Now an action may imply a contradiction two ways, either in respect of the object, or in respect of the agent. In respect of the object it may imply a contradiction immediately or consequentially. That doth imply a contradiction immediately, which plainly and in terms doth signify a repugnancy, and so destroys itself, as for the same thing to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been. And therefore it must be acknowledged, that it is not in the power of God to make that not to have been, which hath already been :* but that is no derogation to God's power, because not within the object of any power. And he may certainly have all power, who hath not that which belongeth to no power. Again, that doth imply a contradiction consequentially, which in appearance seemeth not to be impossible, but by necessary consequence, if admitted, leadeth infallibly to a contradiction. As that one body should bo at the same time in two distinct places, speaks no repugnancy in terms; but yet by consequence it leads to that which is repugnant in itself; which is, that the same body is but one body, and not but one. Being then a covert and consequential contradiction is as much and as truly a contradiction as that which is open and immediate, it followeth that it is as impossible to be effected, and therefore comes not under the power of God. A That doth imply a contradiction in respect of the agent, which is repugnant to his essential perfection; for being every action floweth from the essence of the agent, whatsoever is totally repugnant to that essence, must involve a contradiction as to the agent. Thus we may say, God cannot sleep, God cannot want, God cannot die; he cannot sleep, whose being is spiritual; he cannot want, whose nature is all-suffility in the object, it proveth no deficiency in God. 6 * Tò yeyovòs oùr ivdéxetai μǹ yevéσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς ̓Αγάθων, Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεὸς στερίσκεται, + Neque enim et vitam Dei et præscientiam Dei sub necessitate poAristot. Ethic. Eud. 1. v. c. 2. nimus, si dicamus, Necesse est Deum Quisquis dicit, Si omnipotens est semper vivere et cuncta præscire; sicDeus, faciat ut quæ facta sunt, facta ut nec potestas ejus minuitur, cum non fuerint; non videt hoc se dicere, dicitur mori fallique non posse. Sic Si omnipotens est, faciat ut ea quæ enim hoc non potest, ut potius, si posvera sunt, eo ipso quo vera sunt set, minoris esset utique potestatis. falsa sint. S. August. contra Fau- Recte quippe omnipotens dicitur qui stum, l. xxvi. c. 5. It is granted there- tamen mori et falli non potest. Difore to be true, which Pliny objects, citur enim Omnipotens faciendo quod Nat. Hist. 1. ii. c. 7. Deum non vult, non patiendo quod non vult: facere ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui quod si ei accideret, nequaquam honores gessit non gesserit;' as this esset Omnipotens. Unde propterea proves nothing against omnipotency, quædam non potest, quia Omnipotens because it is no act of possibility. est.' S. August. de Civ. Dei, l. v. c. Had the act objected been feasible, 10. 'Nam ego dico quanta non posand God had not the power to effect sit. Non potest mori, non potest pecit, then had he wanted some power, care, non potest mentiri, non potest and consequently had not been om- falli. Tanta non potest; quæ si posset, nipotent. But being it is not want non esset Omnipotens.' Idem, de Temof power in the agent, but of possibi- pore Serm. 119. al. 213. §. 1. 66 cient; he cannot die, who is essentially and necessarily existent. Nor can that be a diminution of his omnipotency, the contrary whereof would be a proof of his impotency, a demonstration of his infirmity. Thus it is "impossible for God to lie," (Heb. vi. 18.) to whom we say nothing is impossible ; and, he who can do all things, " cannot deny himself.”+ (2 Tim. ii. 13.) Because a lie is repugnant to the perfection of veracity, which is essential unto God as necessarily following from his infinite knowledge, and infinite sanctity. We who are ignorant may be deceived; we who are sinful may deceive: but it is repugnant to that nature to be deceived, which is no way subject unto ignorance; it is contradictory to that essence to deceive, which is no way capable of sin. For as it is a plain contradiction to know all things, and to be ignorant of any thing; so is it to know all things and to be deceived: as it is an evident contradiction to be infinitely holy, and to be sinful; so is it to be infinitely holy and deceive. But it is impossible for any one to lie, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. Therefore it is a manifest contradic 6 Nunquidnam mentitur Deus? Sed non mentitur; quia impossibile est mentiri Deum. Impossibile autem istud nunquidnam infirmitatis est? Non utique. Nam quomodo omnia potest, si aliquid efficere non potest? Quid ergo ei impossibile? Illud utique quod naturæ ejus contrarium est, non quod virtuti arduum. Impossibile, inquit, est ei mentiri, et impossibile istud non infirmitatis est, sed virtutis et majestatis; quia veritas non recipit mendacium, nec Dei virtus levitatis errorem. S. Ambros. Annot. in Num. Si volunt invenire quod Omnipotens non potest, habent prorsus; ego dicam, mentiri non poiest. Credamus ergo quod potest, non credendo quod non potest. S. August. de Civ. Dei, l. xxii. c, 25. † This was the argument of Elymas the sorcerer beforementioned, to which Dionysius Areopagita gives this answer: Ἡ ἑαυτοῦ ἄρνησις ἔκπτωσις ἀληθείας ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ὅν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔκπτωσις τοῦ ὄντος ἔκπτωσις. Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀλήθεια ὄν ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἄρνησις τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ ὄντος ἔκπτωσις, ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκπεσεῖν ὁ Θεὸς οὐ δύναται· καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἄν τις φαίη τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι οὐ δύναται, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι κατὰ στέρησιν οὐκ οἶδεν. De Divin. Nom. c. 8. §. 6. Φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεός· εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν δρᾷ ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ ἔστι Θεός. Orig. cont. Cels. I. v. §. 23. Jobius gives this solution to the same objection: "Α φαμὲν μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ θεῖον, ταῦτα τῶν μήτε ὄντων ἐστὶ μήτε δυνατῶν ὅλως ὑφεστάναι. ποῦ γὰρ ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀρνήσασθαι τὸν Θεὸν ἑαυτὸν, ἢ ἡ τροπή, ἢ ἡ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἔκπτωσις, ἢ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ψεῦδος γενέσθαι; Παντοδύναμος δὲ ὑμνεῖται καὶ λέγεται, ὡς τά τε πρέποντα αὐτῷ καὶ σωτήρια τῶν δημιουργημάτων πάντα δυνάμενος ὅτε βούλεται. Job. de Verb. Incarn. l. iii. c. 13. apud Photium in Biblioth. p. 586. Ὁ ̓Απόστολός φησι περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς, Εν οἷς ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι Θεόν· οὐκ ἀσθέ νειάν τινα κατηγορῶν τῆς παγκρατοῦς δυνάμεως, ἀλλὰ μεγίστην ῥώμην, ὅτι ἀνεπίδεκτός ἐστι τοῦ ψεύδους ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας πατήρ. Καὶ ἀλλαχόσε δὲ ταύτην ὀχυρῶν τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔφη, Ἐὰν ἀρνησώμεθα αὐ τὸν, ἐκεῖνος πιστὸς μένει· ἀρνήσασθαι γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὐ δύναται. Καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἀσθενείας ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλ' ἀνυ περβλήτου ἰσχύος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἑαυτὴν ἀρνήσασθαι. Isid. Pelus. Ep. 335. 1. ii. Theodoret upon that place of St. Paul, " It is impossible for God to lie:” Οὐκ ἀσθενὲς τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ ἄγαν αὐτὸ δεικνὺς δυνατόν. Οὕτω γὰρ, φησὶν, ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς ὡς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ψεῦδος ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ποτέ. Τὸ δυνατὸν ἄρα (ita lege, non ἀδύνατον οὖν) τῆς ἀληθείας διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου σημαίνεται. Dial. iii. p. 123. And upon that, "He cannot deny himself:” Πάλιν οὖν τὸ οὐ δύναται τῆς ἀπείρου δυνάμεως ὑπάρχει δηλωτικόν, &e. Ibid. p. 124. 66 tion to say that God can lie, and consequently it is no dero. gation from his omnipotency, that he cannot. Whatsoever then God cannot do, whatsoever is impossible to him, doth not any way prove that he is not Almighty, but only shew that the rest of his attributes and perfections are as essential to him as his power; and as his power suffereth no resistance, so the rest of his perfections admit no repugnance. Well therefore may we conclude him absolutely omnipotent, who, by being able to effect all things consistent with his perfections, sheweth infinite ability:* and by not being able to do any thing repugnant to the same perfections, demonstrateth himself subject to no infirmity or imbecility. And in this manner we maintain God's omnipotency, with the best and eldest, against the worst and latest, of the heathen authors.+ * Theodoret having proved that there were many things, which fell not under the power of God, at last thus concludes: Πολλὰ τοίνυν εὑρήκαμεν · ἀδύνατα ὄντα τῷ παντοδυνάμῳ Θεῷ. ̓Αλλὰ τὸ μὴ δυνηθῆναί τι τούτων, ἀπείρου δυνάμεως, οὐκ ἀσθενείας τεκμήριον· τὸ δέ γε δυνηθῆναι, ἀδυναμίας δήπουθεν, οὐ δυνάμεως. Ὅτι τούτων ἕκαστον τὸ ἄτρεπτον τοῦ Θεοῦ κηρύττει καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον. Dial. iii. p. 123. And Origen cont. Cels. gives this for the Christian's general rule: Δύναται καθ' ὑμᾶς πάντα ὁ Θεὸς, ἅπερ δυνάμενος, τοῦ Θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ἐξίσταται. 1. iii. §. 70. And the words of Celsus, though ill intended, are yet very true: Αὐτὸς γὰρ (ὁ Θεὸς) ἐστὶν ὁ πάντων τῶν ὄντων λόγος, οὐδὲν οὖν οἷός τε παρὰ λόγον οὐδὲ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαι. Apud Orig. 1. v. §. 14. And so Origen in his answer confesses: ̓Αλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλογον οὔτε παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαί ἐστιν Θεός. Ibid. §. 24. It was the constant opinion of the most ancient heathens, as appeareth by Homer, who expresseth it plainly, Odyss. Κ. 303. -Χαλεπὸν δέ τ' ὀρύσσειν *Ανδράσι γε θνητοῖσι, θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύνανται. And the same sense is attributed to Linus in a distich cited for his by Stobæus, tit. 110. 1.; but may rather be thought to have been made by some of the Pythagoreans. For this was the plain doctrine of Pythagoras, who taught his scholars to believe miracles, and to doubt of nothing said to be done by the gods, because all things were possible to them. Οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ τῶν θεῶν, (vel potius τοῖς θεοῖς) τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ὥσπερ οἴεσθαι τοὺς σοφιζομένους, ἀλλὰ πάντα δυνατά· καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῶν ἐπῶν, ἃ ἐκεῖνοί φασι μὲν εἶναι Λίνου, ἐστὶ μέντοι ἴσως ἐκείνων Ελπεσθαι χρὴ πάντ ̓ ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστ ̓ οὐδὲν ἄελπτον Ρᾴδια πάντα θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν. Iamb. de Vit. Pythag. c. 28. So Epicharmus a disciple of Pythagoras: Αδυνατεῖ οὐδὲν Θεῷ. Ap. Grot. Excerpt. ex Trag. et Comad. Gr. p. 481. So Pater Omnipotens, and Jupiter Omnipotens, familiar in Virgil and the poets before and after him. These do far outweigh the authority in Plutarch, and that of Pliny, with the addition of Galen, who opposeth the opinion of the philosophers to that of Moses expressly, and to our Saviour obliquely: Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ βουληθῆναι τοιαύτας γενέσθαι μόνον ἦν αὐταρκες· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ τὴν πέτραν ἐξαίφνης ἐθε λήσειεν ἄνθρωπον ποιῆσαι, δυνατὸν αὐ r. Which seems to be opposed to those words of our Saviour," God is able to raise children unto Abraham out of these stones." καθ' ὃ τῆς Μωσέως δόξης ἥθ' ἡμετέρα καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων παρ' Ελλη σιν ὀρθῶς μεταχειρισαμένων τοὺς περὶ φύσεως λόγους διαφέρει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρκεῖ, τὸ βουληθῆναι τὸν Θεὸν κοσμῆσαι τὴν ὕλην, ἡ δ ̓ εὐθὺς κεκόσμηται πάντα γὰρ εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ δυνατὰ νομίζει, καν εἰ τὴν τέφραν ἵππον ἢ βοῦν ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν· ἡμεῖς δ' οὐχ οὕτω γινώσκομεν, ἀλλ ̓ εἶναι γάρ τινα λέγομεν ἀδύνατα φύσει, καὶ τούτοις μηδ' ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅλως τὸν Θεὸν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν γενέσθαι τὸ βέλ τιον αἱρεῖσθαι. De Usu Part. l. xi. c. 14. Καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι, Thus God is omnipotent, and God only. For if the power of all things beside God be the power of God, as derived from him, and subordinate unto him, and his own power from whence that is derived can be subordinate to none, then none can be omnipotent but God. Again, we say, that God the Father is Almighty; but then we cannot say, that the Father only is Almighty: for the reason why we say the Father is Almighty, is because he is God; and therefore we cannot say that he only is Almighty, because it is not true that he only is God.* Whosoever then is God, hath the same reason and foundation of omnipotency which the Father hath, and consequently is to be acknowledged properly and truly omnipotent as the Father is. But we have already shewed that the Son of God is truly God; and shall hereafter shew that the Holy Ghost is also God, and that by the same nature, by which the Father is God. The Father therefore is Almighty, because the Father is God; the Son Almighty, because the Son is God; and the Holy Ghost Almighty, because the Holy Ghost is God. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are God, by the same Divinity: therefore, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are omnipotent by the same omnipotency. The Father then is not called Almighty by way of exclusion, but is here mentioned with that attribute peculiarly, because the power of God answereth particularly to the right hand of God, as being the right hand of power.+ The Father therefore is here described by the notion of Almighty, to shew, that Christ having ascended into heaven, and being set down at the right hand of God, is invested with a greater power than he exercised before: and that power which was then actually conferred upon him, acknowledgeth no bounds or limits; but "all power" in the ultimate extent of its infinity is "given unto him," (Matt. xxviii. 18.) who is set down on the right hand of him who is God the Father ; and, being so, is therefore truly and properly Almighty. It is necessary to profess belief in God Almighty; First, because the acknowledgment of his omnipotency begetteth that fear and reverence, submission and obedience, which are due unto his infinite Majesty. Our God is a "great God, a mighty, and a terrible;" (Deut. x. 7.) therefore terrible beNon ergo quispiam audebit potens, rather in relation to the prequamlibet creaturam sive coelestem sent occasion, than in reference to the sive terrestrem dicere Omnipotentem, person who is said to be omnipotent; nisi solam Trinitatem, Patrem scilicet as is observed by Servius upon that et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Non verse of Virgil, Æneid. ix. 625. énim cum dicimus nos credere in Deum Patrem Omnipotentem, sicut Hæretici Ariani, negamus filium Omnipotentem, aut Spiritum Sanctum.' Auctor Lib. de Symbolo ad Catechum. 1. ii. c. 3. + Nor is it unusual in other authors to make use of the word omni Jupiter omnipotens, audacibus annue coeptis. Hoc epitheton interdum ad gloriam numinis ponitur, interdum ad causam dicentis. Namque hoc loco dicendo omnipotens ostendit eum etiam his, qui per se minus valent, præstare posse virtutèm.' cause mighty. - "I will forewarn you (saith our Saviour), whom ye shall fear: Fear him, which after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; I say unto you, fear him." (Luke xii. 5.) Three times we are commanded to fear, and one only reason rendered, but sufficient for a thousand fears, the power of him, who is able eternally to punish us. God gave a general command to Abraham, and with it a powerful persuasion to obedience, when he said unto him, “I am the Almighty God; walk before me, and be thou perfect." (Gen. xvii. 1.) It was a rational advice which the apostle gives us, "Humble yourselves under the mighty hand of God, that he may exalt you in due time.” (1 Pet. v. 6.) And it is a proper incentive to the observation of the Law of God, to consider that he is the " one lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy." (James iv. 12.) Secondly, The belief of God's omnipotency is absolutely necessary, as the foundation of our faith. All the miracles, which have been seen, were therefore wrought, that we might believe; and never miracle had been seen, if God were not omnipotent. The objects of our faith are beyond all natural and finite power; and did they not require an infinite activity, `an assent unto them would not deserve the name of faith. If God were not Almighty, we should believe nothing; but being he is so, why should we disbelieve any thing ?* What can God propound unto us, which we cannot assent unto, if we can believe that he is omnipotent. We Thirdly, It is not only necessary in matters of bare faith, and notions of belief, but in respect of the active and operative reliance upon the promises of God. This was the particular confidence of Abraham the father of the faithful, "who staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief, but was strong in faith, giving glory to God, and being persuaded that what he had promised, he was able also to perform." (Rom. iv. 20, 21.) The promises of God are therefore firm and sure, because he is both willing and able to perform them.+ doubt or distrust the promises of men, either because we may fear they intend not to do what they have promised, or cannot do what they intend: in the first, we may suspect them because they are subject to iniquity; in the second, because they are liable to infirmity. But being God is of infinite sanc* This was the argument which ἀπομνημονεύουσιν, ὡς μηδὲν ἀπιστοῦνthe Pythagoreans used, who believed τες ὅτι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγηται" and many miraculous actions, which others whereas others looked upon them as looked upon as fabulous; because weak and simple people for giving they would disbelieve nothing, which credit to such fabulous relations: pòs was referred to the Divine power: and πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐχὶ αὐτοὺς εὐήθεις the reason of that was, because they νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας. thought all things possible to God, as Iambl. de Vit. Pythag. c. 28. we shewed before. Τῶν τοιούτων δὲ (saith Iamblichus, having related se>veral strange actions, either fabulous or miraculous) τῶν δοκούντων μυθικών +Nulla est in promissis Dei falsitas, quia nulla est in faciendis difficultas aut impossibilitas.' Fulgent, ad Monim. l. i. c. 12. |