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people in Europe, since they catch with such astonishing eagerness at every the most trifling shew of such opinions in their favour. Next, and what appears to me to be full as important, it shews that they are willing publickly to countenance and even to adopt every factious conspiracy that can be formed in this nation, however low and base in itself, in order to excite in the most miserable wretches here an idea of their own sovereign importance, and to encourage them to look up to France, whenever they may be matured into something of more force, for assistance in the subversion of their domestick government. This address of the alehouse club was actually proposed and accepted by the Assembly as an alliance. The procedure was in my opinion a high misdemeanour in those who acted thus in England, if they were not so very low and so very base, that no acts of theirs can be called high, even as a description of criminality; and the Assembly, in accepting, proclaiming, and publishing this forged alliance, has been guilty of a plain aggression, which would justify our court in demanding a direct disavowal, if our policy should not lead us to wink at it.

Whilst I look over this paper to have it copied, I see a manifesto of the Assembly, as a preliminary to a declaration of war against the German princes on the Rhine. This manifesto contains the whole substance of the French politicks with regard to foreign states. They have ordered it to be circulated amongst the people in every country of Europe-even previously to its acceptance by the king, and his new privy council, the club of the Feuillans. Therefore, as a summary of their policy avowed by themselves, let us consider some of the circumstances attending that piece, as well as the spirit and temper of the piece itself.

Declaration

a draft of a declaration to the king, which the Assembly published before it was presented.

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Condorcet (though no marquis, as he styled himself before the Revolution) is a man of another sort of birth, fashion, and occupation from Brissot; but in every principle, and every disposition to the lowest as well as the highest and most determined villanies, fully his equal. He seconds Brissot in the Assembly, and is at once his coadjutor and his rival in a newspaper, which, in his own name and as successor to M. Garat, a member also of the Assembly, he has just set up in that empire of Gazettes. Condorcet was chosen to draw the first declaration presented by the Assembly to the king, as a threat to the elector of Treves, and the other provinces on the Rhine. In that piece, in which both Feuillans and Jacobins concurred, they declared publickly, and most proudly and insolently, the principle on which they mean to proceed in their future disputes with any of the sovereigns of Europe; for they say, "that it is not with fire and sword they mean to "attack their territories, but by what will be more dreadful to them, the introduction of liberty."-I have not the paper by me to give the exact words-but I believe they are nearly as I state them. Dreadful indeed will be their hostility, if they should be able to carry it on according to the example of their modes of introducing liberty. They have shewn a perfect model of their whole design, very complete, though in little. This gang of murderers and savages have wholly laid waste and utterly ruined the beautiful and happy country of the Comtat Venaiffin and the city of Avignon. This cruel and treacherous outrage the sovereigns of Europe, in my opinion, with a great mistake of their honour and interest, have permitted, even without a remonstrance, to be carried to the desired point, on the principles on which they are now themselves threatened in their own states; and this, because, according to the poor and narrow spirit now in fashion, their brother sovereign, whose subjects have been thus traitorously and inhumanly treated in violation of the law of nature and of nations, has a name somewhat different from theirs, and instead of being styled king, or duke, or landgrave, is usually called pope.

empire.

It was preceded by a speech from against the Brissot, full of unexampled insolence Emperours. towards all the sovereign states of Germany, if not of Europe. The Assembly, to express their satisfaction in the sentiments which it contained, ordered it to be printed. This Brissot had been in the lowest and basest employ under the deposed monarchy: a sort of thief-taker, or spy of police; in which character he acted after the manner of persons in that description. He had been employed by his master, the lieutenant The electors of Treves and Mentz State of the de police, for a considerable time in London, in were frightened with the menace of a the same or some such honourable occupation. similar mode of war. The Assembly, however, not The Revolution, which has brought forward all thinking that the electors of Treves and Mentz merit of that kind, raised him, with others of a had done enough under their first terrour, have similar class and disposition, to fame and emi- again brought forward Condorcet, preceded by nence. On the Revolution he became a publisher Brissot, as I have just stated. The declaration, of an infamous newspaper, which he still continues. which they have ordered now to be circulated in He is charged, and I believe justly, as the first | all countries, is in substance the same as the first, mover of the troubles in Hispaniola. There is no but still more insolent, because more full of detail. wickedness, if I am rightly informed, in which he There they have the impudence to state that is not versed, and of which he is not perfectly they aim at no conquest; insinuating that all the capable. His quality of news writer, now an em- old, lawful powers of the world had each made a ployment of the first dignity in France, and his constant, open profession of a design of subduing practices and principles, procured his election into his neighbours. They add, that if they are prothe Assembly, where he is one of the leading mem-voked, their war will be directed only against those bers. M. Condorcet produced on the same day who assume to be masters. But to the people

they will bring peace, law, liberty, &c. &c. There | fear or addressed to it are, I well know, of doubt

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is not the least hint that they consider those whom they call persons assuming to be masters," to be the lawful government of their country, or persons to be treated with the least management or respect. They regard them as usurpers and enslavers of the people. If I do not mistake they are described by the name of tyrants in Condorcet's first draft. I am sure they are so in Brissot's speech, ordered by the Assembly to be printed at the same time and for the same purposes. The whole is in the same strain, full of false philosophy and false rhetorick, both however calculated to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to excite sedition in the countries in which it is ordered to be circulated. Indeed it is such, that if any of the lawful, acknowledged sovereigns of Europe had publickly ordered such a manifesto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the ambassador of that power would instantly be ordered to quit every court without an audience.

Effect of fear on the sovereign powers.

ful appearance. To be sure, hope is in general the incitement to action. Alarm some men-you ca not drive them to provide for their security; you put them to a stand; you induce them, not to take measures to prevent the approach of dange but to remove so unpleasant an idea from ther minds; you persuade them to remain as they are from a new fear that their activity may bring on the apprehended mischief before its time. I cofess freely that this evil sometimes happens from an overdone precaution; but it is when the measures are rash, ill chosen, or ill combined, and the effects rather of blind terrour than of enlightened fore sight. But the few to whom I wish to submit my thoughts are of a character which will enable the to see danger without astonishment, and to provi against it without perplexity.

To what lengths this method of circulating tinous manifestoes, and of keeping emissaries of sedition in every court under the name of ambas The powers of Europe have a pre-sadors, to propagate the same principles and text for concealing their fears, by say- to follow the practices, will go, and how son ing that this language is not used by they will operate, it is hard to say--but go ca i the king; though they well know that there is in will-more or less rapidly, according to events effect no such person, that the Assembly is in re- and to the humour of the time. The princes ality, and by that king is acknowledged to be, the naced with the revolt of their subjects, at the same master; that what he does is but matter of forma- time that they have obsequiously obeyed the sove lity, and that he can neither cause nor hinder, ac- reign mandate of the new Roman senate, bar celerate nor retard, any measure whatsoever, nor received with distinction, in a publick characte add to nor soften the manifesto which the As- ambassadors from those who in the same act nat sembly has directed to be published, with the de- circulated the manifesto of sedition in their clared purpose of exciting mutiny and rebellion minions. This was the only thing wanting to th in the several countries governed by these powers. degradation and disgrace of the Germanick by By the generality also of the menaces contained in The ambassadors from the rights of man, this paper (though infinitely aggravating the out- their admission into the diplomatick system, I a. rage) they hope to remove from each power sepa- to be a new era in this business. It will be rately the idea of a distinct affront. The persons most important step yet taken to affect the exs first pointed at by the menace are certainly the ence of sovereigns, and the higher classes ci princes of Germany, who harbour the persecuted-I do not mean to exclude its effects upon house of Bourbon and the nobility of France; the declaration, however, is general, and goes to every state with, which they may have a cause of quarrel. But the terrour of France has fallen upon all nations. A few months since all sovereigns seemed disposed to unite against her; at present they all seem to combine in her favour. At no period has the power of France ever appeared with so formidable an aspect. In particular the liberties of the empire can have nothing more than an existence the most tottering and precarious, whilst France exists with a great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greatest in the weakest; but with neither power nor disposition to support the smaller states in their independence against the attempts of the more powerful.

I wind up all in a full conviction within my own breast, and the substance of which I must repeat over and over again, that the state of France is the first consideration in the politicks of Europe, and of each state, externally as well as internally

considered.

Most of the topicks I have used are drawn from fear and apprehension. Topicks derived from

classes-but the first blow is aimed at the r prominent parts in the ancient order of things. What is to be done?

It would be presumption in me to do more tha to make a case. Many things occur. But as the like all political measures, depend on disposita tempers, means, and external circumstances, all their effect, not being well assured of these. do not know how to let loose any speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated, in opinion, as it exists. The remedy must be wis power, wisdom, and information, I hope, are m united with good intentions than they can be me. I have done with this subject, I believe, N ever. It has given me many anxious mot for the two last years. If a great change is t made in human affairs, the minds of men wi fitted to it, the general opinions and feelings draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will ward it; and then they, who persist in p this mighty current in human affairs, will ap rather to resist the decrees of Providence than the mere designs of men. They will pa resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate.

HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION

ON THE

PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.

WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792,

THAT France by its mere geographical position, independently of every other circumstance, must affect every state of Europe; some of them immediately, all of them through mediums not

very remote.

That the standing policy of this kingdom ever has been to watch over the external proceedings of France, (whatever form the interiour government of that kingdom might take,) and to prevent the extension of its dominion, or its ruling influence, over other states.

That there is nothing in the present internal state of things in France, which alters the national olicy with regard to the exteriour relations of that ountry.

That there are, on the contrary, many things in he internal circumstances of France, (and perhaps of this country too,) which tend to fortify the principles of that fundamental policy; and which ender the active assertion of those principles more >ressing at this than at any former time.

seems to me, even if it went no further, truly serious.

Circumstances have enabled France to do all

this by land. On the other element she has begun to exert herself; and she must succeed in her designs, if enemies very different from those she has hitherto had to encounter do not resist her.

She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at sea, by which she is enabled to give law to the whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact (and if not so known, it is in the nature of things highly probable) that she proposes the ravage of the Ecclesiastical state, and the pillage of Rome, as her first object; that next she means to bombard Naples; to awe, to humble, and thus to command, all Italy-to force it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence to compel the Italian princes and republicks to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an open intercourse, and, the sure concomitant of that intercourse, the affiliated societies, in a manner similar to those she has That, by a change effected in about three weeks, established at Avignon, the Comtat, Chamberry, France has been able to penetrate into the heart of London, Manchester, &c. &c. which are so many Germany; to make an absolute conquest of Savoy; colonies planted in all these countries, for extendo menace an immediate invasion of the Nether-ing the influence, and securing the dominion, of ands; and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetick body, which is in a most perilous situation. The great aristocratick cantons having, perhaps, as much or more to dread from their own people whom they arm, but do not choose or dare to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which against all publick faith has butchered their troops, serving by treaty in France. To this picture it is hardly necessary to add the means by which France has been enabled to effect all this, namely, the apparently entire destruction of one of the largest, and certainly the highest disciplined and best appointed, army ever seen, headed by the first military sovereign in Europe, with a captain under him of the greatest renown; and that without a blow given or received on any side. This state of things

the French republick.

That there never has been hitherto a period in which this kingdom would have suffered a French fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force ITALY to submit to such terms as France would think fit to impose-to say nothing of what has been done upon land in support of the same system. The great object for which we preserved Minorca, whilst we could keep it, and for which we still retain Gibraltar, both at a great expence, was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France over the Mediterranean.

Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of that armament upon the Italian states. The probable effect which that armament, and the other armaments preparing at Toulon, and other ports,

may have upon SPAIN, on the side of the Mediterranean, is worthy of the serious attention of the British councils.

That it is most probable, we may say, in a manner certain, that if there should be a rupture between France and Spain, France will not confine her offensive piratical operations against Spain to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which side, however, she may grievously affect Spain, especially if she excites Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly she will, to fall upon that power.

That she will fit out armaments upon the ocean, by which the flota itself may be intercepted, and thus the treasures of all Europe, as well as the largest and surest resources of the Spanish monarchy, may be conveyed into France, and become powerful instruments for the annoyance of all her neighbours.

That she makes no secret of her designs.

That, if the inward and outward bound flota should escape, still France has more and better means of dissevering many of the provinces in the West and East Indies from the state of Spain, than Holland had when she succeeded in the same attempt. The French marine resembles not a little the old armaments of the Flibustiers, which about a century back, in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought such calamities upon the Spanish colonies. They differ only in this, that the present piratical force is, out of all measure and comparison, greater; one hundred and fifty ships of the line, and frigates, being ready built, most of them in a manner new, and all applicable in different ways to that service. Privateers and Moorish corsaires possess not the best seamanship, and very little discipline, and indeed can make no figure in regular service, but in desperate adventures, and animated with a lust of plunder, they are truly formidable.

That the land forces of France are well adapted to concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions of this nature. In such expeditions, enterprise supplies the want of discipline, and perhaps more than supplies it. Both for this, and for other service, (however contemptible their military is in other respects,) one arm is extremely good, the engineering and artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being composed for the greater part of those who were not gentlemen, or gentlemen newly such, few have abandoned the service, and the men are veterans well enough disciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they must make war with good advantage. They must do so, even on the side of Flanders, either offensively or defensively. This shews the difference between the policy of Louis the XIVth, who built a wall of brass about his kingdom; and that of Joseph the Second, who premeditately uncovered his

whole frontier.

That Spain, from the actual and unexpected prevalence of French power, is in a most perilous situation; perfectly dependent on the mercy of that republick. If Austria is broken, or even humbled, she will not dare to dispute its mandates.

In the present state of things, we have nothing at all to dread from the power of Spain by sea, or by land, or from any rivalry in commerce.

That we have much to dread from the connexions into which Spain may be forced.

From the circumstances of her territorial posses sions, of her resources, and the whole of her civil and political state, we may be authorized safely, and with undoubted confidence, to affirm, that Spain is not a substantive power :

That she must lean on France, or on England. That it is as much for the interest of Great Britain to prevent the predominancy of a French interest in that kingdom, as if Spain were a prevince of the Crown of Great Britain, or a state actually dependent on it; full as much so as ever Portugal was reputed to be. This is a dependency of much greater value and its destruction, or s being carried to any other dependency, of much more serious misfortune.

One of these two things must happen: Either Spain must submit to circumstances, and take such conditions as France will impose; or she must engage in hostilities along with the empero and the king of Sardinia.

If Spain should be forced or awed into a treaty with the republick of France, she must open her ports and her commerce, as well as the land o munication for the French labourers, who wen accustomed annually to gather in the harvest n Spain. Indeed she must grant a free comman cation for travellers and traders through be whole country. In that case it is not conjectur it is certain, the clubs will give law in the p vinces; Bourgoing, or some such miscreant, w give law at Madrid.

In this England may acquiesce if she pleases. and France will conclude a triumphant peace Spain under her absolute dependence, with a broad highway into that, and into every state of Europe She actually invites Great Britain to divide with be the spoils of the new world, and to make a part tion of the Spanish monarchy. Clearly it is be to do so, than to suffer France to possess spoils and that territory alone; which, withou doubt, unresisted by us, she is altogether as abe. as she is willing, to do.

these

This plan is proposed by the French, in the wat in which they propose all their plans; and in only way in which indeed they can propose the where there is no regular communication betwe His Majesty and their Republick.

What they propose is a plan. It is a plan ik to resist their predatory project. To remain qu and to suffer them to make their own use of a navat power before our face, so as to awe and buf Spain into a submissive peace, or to drive thera a ruinous war, without any measure on our part. I fear is no plan at all.

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However, if the plan of co-operation France desires, and which her affiliated socatas here ardently wish and are constantly writing should not be adopted, and the war between emperour and France should continue, I thank

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not at all likely that Spain should not be drawn into the quarrel, In that case, the neutrality of England will be a thing absolutely impossible. The time only is the subject of deliberation. Then the question will be, whether we are to defer putting ourselves into a posture for the comnon defence, either by armament, or negociation, or both, until Spain is actually attacked; that is, whether our court will take a decided part for Spain, whilst Spain, on her side, is yet in a condition to act with whatever degree of vigour she may have; whilst that vigour is yet unexhausted; or whether we shall connect ourselves with her broken fortunes; after she shall have received naterial blows, and when we shall have the whole slow length of that always unwieldy, and ill con- | structed, and then wounded and crippled body, to drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilst our disposition is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herself in such a state of defence as will make her hostility formidable, or her neutrality respectable.

If the decision is such as the solution of this question (I take it to be the true question) conlucts to no time is to be lost. But the measures, hough prompt, ought not to be rash and indigested. They ought to be well chosen, well combined, and well pursued. The system must be general; but it must be executed, not successively, or with interruption, but all together uno flatu, in one meltng, and one mould.

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For this purpose, we must put Europe before 1s, which plainly is, just now, in all its parts, in I state of dismay, derangement, and confusion; ind, very possibly amongst all its sovereigns, full of secret heart-burning, distrust, and mutual accu- | sation. Perhaps it may labour under worse evils. There is no vigour any where, except the distemvered vigour and energy of France. That counry has but too much life in it, when every thing round is so disposed to tameness and languor. The very vices of the French system at home tend o give force to foreign exertions. The generals nust join the armies. They must lead them to enterprise, or they are likely to perish by their hands. Thus, without law or government of her wn, France gives law to all the governments in Europe.

This great mass of political matter must have been always under the views of thinkers for the publick, whether they act in office or not. Amongst events, even the late calamitous events were in he book of contingency. Of course, they must have been in design, at least, provided for. A plan, which takes in as many as possible of the states concerned, will rather tend to facilitate and simplify rational scheme for preserving Spain, (if that were our sole, as I think it ought to be our principal, bject,) than to delay and perplex it.

If we should think that a provident policy perhaps now more than provident, urgent and ecessary) should lead us to act, we cannot take measures as if nothing had been done. We must see the faults, if any, which have conducted to

the present misfortunes; not for the sake of criticism, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming persons and counsels which have not been successful; but in order, if we can, to administer some remedy to these disasters, by the adoption of plans more bottomed in principle, and built on with more discretion. Mistakes may be lessons.

There seem indeed to have been several mistakes in the political principles on which the war was entered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was conducted; some of them very fundamental, and not only visibly, but, I may say, palpably, erroneous; and I think him to have less than the discernment of a very ordinary statesman, who could not foresee, from the very beginning, unpleasant consequences from those plans, though not the unparalleled disgraces and disasters which really did attend them: for they were, both principles and measures, wholly new and out of the common course, without any thing apparently very grand in the conception, to justify this total departure from all rule.

For, in the first place, the united sovereigns very much injured their cause by admitting, that they had nothing to do with the interiour arrangements of France; in contradiction to the whole tenour of the publick law of Europe, and to the correspondent practice of all its states, from the time we have any history of them. In this particular, the two German courts seem to have as little consulted the publicists of Germany, as their own true interests, and those of all the sovereigns of Germany and Europe. This admission of a false principle in the law of nations brought them into an apparent contradiction, when they insisted on the re-establishment of the royal authority in France. But this confused and contradictory proceeding gave rise to a practical errour of worse consequence. It was derived from one and the same root; namely, that the person of the monarch of France was every thing; and the monarchy, and the intermediate orders of the state, by which the monarchy was upheld, were nothing. So that if the united potentates had succeeded so far, as to re-establish the authority of that king, and that he should be so illadvised as to confirm all the confiscations, and to recognise as a lawful body, and to class himself with that rabble of murderers, (and there wanted not persons who would so have advised him,) there was nothing in the principle or in the proceeding of the united powers, to prevent such an arrangement.

An expedition to free a brother sovereign from prison was undoubtedly a generous and chivalrous undertaking. But the spirit and generosity would not have been less, if the policy had been more profound, and more comprehensive; that is, if it had taken in those considerations, and those persons, by whom, and, in some measure, for whom, monarchy exists. This would become a bottom for a system of solid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that system.

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