pulation in Lancashire to an astonishing extent. It was the duty of the House to inquire whether these statments were well founded or not. One fact was indisputable; that the export of British manufactures decreased in 1793 to the amount of four millions. In 1794, it got up again about two millions; but this was to be ascribed solely to the spirit of adventure or of sanguine speculation respecting conquered islands in the West Indies, and which neither could or would be continued. Our maritime trade was in reality unable to bear the enormous weight of insurance. At no period of the last war, when we had to contend with France, Spain, Holland, and America, was insurance higher than at this

moment.

"Our next point of resource was our foreign allies. He wished to know who they were? Was the King of Prussia our ally? Did he fulfil the treaty for which the subsidy was paid him? If he did fulfil it, why did we cease to pay that subsidy? Why had we broken the contract? Surely parliament ought to inquire into, and ascertain this point? Let the House do their duty, and render justice to that monarch: let them declare that ministers have acted towards him with treachery or let them express their indignation at the scandalous breach of contract which he has committed; and let them shew to the nations in Europe, that, faithful to their own engagements, they will not submit to be the dupes of any potentate on earth. Our connection with Prussia was to be viewed in another light also. If he was no longer our ally, what had become of the treaty in 1788? By that treaty, he was obliged to furnish 30,000 men. It had been made the ground for justifying the treaty of 1793, that his former engagement extending only to a supply of 30,000 men, it was good policy to give him a

subsidy

subsidy of twelve hundred thousand pounds for furnishing double the number. What followed? He left the allies in the middle of the campaign; and by a second bargain for an increase of his services, we lost them totally. Was a British House of Commons to lavish enormous sums of money only to purchase the breach of treaties, to procure the violation of engagements, leading, in their consequences, to the destruction of all the measures in which we were engaged? They had read such various accounts of his present proceedings, as made it still more necessary to inquire into the fact. They had heard of his sending armies again to the Rhine; and they had heard that he considered the Rhine as a proper boundary for France. It was said by some that his armies were marching against the French, and by others that he was marching against the allies. They ought to know precisely what he was, whether he was an ally, whether he was neutral, or whether he was an enemy. An honorable gentleman [Sir WILLIAM PULTENEY] had said, that, the King of Prussia during the last campaign, did us better service, than by direct co-operation with the allied armies.' Perhaps his Prussian Majesty might explain and prove the assertion thus: he might say, that the war having been undertaken for the demolition of Jacobin principles, which set themselves up against regular governments like his, he had rendered more service to the allies by his attack upon Poland, than hẹ could by any other means: he might say, what signified the capture of a town, the recovery of a fortress, or the protection of a province, compared with the great atchievements which he had performed in Poland? Had he not crushed the rise of Jacobin principles among that abominable people? He had reduced them to that condition of slavery which was consistent with, and safe for,

the

the regular governments! What signified the recovery of Flanders, or the presevation of Holland, when opposed to the capture of KOSCIUSKO? To the overthrow of that distinguished man, whose courage and talents had excited the sympathy of every congenial breast, and whose example warmed every generous soul to the great and sacred duty of the melioration of the condition of his kind! The King of Prussia might say, that he had thus done more for the real cause, rendered more service to the real object of the confederacy, than by any co-operation with their troops! If so, it was manifest we had given one million two hundred thousand pounds to subdue Poland. Unless we had granted him the subsidy, he could have nothing, by his own confession. If we had not given him the sum, he would have done for us just as much as he had done-that was nothing! If he was to be considered as our ally, he must again be subsidized. We must either, therefore, look upon him as an ally gone off, or as an ally to be hired, unless, indeed, we were even to be obliged to purchase his neutrality.—With respect to the Emperor, we were to give him four or six millions, which-ever he pleased to accept; and if he should imitate the example set him of withdrawing in the middle of the campaign, we could not withdraw also, as we were to advance the whole sum at once, and thus to deprive ourselves of all power of check on his conduct. But the most material consideration was, that if he could not take the field this year without so enormous a loan, he would be equally incapable of taking it next year without another loan; and thus Great Britain was to sustain the whole burthen of the war. Though large subsidies were paid to the Italian Princes, we scarcely heard of a movement in that country; and as to Sardinia, would not its neutrality have been as serviceable to us as the

diversion

diversion it had made? Spain had lost Navarre, Biscay, and Catalonia; and her finances were in such a state, that she must either apply for a subsidy, or make a separate peace with the enemy. All this undoubtedly called for inquiry, that we might ascertain what precise dependence we ought to have on the exertions of our allies.

"It was also of importance to inquire whether we stood high in the estimation of neutral states, for our rectitude, dignity, moderation, and justice. These ought to be ranked among the number of our resources; and no man would deny the eternal truth of the principle, that, if we had been deficient in justice, we had been deficient in wisdom, and had thereby enfeebled our aim, and taken from the vital strength of the country. With respect to America, after taking her ships, we had agreed to pay for the damage she had sustained. To the court of Denmark we had sent memorial after memorial complaining of her neutrality; the answers to which had raised the character of M. BERNSTOFF higher than that of any Danish minister before him. We had engaged in a diplomatic contest, in which we shewed ourselves completely ignorant of the laws of nations, and were foiled accordingly. After having by menace and insult compelled the Duke of Tuscany to declare war, contrary to his own inclination, the advice of his ministers, and the interests of his subjects, we were at last obliged to submit not only to his neutrality, but to his concluding a treaty of peace and amity with the French Convention. We had insolently told the independent cantons of Switzerland, that, although, they might choose to call themselves neutral, they were not to allow their subjects to reap the advantages of that neutrality by any intercourse with the people of France. The Swiss returned a digni

fied answer, that they would preserve a neutrality which His Britannic Majesty had often commended, and even acknowledged as an obligation. Our conduct and language to the little Republic of Genoa had been still more unbecoming; but, after blockading the port, we were content to withdraw our ships, with an ungracious apology for the insult we had offered. Thus had ministers impaired the character of the nation, and brought upon it, what it had never known before, the imputation of injustice and pusillanimity."

Their disingenuity, in having never avowed the specific object of the war, he deemed equally impolitic and mean fpirited. "If," faid Mr. Fox, "they had thought or acted like statefmen, they would have told the world, we care not what the government of France may be, we are fighting to repel an unprovoked aggression, and to protect our allies the Dutch; or they would have adopted the idea of a late distinguished member of this House, who by an odd figure, said, the object of the war was not the defence of the Dutch, but the restoration of monarchy in France,—the restoration of the emigrants to their property, and the reestablishment of ancient institutions; because, unless all this was done, his Majesty was not safe upon his throne-no gentleman could be assured of his estate-nor any religious or civil establishment be free from danger. Either side of the alternative would have had its inconveniences. If we had taken the former, and said that we sought only indemnity for ourselves, and security for our allies, without regarding what might be the form of government in France, we should

The figurative expression here alluded to, which Mr. Fox through delicacy did not repeat, had been made use of in a former debate by Mr. BURKE, whose exact words were, war about the Scheldt, a war about a chamber pot!"

"A

have