length, the hawks were victorious, and brought the heron to the ground, without doing him the leaft injury. In gratitude for the diverfion which this heron had afforded his Lordfhip, he ordered a gold ring to be made, with E. Orford, and the date of the year, engraved upon it, and put it about the heron's leg, and gave him his liberty, Two months ago, his Lordship received a letter from the Imperial Ambassador, with the above-named ring inclosed, in forming him, that he was cominanded by the Emperor to acquaint his Lordship, that he (the Emperor) took the inclofed ring from the leg of a heron which his hawks had killed; and feeing his Lord. fhip's name upon the ring, and obferving the date, had fent it to his Lordship by his Ambaffador, as a great curiofity.The ring is very little worfe, but much bruifed and difcoloured, and the infcrip tion quite perfect notwithstanding.

A traitor rewarded and characterized.

Q. Is it your opinion, that it was poffible, or not, to have overtaken Gen. Wafhington's army before it had croffed the Delaware?

A. I am no military man, and can fpeak only to facts, which, as far as they

Spaniards at Bergen-op-Zoom to Q. Elifabeth, came to England, to give her an account of his fuccefs, ard to claim his reward, the Queen gave him a thousand crowns; but said to him at the fame time," Get you home, that I may know where to fend when i want a thorough-paced villain.”

The

more than once repented having neglect ed her true interefts, to follow blindly the deftructive projects of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon, was engaged to change the part of mediator, for that of enemy of Great Britain. The calamities of war are multiplied; but the court of Verfailles hath hitherto nothing to boaft of the success of its military operations; and Europe knows well how to rate those naval victories, which exift no where but in the gazettes and manifeftoes of pretended conquerors.

Since war and peace impofe on nations duties entirely different, and even oppofite, it is indifpenfably neceffary to diftinguish, in reasoning as well as in conduct, the two conditions; but in the laft manifefto published by France, thefe two conditions are perpetually confounded. She pretends to juftify her conduct, in making the beft, by turns, nay, almoft at the fame time, of those rights which an enemy only is permitted to claim, and of thofe maxims which regulate the obligations and procedure of national friendship. The fineffe of the court of Versailles, in blending inceffantly two fuppofitions which have no connection, is the natural confequence of a falfe and treacherous policy, which cannot bear the light of the day. The fen-. timents and conduct of the King have nothing to fear from the most severe fcrutiny; but, on the contrary, invite it, to diftinguifh clearly what his enemies have confounded with fo much artifice. Juftice alone can fpeak, without fear, the language of reafon and truth.

The full juftification of his Majefty, and the indelible condemnation of France, may be reduced to the proof of two fimple, and almoft felf-evident principles: First, That a profound, permanent, and, on the part of England, a fincere and true peace, fubfifted between the two nations, when France formed connections with the revolted colonies, fecret at firft, but afterwards public and avowed; fecond, That according to the best acknowledged maxims of the rights of nations, and even according to the tenor of treaties actually fubfifting between the two crowns, thefe connections might be regarded as an infraction of the peace, and the public avowal of these connections was equivalent to a declaration of war on the part of the Moft Chriftian King. This is, perhaps, the first time that a refpectable nation had an occafion

prove two truths so inconteftable, and

the juftice of the King's caufe is already acknowledged by every difinterested and unprejudiced perfon.

"When Providence called the King to the throne, France enjoyed a molt profound peace." These are the expreffions of the last manifefto of the court of Verfailles, which easily remembers the folemn affurances of a fincere friendship, and the moft pacific difpofition which it received from his Britannic Majefty; and which were often renewed by the intervention of ambaffadors to the two courts, during four years, until the fatal and decifive moment of the decla ration of the Marquis de Noailles. The question, then, is, to prove, That, du ring this happy time of general tranquillity, England concealed a fecret war under the appearances of peace; and that her unjust and arbitrary procedure was carried to fuch a pitch, as to render lawful, on the part of France, the boldeft fteps which are permiffible only in a declared enemy. To attain this object, griefs clearly articulated, and folidly established, should be produced before the tribunal of Europe. This great tribu. nal will require formal, and, perhaps, repeated proofs of the injury, of the complaint, of a refusal of competent fatisfac tion, and of a proteftation of the injured party, that it held itself highly offended by such refufal, and that it fhould look upon itself hereafter as released from the duties of friendship, and the bonds of treaties. Thofe nations which respect the fanctity of oaths, and the advanta ges of peace, are the flowest to catch hold of opportunities which feem to dif charge them from a facred and folemn obligation; and it is but with trembling that they dare to renounce the friendship of powers from which they have long borne injuftice and infult.

But the court of Verfailles hath been either ignorant of thefe wife and falutary principles, or it hath defpifed them; and, inftead of fixing the foundations of a juf and legitimate war, it hath contented itself to spread through every page of its manifefto, general and vague complaints, expreffed with exaggerations in a metaphorical ftyle. It goes above threescore years back to accufe England of her want of care to ratify some commercial regu lations, fome articles of the treaty of Utrecht. It prefumes to reproach the King's minifters, with ufing the language of haughtiness and ambition, without condefcending

ndefcending to the duty of proving putations as unlikely as they are odi. 18. The free fuppofitions of the ambion and infincerity of the court of Lonon, are confufedly heaped up, as if they ared to be difcriminated; the pretendinfults which the commerce, the flag, d the territories of France, have underone, are infinuated in a very obfcure anner; and at laft there efcapes an awal of the engagement which the Moft riftian King had already made with ain, "to avenge their refpective wrongs, d put bounds to the tyrannical empire hich England had ufurped, and prended to maintain over the fea."

It is difficult to encounter phantoms, to answer closely and precifely to the nguage of declamation. The juft conence of the King would doubtlefs dee to fubmit to the ftricteft examination, ofe vague complaints, thofe pretended rongs, upon which the court of Verilles has fo prudently avoided to exain itself with that clearness and partilarity which alone could fupport its afons, and excufe its conduct. Dung a fifteen-years peace, the interefts two powerful, and perhaps jealous ations, which approached in fo many aces in the Old and New World, would evitably furnish subjects of complaint d difcuffion, which a reciprocal modetion would always know how to fettle, at which are but too eafily fharpened d impoifoned by the real hatred, or fected fufpicions, of a fecret and ambious enemy and the troubles of Ameca were but too apt to multiply the opes, the pretexts, and the unjuft prenfions of France. Nevertheless, iuch as been the ever uniform, and ever eaceable conduct of the King and his inifters, that it hath often filenced his nemies and if it may be permitted to iscover the true fenfe of these indefinite nd equivocal accufations, whofe ftudied bfcurity betrays the features of fhame nd artifice; if it may be permitted to onteft objects which have no existence; may be affirmed, with the boldnefs of ruth, that several of these pretended inries are announced, for the firft time, a declaration of war, without having een propofed to the court of London, t a time when they might have been onfidered with the ferious and favourble attention of friendship. In refpect o thofe complaints which the ambaffalors of his Moll Chriftian Majefty have

communicated from time to time to the King's minifters, it would be easy to give, or rather to repeat, fatisfactory answers, which would demonftrate, to the eyes of France herfelf, the King's moderation, his love of juftice, and the fincerity of his difpofition to preferve the general tranquillity of Europe. Thofe complaints, which the court of Verfailles may difpenfe with recollecting, were very rarely founded in truth and reafon ; and it was moft generally found, that thofe perfons in Europe, America, or on the feas, from whom an ill-founded and fufpected intelligence was derived, had not been afraid to abuse the confidence of France, the better to serve her fecret intentions.

If fome facts which France enhanced as the ground of her complaints, were built on a lefs brittle foundation, the King's minifters cleared them up without delay, by a most clear and entire justification of the motives and rights of their fovereign, who might punish a contra band trade on his coaft, without wounding the public repose; and to whom the law of nations gave a lawful right to feize all veffels which carried arms or warlike stores to his enemies, or his rebellious fubjects. The courts of justice were always open to individuals of all nations; and thofe must be very ignorant of the British conftitution, who fuppofe that the royal authority was capable to fhut out the means of an appeal. In the vast and extended theatre of the operations of a naval war, the most active vigilance, and the most steady authority, are unable to difcover or fupprefs every disorder; but every time that the court of Verfailles was able to eftablifh the truth of any real injuries that its fubjects had fuftained, without the knowledge or approbation of the King, his Majefty gave the most speedy and etfectual orders to ftop an abufe, which injured his own dignity, as well as the interefts of his neighbours, who had been involved in the calamities of war. The object and importance of this war will fuffice to fhow to all Europe, on what principles the political proceedings of England ought to be regulated. Is it likely, that whilft England employed her forces to bring the revolted colonies of America back to their duty, the fhould have chofen that moment to irritate the moft refpe&table powers of Europe by the injuftice and violence of her conduct ? 3 X 2

Equity