bable that the proposed duties would yield a sum much exceeding that which would be necessary; but should they fortunately do so, the surplus revenue might be advantageously employed in extinguishing a part of the principal. They were not, they said, of opinion, that a public debt was a public blessing, or that it ought to be perpetuated.

An augmentation of the revenue being indispensable to the solidity of the public credit, a more eligible system than that proposed in the bill, could not, it was believed, be devised. Still further to burden commerce, would be a hazardous experiment which might afford no real supplies to the treasury. Until some lights should be derived from experience, it behoved the legislature to be cautious not to lay such impositions upon trade as might probably introduce a spirit of smuggling, which, with a nominal increase, would occasion a real diminution of revenue. In the opinion of the best judges, the impost on the mass of foreign merchandise could not safely be carried further for the present. The extent of the mercantile capital of the United States would not justify the attempt. Forcible arguments were also drawn from the policy and the justice of multiplying the subjects of taxation, and diversifying them by a union of internal with external objects.

Neither would a direct tax be adviseable. The experience of the world had proved, that a tax on consumption was less oppressive, and more productive, than a tax on either property or income. Without discussing the principles on which the fact was founded, the fact itself was incontestable, that, by insensible means, much larger sums might be drawn from any class of men, than could be extracted from them by open and direct taxes. To the latter system there were still other objections. The difficulty of carrying it into operation, no census having yet been taken, would not be inconsiderable; and the expense of collection through a country thinly settled, would be enormous. Add to this, that public opinion was believed to be more decidedly and unequivocally opposed to it, than to a duty on ardent spirits. North Carolina had expressed her hostility to the one as well as to the other, and several other states were known to disapprove of direct taxes. From the real objections which existed against them, and for other reasons suggested in the report of the secretary, they ought, it was said, to remain untouched, as a resource when some great emergency should require an exertion of all the faculties of the United States.

Against the substitution of a duty on internal negotiations, it was said, that revenue to any considerable extent could be collected from them only by means of a stamp act, which was not less obnoxious to popular re

sentment than an excise, would be less certainly productive than the proposed duties, and was, in every respect, less eligible.

The honour, the justice, and the faith of the United States were pledged, it was said, to that class of creditors for whose claims the bill under consideration was intended to provide. No means of making the provision had been suggested, which, on examination, would be found equally eligible with a duty on ardent spirits. Much of the public prejudice which appeared in certain parts of the United States against the measure, was to be ascribed to their hostility to the term "excise," a term which had been inaccurately applied to the duty in question. When the law should be carried into operation, it would be found not to possess those odious qualities which had excited resentment against a system of excise. In those states where the collection of a duty on spirits distilled within the country had become familiar to the people, the same prejudices did not exist. On the good sense and virtue of the nation they could confidently rely for acquiescence in a measure which the public exigencies rendered necessary, which tended to equalize the public burdens, and which in its execution would not be oppressive.

A motion made by Mr. Jackson, to strike out that section which imposed a duty on domestic distilled spirits, was negatived by thirty-six to sixteen; and the bill was carried by thirty-five to twenty-one.

Some days after the passage of this bill, another question was brought forward, which was understood to involve principles of deep interest to the government.

The secretary of the treasury had been the uniform advocate of a national bank. Believing that such an institution would be "of primary importance to the prosperous administration of the finances; and of the greatest utility in the operations connected with the support of public credit,” he had earnestly recommended its adoption in the first general system which he presented to the view of congress; and, at the present session, had repeated that recommendation in a special report, containing a copious and perspicuous argument on the policy of the measure. A bill conforming to the plan he suggested was sent down from the senate, and was permitted to proceed, unmolested, in the house of representatives, to the third reading. On the final question, a great, and, it would seem, an unexpected opposition was made to its passage. Mr. Madison, Mr. Giles, Mr. Jackson, and Mr. Stone spoke against it. The general utility of banking systems was not admitted, and the particular bill before the house was censured on its merits; but the great strength of the argument was directed against the constitutional authority of congress to pass an act for incorporating a national bank.

The government of the United States, it was said, was limited; and the powers which it might legitimately exercise were enumerated in the constitution itself. In this enumeration, the power now contended for was not to be found. Not being expressly given, it must be implied from those which were given, or it could not be vested in the government. The clauses under which it could be claimed were then reviewed and critically examined; and it was contended that, on fair construction, no one of these could be understood to imply so important a power as that of creating a corporation.

The clause which enables congress to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute the specified powers, must, according to the natural and obvious force of the terms and the context, be limited to means necessary to the end and incident to the nature of the specified powers. The clause, it was said, was in fact merely declaratory of what would have resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and as it were technical means of executing those powers. Some gentlemen observed, that "the true exposition of a necessary mean to produce a given end was that mean without which the end could not be produced."

The bill was supported by Mr. Ames, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Gerry, and Mr. Vining.

The utility of banking institutions was said to be demonstrated by their effects. In all commercial countries they had been resorted to as an instrument of great efficacy in mercantile transactions; and even in the United States, their public and private advantages had been felt and acknowledged.

Respecting the policy of the measure, no well founded doubt could be entertained; but the objections to the constitutional authority of congress deserved to be seriously considered.

That the government was limited by the terms of its creation was not controverted; and that it could exercise only those powers which were conferred on it by the constitution, was admitted. If, on examination, that instrument should be found to forbid the passage of the bill, it must be rejected, though it would be with deep regret that its friends would suffer such an opportunity of serving their country to escape for the want of a constitutional power to improve it.

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In asserting the authority of the legislature to pass the bill, gentlemen contended, that incidental as well as express powers must necessarily belong to every government: and that, when a power is delegated to effect particular objects, all the known and usual means of effecting them, must pass as incidental to it. To remove all doubt on this sub

ject, the constitution of the United States had recognised the principle, by enabling congress to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the government. They maintained the sound construction of this grant to be a recognition of an authority in the national legislature, to employ all the known and usual means for executing the powers vested in the government. They then took a comprehensive view of those powers, and contended that a bank was a known and usual instrument by which several of them were exercised.

After a debate of great length, which was supported on both sides with ability, and with that ardour which was naturally excited by the importance attached by each party to the principle in contest, the question was put, and the bill was carried in the affirmative by a majority of nineteen voices.

The point which had been agitated with so much zeal in the house of representatives, was examined with equal deliberation by the execu tive. The cabinet was divided upon it. The secretary of state, and the attorney general, conceived that congress had clearly transcended their constitutional powers; while the secretary of the treasury, with equal clearness, maintained the opposite opinion. The advice of each minister, with his reasoning in support of it, was required in writing, and their arguments were considered by the President with all that attention which the magnitude of the question, and the interest taken in it by the opposing parties, so eminently required. This deliberate investigation of the subject terminated in a conviction, that the constitution of the United States authorized the measure ;* and the sanction of the executive was given to the act.

The judgment is so much influenced by the wishes, the affections, and the general theories of those by whom any political proposition is decided, that a contrariety of opinion on this great constitutional question ought to excite no surprise. It must be recollected that the conflict between the powers of the general and state governments was coeval with those governments. Even during the war, the preponderance of the states was obvious; and, in a very few years after peace, the struggle ended in the utter abasement of the general government. Many causes concurred to produce a constitution which was deemed more competent to the preservation of the union, but its adoption was opposed by great numbers; and in some of the large states especially, its enemies soon felt and manifested their superiority. The old line of division was still as strongly marked as ever. Many retained the opinion that liberty *See note, No. V. at the end of the volume.

could be endangered only by encroachments upon the states; and that it was the great duty of patriotism to restrain the powers of the general government within the narrowest possible limits.

In the other party, which was also respectable for its numbers, many were found who had watched the progress of American affairs, and who sincerely believed that the real danger which threatened the republic was to be looked for in the undue ascendency of the states. To them it appeared, that the substantial powers, and the extensive means of influence, which were retained by the local sovereignties, furnished them with weapons for aggression which were not easily to be resisted, and that it behoved all those who were anxious for the happiness of their country, to guard the equilibrium established in the constitution, by preserving unimpaired, all the legitimate powers of the union. These were more confirmed in their sentiments, by observing the temper already discovered in the legislatures of several states, respecting the proceedings of congress.

To this great and radical division of opinion, which would necessarily affect every question on the authority of the national legislature, other motives were added, which were believed to possess considerable influence on all measures connected with the finances.

As an inevitable effect of the state of society, the public debt had greatly accumulated in the middle and northern states, whose inhabitants had derived, from its rapid appreciation, a proportional augmentation of their wealth. This circumstance could not fail to contribute to the complacency with which the plans of the secretary were viewed by those who had felt their benefit, nor to the irritation with which they were contemnplated by others who had parted with their claims on the nation. It is not impossible, that personal considerations also mingled themselves with those which were merely political.

With so many causes to bias the judgment, it would not have been wonderful if arguments less plausible than those advanced by either party had been deemed conclusive on its adversary; nor was it a matter of surprise that each should have denied to those which were urged in opposition, the weight to which they were certainly entitled. The liberal mind which can review them without prejudice, will charge neither the supporters nor the opponents of the bill with insincerity, nor with being knowingly actuated by motives which might not have been avowed.

This measure made a deep impression on many members of the legislature; and contributed, not inconsiderably, to the complete organization of those distinct and visible parties, which, in their long and du