improvement of the methods of elementary instruction, I find that, in recognizing observation as the absolute basis of all knowledge, I have established the first and most important principle of instruction, and that, setting aside all particular systems of instructions, I have endeavored to discover what ought to be the character of the instruction itself, and what are the fundamental laws according to which the education of the human race must be determined by nature" In another place, he requires it to be acknowledged, "that observation is the absolute basis of all knowledge, in other words, that all knowledge must proceed from observation and must admit of being retraced to that source."

But what does Pestalozzi understand by observation? “It is, (he says,) simply directing the senses to outward objects, and exciting consciousness of the impression produced on them by those objects." He refers, of course, principally to the sense of sight. But the ear is not to be neglected. "When sounds are produced so as to be heard by the child, and its consciousness of the impression which these sounds make on its mind through the sense of hearing is aroused, this, to the child, is just as much observation, as when objects are placed before its eyes, and consciousness is awakened by the impression which the objects make on the sense of sight. By the aid of his spelling book, therefore, the child's ear is to be familiarized with the series of elementary sounds which constitutes the foundation of a knowledge of language, just as it is to be made acquainted with visible objects by the aid of his Book for Mothers.

According to this, observation would mean every impression which the mind receives through the eye and the ear.

Does Pestalozzi exclude the remaining senses? No; for he frequently speaks of the impressions of the five senses, and he says that the understanding collects the impressions which the senses receive from external nature into a whole, or into a notion, and then develops this idea until it attains clearness. And elsewhere he says that the mechanical form of all instruction should be regulated by the eternal laws according to which the human mind rises from the perceptions of sense to clear notions.

Pestalozzi repeatedly dwells upon this process of intellectual development.

Above every thing, he will have attention given to the first step in the process, namely observation. Care is to be taken that the objects are seen separately by the children, not dimly at a distance, but close at hand and distinctly; then also that there shall be placed before the children, not abnormal, but characteristic specimens of any class

of objects such as will convey a correct idea of the thing and of its most important properties. Thus, for example, a lame, one-eyed, or six-fingered man, he says, would not be proper to convey the idea of

the human form.

Out of the observation of an object, the first thing that arises, he says, is the necessity of naming it; from naming it, we pass on to determining its properties, that is to description; out of a clear description is finally developed the definition-the distinct idea of the object. The full maturity of this, the last fruit of all instruction, depends materially on the vigorous germination of the seed sown in the first instance-on the amount of wisdom exercised in guiding the children to habits of observation. Definitions not founded on observations, he says, produce a superficial and unprofitable kind of knowledge.

Just when we begin to think that we understand Pestalozzi's views, he again leads us into uncertainty as to the idea which he attaches to observation.

He says the idea had only lately struck him, "that all our knowledge arises out of number, form, and words." On this triple basis, he says, education must proceed; and

"1. It must teach the children to look attentively at every object which they are made to perceive as unity, that is, as separated from those other objects with which it appears in connection.

2. It must make them acquainted with the form of every object, that is, its size and proportion.

3. It must teach them as early as possible the names and words applicable to all the objects with which they are acquainted."

Pestalozzi found it difficult, however, to answer the question, "Why are not all the other properties which the five senses enable us to perceive in objects, just as much elements of our knowledge, as number, form, and name?" His answer is, "All possible objects have necessarily number, form, and name; but the remaining properties which the senses enable us to perceive are not possessed by any object in common with all others, but this property is shared with one object, and that with another."

When Pestalozzi made form a category to embrace all and every thing, he only thought of the visible, as is evidenced by the further development of his instruction in form, which deals chiefly with the measuring of visible objects.

But there are innumerable observations which have nothing whatever to do with form and number; for example, tasting honey, smelling roses, &c.

The prominence which Pestalozzi gave to form and number caused him to undertake a new treatment of the subjects of geometry and arithmetic. Subsequently he divided geometry into instruction in form and instruction in spaces, for the reason that we perceive shape and size, (mathematical quality and quantity,) independently of each other; drawing he made a part of the instruction in form-writing a part of drawing.

But what became of Pestalozzi's principle, that observation is the foundation of all intelligence, when he thus gave an undue prominence to form and number, and neglected all other properties? Suppose that we put a glass cube into the hands of a child and he observes in respect to it nothing else, but that it has the cubic form, and, over and above this, that it is one cube,-so far this glass cube is in no way distinguished from a wooden one. But if I require to take notice of other properties, such as color, transparency, weight, &c., in order that I may form a correct idea of the glass cube, as a separate object, and so describe it that it shall be distinguished with certainty from every other cube,-then I must fix my attention, not only on form and number, but on all apparent properties, as elements in a complete observation.

Lastly, language itself has nothing to do with observation. Why should I not be able to form a perfectly correct notion of an object that has no name—for instance a newly-discovered plant? Language only gives us the expression for the impressions of the senses; in it is reflected the whole world of our perceptions. "It is," as Pestalozzi rightly observes, "the reflex of all the impressions which nature's entire domain has made on the human race." But what does he go on to say? "Therefore I make use of it, and endeavor, by the guidance of its uttered sounds, to reproduce in the child the self-same impressions which, in the human race, have occasioned and formed these sounds. Great is the gift of language. It gives to the child in one moment what nature required thousands of years to give man."

In that case, every child would be a rich heir of antiquity, without the trouble of acquisition; words would be current notes for the things which they designate. But both nature and history protest against payment in such currency, and give only to him that hath. Does not Pestalozzi himself repeatedly protest against this very thing? "The christian people of our quarter of the world, (he says,) have sunk into these depths, because in their lower school establishments the mind has been loaded with a burden of empty words, which has not only effaced the impressions of nature, but has even destroyed the inward susceptibility for such impressions."

Pestalozzi's further treatment of the instruction in language clearly proves that, contrary to his own principles, he really ascribed a magical power to words that he put them more or less in the place of observation-and, (to speak with a figure,) that he made the reflected image of a thing equal to the thing itself.

As this error of Pestalozzi's is of the greatest consequence, I will examine it more closely. In the instruction in language, he begins with lessons on sounds; these are followed by lessons on words; and these again by lessons on language.

I. LESSONS ON SOUNDS.-"The spelling book, (says Pestalozzi,) must contain the entire range of sounds of which the language consists, and portions of it should be repeated daily in every family, not only by the child that is going through the exercises to learn how to spell, but also by mothers, within hearing of the child in the cradle, in order that these sounds may, by frequent repetition, be so deeply impressed upon the memory of the child, even while it is yet unable to pronounce a single one of them, that they shall never be forgotten. No one imagines to what a degree the attention of infants is aroused by the repetition of such simple sounds as ba, ba, ba, da, da, da, ma, ma, ma, la, la, la, &c., or what a charm such repetition has for them."

And so the child in the cradle is to have no rest from elementary teaching; the cradle songs sung to it are to consist of such delightful bawling and bleating as ba, ba, ba, &c., which might well scare away the child's guardian angels.

As soon as the child begins to talk, it is to "repeat some sequences of these sounds every day;" then follow exercises in spelling.

II. "LESSONS IN WORDS, or rather, LESSONS IN NAMES."-ACcording to Pestalozzi, "all the most important objects in the world are brought under the notice of the child in the Book for Mothers."

"Lessons in names consist in giving the children lists of the names of the most important objects in all three kingdoms of nature, in history, in geography, and in the pursuits and relations of mankind. These lists of words are placed in the hands of the child, merely as exercises in learning to read, immediately after he has gone through his spelling book; and experience has shown me that it is possible. to make the children so thoroughly acquainted with these lists of words, that they shall be able to repeat them from memory, merely in the time that is required to perfect them in reading: the gain of what at this age is so complete a knowledge of lists of names so various and comprehensive, is immeasurable, in facilitating the subsequent instruction of the children."

Here again it is not even remotely hinted that the children ought to know the things named; words, mere words, are put in the place of observation.

3. LESSONS IN LANGUAGE.-The highest aim of language, according to Pestalozzi's idea, is to lead us from dim perceptions to clear notions, and that by the following process:

1. "We acquire a general knowledge of an object, and name it as unity, as an object.

2. We gradually become conscious of its distinguishing qualities, and learn how to name them.

3. We receive through language the power of designating these qualities of the objects more precisely by means of verbs and adverbs."

The first step in this process is, as we have seen, the object of the Pestalozzian lessons in names; but, when viewed more closely, the lessons are found to consist, not in the naming of objects arising out of knowing them, but in the names for their own sake.

In reference to the second operation, when Pestalozzi writes on the black-board the word "eel," and adds the qualities, "slippery, wormshaped, thick-skinned," the children by no means become conscious of the distinguishing qualities of an eel, and learn to name them, through observing an eel; they rather get adjectives to the noun "eel." Of the process by which these adjectives arise from the observation of the qualities which they express, there is again nothing said. This neglect of observation is still more striking, when Pestalozzi, further on, classifies what is to be learned under the following heads: 1. Geography. 3. Physics. 5. Physiology. 2. History.

4. Natural History.

Each of these five heads he divides again into forty subdivisions, so that he makes two hundred subdivisions. He now proceeds to give lists of words in all these subjects in alphabetical order, which lists are to be impressed upon the childrens' memories, "till it is impossible they should be forgotten." Afterward, this alphabetical nomenclature is to be transformed into a "scientific" one. "I do not know, (says Pestalozzi,) whether it is necessary to illustrate the matter further by an example; it appears to me almost superfluous: nevertheless, I will do so, on account of the novelty of form. E. G. One of the subdivisions of Europe is Germany: the child is first of all made well acquainted with the division of Germany into ten circles, so that he shall not be able to forget it; then the names of the towns of Germany are placed before him, at first in mere alphabetical order for him to read, but each of these towns is previously marked with