independent powers be combined together, under the direction (if I may so speak) of one and the same will, I mean the law of the society. Without this there is no politeness, no order, no peace among men, but the world is one great heap of misery and confusion; the strong as well as the weak, the wise as well as the foolish, standing on all sides exposed to all those calamities, which man can be liable to in a state where he has no other security, than the not being possessed of any thing which may raise envy or desire in another. A state by so much more ineligible than that of brutes, as a reasonable creature hath a greater reflection and foresight of miseries than they. From all which it plainly follows, that loyalty, or submission to the supreme authority, hath, if universally practised in conjunction with all other virtues, a necessary connexion with the well-being of the whole sum of mankind; and by consequence, if the criterion we have laid down be true, it is, strictly speaking, a moral duty, or branch of natural religion. And, therefore, the least degree of rebellion is, with the utmost strictness and propriety, a sin: not only in Christians, but also in those who have the light of reason alone for their guide. Nay, upon a thorough and impartial view, this submission will, I think, appear one of the very first and fundamental laws of nature, inasmuch as it is civil government which ordains and marks out the various relations between men, and regulates property, thereby giving scope and laying a foundation for the exercise of all other duties. And, in truth, whoever considers the condition of man, will scarce conceive it possible that the practice of any one moral virtue should obtain, in the naked, forlorn state of nature.

XVII. But since it must be confessed, that in all cases our actions come not within the direction of certain fixed moral rules, it may possibly be still questioned, whether obedience to the supreme power be not one of those exempted cases, and, consequently, to be regulated by the prudence and discretion of every single person, rather than adjusted to the rule of absolute non-resistance. I shall therefore endeavour to make it yet more plain, that, thou shalt not resist the supreme power, is an undoubted precept of morality; as will appear from the following considerations. First, then, submission to government is a point important enough to be established by a moral rule. Things of insignificant and trifling concern, are, for that very reason, exempted from the rules of morality. But government, on which so much depend the peace, order, and well-being of mankind, cannot surely be thought of too small importance to be secured and guarded by a moral rule. Government, I say, which is itself the principal source under heaven, of those particular advantages, for the procurement and conservation whereof, several unquestionable moral rules were prescribed to men.

XVIII. Secondly, obedience to government is a case uni

versal enough to fall under the direction of a law of nature. Numberless rules there may be for regulating affairs of great concernment, at certain junctures, and to some particular persons or societies, which, notwithstanding, are not to be esteemed moral or natural laws, but may be either totally abrogated or dispensed with; because the private ends they were intended to promote, respect only some particular persons, as engaged in relations not founded in the general nature of man, who, on various occasions, and in different postures of things, may prosecute their own designs by different measures, as in human prudence shall seem convenient. But what relation is there more extensive and universal than that of subject and law? This is confined to no particular age or climate, but universally obtains, at all times, and in all places, wherever men live in a state exalted above that of brutes. It is therefore evident, that the rule, forbidding resistance to the law or supreme power, is not, upon pretence of any defect in point of universality, to be excluded from the number of the laws of nature.

XIX. Thirdly, there is another consideration, which confirms the necessity of admitting this rule for a moral or natural law; namely, because the case it regards is of too nice and difficult a nature to be left to the judgment and determination of each private person. Some cases there are so plain and obvious to judge of, that they may safely be trusted to the prudence of every reasonable man; but in all instances, to determine whether a civil law is fitted to promote the public interest; or whether submission or resistance will prove most advantageous in the consequence; or when it is, that the general good of a nation may require an alteration of government, either in its form, or in the hands which administer it: these are points too arduous and intricate, and which require too great a degree of parts, leisure, and liberal education, as well as disinterestedness and thorough knowledge in the particular state of a kingdom, for every subject to take upon him the determination of them. From which it follows, that upon this account also, non-resistance, which, in the main, nobody can deny to be a most profitable and wholesome duty, ought not to be limited by the judgment of private persons to particular occasions, but esteemed a most sacred law of nature.

XX. The foregoing arguments do, I think, make it manifest, that the precept against rebellion is on a level with other moral rules. Which will yet further appear from this fourth and last consideration. It cannot be denied, that right reason doth require some common stated rule or measure, whereby subjects ought to shape their submission to the supreme power; since any clashing or disagreement in this point must unavoidably tend to weaken and dissolve the society. And it is unavoidable, that there should be great clashing, where it is left to the breast of

each individual to suit his fancy with a different measure of obcdience. But this common stated measure must be either the general precept forbidding resistance, or else the public good of the whole nation: which last, though it is allowed to be in itself something certain and determinate; yet, forasmuch as men can regulate their conduct only by what appears to them, whether in truth it be what it appears or no; and since the prospects men form to themselves of a country's public good, are commonly as various as its landscapes, which meet the eye in several situations: it clearly follows, that to make the public good the rule of obedience, is in effect not to establish any determinate, agreed, common measure of loyalty, but to leave every subject to the guidance of his own particular mutable fancy.

XXI. From all which arguments and considerations it is a most evident conclusion, that the law prohibiting rebellion is in strict truth a law of nature, universal reason, and morality. But to this, it will perhaps be objected by some, that whatever may be concluded with regard to resistance, from the tedious deductions of reason, yet there is I know not what turpitude and deformity in some actions, which at first blush shows them to be vicious; but they, not finding themselves struck with such a sensible and immediate horror at the thought of rebellion, cannot think it on a level with other crimes against nature. To which I answer, that it is true, there are certain natural antipathies implanted in the soul, which are ever the most lasting and insurmountable; but as custom is a second nature, whatever aversions are from our early childhood continually infused into the mind, give it so deep a stain as is scarce to be distinguished from natural complexion. And as it doth hence follow, that to make all the inward horrors of soul pass for infallible marks of sin, were the way to establish error and superstition in the world: so, on the other hand, to suppose all actions lawful, which are unattended with those starts of nature, would prove of the last dangerous consequence to virtue and morality. For these pertaining to us as men, we must not be directed in respect of them by any emotions in our blood and spirits, but by the dictates of sober and impartial reason. And if there be any, who find they have a less abhorrence of rebellion than of other villanies, all that can be inferred from it is, that this part of their duty was not so much reflected on, or so early and frequently inculcated into their hearts, as it ought to have been. Since without question there are other men who have as thorough an aversion for that, as for any other crime.*

"Il disait ordinairement qu'il avait un aussi grand eloignement pour ce peché là que pour assassiner le monde, ou pour voler sur les grands chemins, et qu'enfin il n'y avait rien qui fut plus contraire à son naturel." He (M. Pascal) used to say he had as great an abhorrence of rebellion as of murder, or robbing on the highway, and that there was nothing more shocking to his nature. Vie de M. Pascal, page 44.

XXII. Again, it will probably be objected, that submission to government differs from moral duties, in that it is founded in a contract, which upon the violation of its conditions doth of course become void, and in such case rebellion is lawful: it hath not therefore the nature of a sin or crime, which is in itself absolutely unlawful, and must be committed on no pretext whatsoever. Now, passing over all inquiry and dispute concerning the first obscure rise of government, I observe its being founded on a contract may be understood in a twofold sense: either, first, that several independent persons finding the unsufferable inconvenience of a state of anarchy, where every one was governed by his own will, consented and agreed together to pay an absolute submission to the decrees of some certain legislative; which, though sometimes they may bear hard on the subject, yet must surely prove easier to be governed by, than the violent humours and unsteady opposite wills of a multitude of savages. And in case we admit such a compact to have been the original foundation of civil government, it must even on that supposition be held sacred and inviolable.

. XXIII. Or secondly, it is meant that subjects have contracted with their respective sovereigns or legislators, to pay, not an absolute, but conditional and limited submission to their laws, that is, upon condition, and so far forth as the observation of them shall contribute to the public good: reserving still to themselves a right of superintending the laws, and judging whether they are fitted to promote the public good or no; and (in case they or any of them think it needful) of resisting the higher powers, and changing the whole frame of government by force: which is a right that all mankind, whether single persons or societies, have over those that are deputed by them. But in this sense a contract cannot be admitted for the ground and measure of civil obedience, except one of these two things be clearly shown: either, first, that such a contract is an express known part of the fundamental constitution of a nation, equally allowed and unquestioned by all as the common law of the land: or, secondly, if it be not express, that it is at least necessarily implied in the very nature or notion of civil polity, which supposes it is a thing manifestly absurd, that a number of men should be obliged to live under an unlimited subjection to civil law, rather than continue wild and independent of each other. But to me it seems most evident, that neither of those points will ever be proved.

XXIV. And till they are proved beyond all contradiction, the doctrine built upon them ought to be rejected with detestation. Since to represent the higher powers as deputies of the people, manifestly tends to diminish that awe and reverence, which all good men should have for the laws and government of their country. And to speak of a conditioned, limited loyalty, and I

know not what vague and undetermined contracts, is a most effectual means to loosen the bands of civil society; than which nothing can be of more mischievous consequence to mankind. But after all, if there be any man, who either cannot or will not sce the absurdity and perniciousness of those notions, he would, I doubt not, be convinced with a witness, in case they should once become current, and every private man take it in his head to believe them true, and put them in practice.

XXV. But there still remains an objection, which hath the appearance of some strength against what has been said. Namely, that whereas civil polity is a thing entirely of human institution, it seems contrary to reason to make submission to it part of the law of nature, and not rather of the civil law. For how can it be imagined that nature should dictate or prescribe a natural law about a thing, which depends on the arbitrary humour of men, not only as to its kind or form, which is very various and mutable, but even as to its existence; there being nowhere to be found a civil government set up by nature. In answer to this I observe first, that most moral precepts do presuppose some voluntary actions, or pacts of men, and are nevertheless esteemed laws of nature. Property is assigned, the signification of words ascertained, and matrimony contracted by the agreement and consent of mankind; and for all that it is not doubted, whether theft, falsehood, and adultery, be prohibited by the law of nature. Loyalty, therefore, though it should suppose and be the result of human institutions, may, for all that, be of natural obligation. I say, secondly, that, notwithstanding particular societies are formed by men, and are not in all places alike, as things esteemed natural are wont to be, yet there is implanted in mankind a natural tendency or disposition to a social life. I call it natural because it is universal, and because it necessarily results from the differences which distinguish man from beast: the peculiar wants, appetites, faculties, and capacities of man, being exactly calculated and framed for such a state, insomuch that, without it, it is impossible he should live in a condition in any degree suitable to his nature. And since the bond and cement of society is a submission to its laws, it plainly follows, that this duty hath an equal right with any other to be thought a law of nature. And surely that precept which enjoins obedience to civil laws, cannot itself, with any propriety, be accounted a civil law; it must therefore either have no obligation at all on the conscience, or, if it hath, it must be derived from the universal voice of nature and reason.

XXVI. And thus the first point proposed seems clearly made out: namely, that loyalty is a virtue or moral duty; and disloyalty or rebellion, in the most strict and proper sense, a vice or crime against the law of nature. We are now come to the